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 INTRODUCTION: THE MANY FACES OF 
GREAT-POWER COMPETITION
Ville Sinkkonen and Bart Gaens
It has become commonplace of late to argue that the world has entered 
an era of great-power competition after a brief unipolar post-Cold War 
interregnum.1 The United States and China, the two most powerful states 
in the system, are posited to be at the epicenter of this contest. Indeed, the 
relationship between these two giants has become noticeably strained in 
the past few years, and currently spans the spectrum from the traditional 
realm of the geostrategic through the geo-economic all the way to the 
ideational and ideological. 
Although the concept entered the policy lexicon towards the end of 
Barack Obama’s second term in office, the narrative of great-power com-
petition has really engulfed Washington D.C. during President Donald J. 
Trump’s first years in the White House.2 The 2017 US National Security 
Strategy (NSS) famously refers to China – alongside Russia – as a “revi-
sionist power”, bent on challenging the US not only economically and 
militarily, but also by exploiting cyberspace and emerging technological 
frontiers like 5G and AI.3 The National Defense Strategy (NDS), unveiled in 
early 2018, offers a similar prognosis, arguing that “[t]he central challenge 
to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic 
competition”, wherein America’s antagonists “want to shape a world 
1 On the unipolar interregnum, see e.g. C. Krauthammer (1990), “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, 
no. 1, pp. 23–33; C. Krauthammer (2002), “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest 70, pp. 
5–18; C. Layne (2012), “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International 
Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1, pp. 203–13.
2 U. Friedman (2019), “The New Concept Everyone in Washington Is Talking About,” The Atlantic,  https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/what-genesis-great-power-competition/595405.
3 D. J. Trump (2017), “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
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consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over 
other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions”.4 It appears 
we are living through an age of contestation over the very parameters of 
the future international order.
Naturally, this talk of emerging rivalry has not been confined to policy 
documents and political speeches. It has also swamped the media and re-
search community, to the extent that one wonders whether great-power 
competition has already become the new hegemonic narrative in discus-
sions on foreign policy and national security in the United States,5 and 
even globally. According to an assessment published in a leading policy 
journal, these are the opening stages of “a protracted struggle over who 
will decide how the world works in the twenty-first century”, a contest 
that “will be less forgiving of hubris and unpreparedness than were the 
circumstances of the recent past”.6 Another much-cited debater sees “a 
dramatic change in world politics that necessitates a change in strategy” 
on the part of the US, an alteration that entails forgoing visions of “con-
vergence” or “accommodation” in favor of “a competitive foreign policy 
that pushes back against [Chinese and Russian] neo-authoritarianism”.7 
Both takes reflect the brunt of the manifold calls to action: the United 
States must awake from its twenty-year-long post-Cold War slumber 
to confront its great power rivals, who, in hindsight, have actually been 
playing this new game for much longer than the United States.
This FIIA report places the emerging and – by most accounts – inten-
sifying rivalry between the United States and China front and center. The 
constituent chapters not only delve into the theoretical underpinnings 
as well as geostrategic and geo-economic dynamics driving great-power 
competition, but also move beyond such macro-level aspects by explor-
ing future prospects for contestation and engagement in key issue areas, 
such as arms control, trade and sanctions. By looking at key regional 
powers and the state of America’s alliances, the report’s contributions 
also place due emphasis on the Indo-Pacific as the immediate regional 
frontline of the unfolding great-power contest. However, authors also 
venture beyond the region, and consider the role that Europe in general, 
and the European Union as an entity, might play as the tectonic plates 
4 US Department of Defense (2018), “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America,” Defense.gov, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf.
5 On hegemonic, i.e. dominant, discursive formations, see R. R. Krebs & J. K. Lobasz (2007), “Fixing the 
Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies 16, no. 3, pp. 409–51.
6 E. A. Colby & A. Wess Mitchell (2020), “The Age of Great-Power Competition: How the Trump Administration 
Refashioned American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1, pp. 118–30.
7 T. Wright (2018), “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic, September 12, https://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-
authoritarianism/569881/.
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of great-power politics shift. As such, the report is guided by four broad 
questions, which each author has utilized as guideposts when formulating 
the arguments of their respective chapters. Namely: What does the shift in 
narrative and, increasingly, policy implementation towards great-power 
competition on the part of both the United States and China augur for the 
present state and the future of their relationship? What are the theoretical 
foundations and practical implications of this emerging rivalry? How is 
great-power competition currently reflected in different domains and 
regions of world politics? What is the role of other key players, whether 
the EU, Japan or India, amidst this emerging rivalry?
The authors, each in their own way, thus grapple with what looks to 
be a, if not the, central predicament of 21st-century international poli-
tics: the evolution of a world order in the face of a rising and more asser-
tive China, and a United States that is re-envisioning the trappings of its 
hitherto (liberal) hegemonic global role. The introductory remarks that 
follow are thus intended as a conceptual and theoretical backgrounder 
on great-power competition as the key crosscutting theme of the re-
port. These reflections will be complemented with short descriptions of 
the chapters, laying out how each one fits into the broader rubric of the 
compendium.
GREAT-POWER COMPETITION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
A CONCEPTUAL ODYSSEY
The sheer quantity of ink spilled on great-power competition in the past 
five years or so is testament to its inherent appeal as a descriptor of the 
current times.8 The term obviously presents both a simple catchword to 
describe a central predicament of the current age, and a lens through 
which the future prospects of world order(ing) can be refracted. However, 
by virtue of its ubiquity, great-power competition and its manifold ter-
minological siblings like “(geo)strategic competition”,9 “comprehensive 
competition”10 or “great-power rivalry”,11 risk becoming mere empty 
signifiers that obscure from view more than they illuminate. In the col-
loquial but apt words of one analyst, “[y]ou can drive a truck through 
8 See Friedman (2019)
9 A. A. Michta (2018), “The Revenge of Hard Power Politics,” The National Interest, https://www.the-
american-interest.com/2018/10/16/the-revenge-of-hard-power-politics/; B. D. Blankenship & B. Denison 
(2019) “Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?”, Survival 61, no. 5, pp. 43–64.
10 D. Shambaugh (2017), “Dealing with China: Tough Engagement and Managed Competition,” Asia Policy 23, 
no. 1, pp. 4–12.
11 H. Brands (2018), “Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict,” Survival 
60, no. 5, pp. 61–114.
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the idea of competition”,12 and – as will become clear below – the same 
could be said about the notion of power. More insidiously, great-power 
competition may be evoked by political leaders to defend any number 
of disparate policies regardless of their strategic merit, justify states of 
exception,13 or stifle public debate on (grand) strategy altogether. 
As already pointed out, in US foreign and security policy circles, 
great-power competition has been seized upon as a particularly appro-
priate descriptor of the relationship(s) that the US has with two other 
great powers, China and Russia. While the latter dyad has been front and 
center in the scandals that have marked President Trump’s presidency, 
the former has become a rare example of political and grand-strategic 
convergence in the hyper-partisan political environment of Washington 
D.C. Both Republicans and Democrats seem intent on taking a firmer 
stand against China’s perceived infractions.14 By way of illustration, in 
the heat of another round of trade deal negotiations between the US and 
China in May 2019, even Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer – hardly 
a member of Donald Trump’s fan club – urged the President to “[h]ang 
tough”, because “[s]trength is the only way to win with China”.15 Nu-
merous qualms exist in Washington regarding China’s conduct, whether 
it concerns attempts by Beijing to strengthen its geostrategic position in 
its near abroad through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and maritime 
forays in the South and East China Seas, perceived unfair trading practices, 
industrial subsidies and forced technology transfer, a worsening human 
rights situation in Xinjiang, or the curtailing of freedoms in Hong Kong.16 
Similarly, in the debates over American grand strategy, proponents of a 
tough line on Beijing now inhabit both the “deep engagement” and “off-
shore balancing” camps, which otherwise diverge on the need for the US 
12 M. Karlin quoted in K. Bo Williams (2019), “What’s Great Power Competition? No One Really Knows,” 
Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/news/2019/05/whats-great-power-competition-no-one-
really-knows/156969/; emphasis added.
13 This idea is central to the Copenhagen School of security studies; see B. Buzan, O. Wæver & J. de Wilde (1999), 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner.
14 D. W. Drezner (2020), “Meet the New Bipartisan Consensus on China, Just as Wrong as the Old 
Bipartisan Consensus on China,” The Washington Post, April 28, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2020/04/28/meet-new-bipartisan-consensus-china-just-wrong-old-bipartisan-consensus-
china/.
15 C. Schumer (2019), Twitter post, May 6, https://twitter.com/senschumer/status/1125143336837206016.
16 Cf. H.R. McMaster (2020), “What China Wants: And How We Should See China,” The Atlantic, https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/05/mcmaster-china-strategy/609088/; E. Ratner 
(2019), “Blunting China’s Illiberal Order: The Vital Role of Congress in U.S. Strategic Competition with 
China,” Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, https://www.cnas.org/publications/
congressional-testimony/blunting-chinas-illiberal-order-the-vital-role-of-congress-in-u-s-strategic-
competition-with-china.
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to retain its current military presence in other key areas of the globe, like 
the Gulf region or Europe.17
While consensus around great-power competition has emerged rather 
slowly in Washington D.C., on the part of America’s adversaries it is ar-
guably possible to date the origins of a shift to the mid-to-late 2000s. In 
the case of Russia, its military action against Georgia in August 2008 can 
be seen as a landmark event. As for China, analysts point to the financial 
crisis of 2007/8, which exposed cracks in the shield of the United States 
as the incumbent leader of the international order.18 The hindsight-laden 
argument is that the US and the West at large failed to grasp the gravity of 
the shift, distracted by the global battle against terrorism and suffused in 
liberal dreams of “the end of history”.19 Against this background, Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in Ukraine in 2014, China’s 
increasingly assertive approach in its neighborhood, and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) tightening grip on power seem almost preor-
dained developments. 
As a term, therefore, great-power competition is hardly normatively 
neutral. It implies rivalry tinted with antagonism and animosity. This is 
the case even though some US officials have tried to put a positive spin 
on the concept.20 It has become abundantly clear that in this 21st-cen-
tury power game, competition crowds out cooperation and induces the 
antagonists to pursue relative as opposed to absolute gains.21 This much 
is clear whether one looks at the present state of great-power divergence 
in matters as diverse as trade, arms control, climate action or the battle 
17 Cf. T. J. Wright (2020), “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World,” Foreign 
Affairs 99, no. 2, pp. 10–18; J. J. Mearsheimer & S. M. Walt (2016) “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” Foreign 
Affairs 95, no. 4, pp. 70–84.
18 T. J. Wright (2017), All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future 
of American Power, London: Yale University Press, p. 20–27; R. Kagan (2018), “Believe It or Not, Trump’s 
Following a Familiar Script on Russia,” The Washington Post, August 8, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/the-west-has-spent-a-decade-playing-right-into-putins-hands/2018/08/07/c1aec698-
9a60-11e8-b60b-1c897f17e185_story.html; H. W. French (2014), “China’s Dangerous Game,” The Atlantic, 
November issue, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-
game/380789/.
19 See e.g. Wright (2017), chap. 1; Michta (2014); R. Kagan (2018), The Jungle Grows Back: America and 
Our Imperiled World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf; A. Cooley & D. Nexon (2020), Exit from Hegemony: 
The Unraveling of the American Global Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, esp. chap. 4.
20 In their famous op-ed in The Wall Street Journal in the summer of 2017, for instance, Trump’s then National 
Security Adviser H. R. McMaster and Director of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn posited that the 
US “embraces” competition as a pre-given descriptor of the “elemental nature of international affairs”. H. 
R. McMaster and G. D. Cohn (2017), “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone,” The Wall Street Journal, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426.
21 For a theoretical take on absolute and relative gains, see D. Snidal (1991), “International Cooperation among 
Relative Gains Maximizers,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4, pp. 387–402.
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against the Covid-19 pandemic.22 Nadia Schadlow, a key proponent of 
the great-power competition concept and one of the authors of the 2017 
NSS puts it rather bluntly: “it is hard to conceive of a genuine community 
of common purposes with such states as China, [and] Russia”.23 In this 
manner, the idea of great-power competition also functions as a mode of 
othering. When evoked in policy discourse, it implies negative identity 
categories like revisionist, rival and rogue.24 
Great-power competition, therefore, is not only a descriptor of a com-
petitive mindset between great powers in their bilateral relationships; it 
also refers to wrangling over advantage on a grand, global scale – al-
though the contest will certainly play out differently in disparate regions. 
Great-power competition has not been coined, nor is it commonly used, 
to refer to piecemeal differences or spats over mundane matters between 
the leading states of the day. Instead, the expectation is that “antagonistic 
powers will seek to maximize their security at others’ expense; competi-
tion will feature constant measures to seize advantage”.25 To accentuate 
the obvious, all this implies great, that is all-encompassing, competition 
over the trappings of power. The dimensions of the competition are thus 
system-wide, and the potential implications pervasive. This is so for the 
rivals themselves and, as the chapters of this report amply illustrate, for 
others in the Indo-Pacific region and further afield as well.
A key insight of the realist canon in International Relations (IR) is that 
great powers endeavor to amass material capabilities in order to enhance 
their security. The often-posited material indicators of strength in inter-
national politics are of the military and economic variety, such as military 
spending, troop levels, stocks of relevant military hardware, Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) or levels of productivity.26 It is also possible to focus 
on the relevant, particularly military, capabilities that allow states to 
22 See e.g. K. M. Campbell and R. Doshi (2020), “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order; 
H. Farrell & A. Newman (2020), “Will the Coronavirus End Globalization as We Know It?,” Foreign Affairs, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-03-16/will-coronavirus-end-globalization-we-know-it; K. 
M. Campbell & E. Ratner (2018), “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign 
Affairs 97, no. 2, pp. 60–70.
23 N. Schadlow (2018), “The Conservative Realism of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy,” Hudson 
Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/14738-the-conservative-realism-of-the-trump-
administration-s-foreign-policy.
24 On different modes of othering, see T. Diez (2005) “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: 
Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3, p. 628.
25 P. Porter (2019), “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition,” Washington Quarterly 42, 
no. 1, p. 11.
26 For prominent formulations of relevant power capabilities in international relations, see e.g. E. Hallett 
Carr (2001), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
London: Palgrave MacMillan; K. N. Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics, Long Grove: Waveland 
Press; R. Gilpin (1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; J. J. 
Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Company; S. G. Brooks 
& W. C. Wohlforth (2016), America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
SEPTEMBER 2020    17
maintain “command of the global commons […] the sea and space […] 
areas that belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the 
globe” – a core foundation for America’s hegemonic position, especially 
in the post-Cold War era.27 In the current age, it is likewise feasible to 
think hard about variables that indicate technological prowess, which 
can be gauged through measures like R&D expenditure or the issuance of 
patents.28 It has even been argued that the sine qua non of the US-China 
confrontation, when analyzed from the standpoint of capabilities, is “a 
race for economic and technological dominance in the long-term”.29 On 
top of building up their own capacities in the military, economic and 
technological domains – called “internal balancing” in the literature 
– great powers may also enhance their power position vis-à-vis rivals 
through “external balancing”, by fostering relationships with other states. 
This could entail, for example, the building of actual military alliances or 
agreements on basing rights.30 
Realists view both forms of balancing as rational approaches to ensur-
ing survival and enhancing security in an “anarchical” international sys-
tem inhabited by states that potentially want to do each other harm. The 
ultimate purpose of building up capabilities and alliances, then, is to deter, 
or – should push come to shove – defeat the rival(s).31 Strictly speaking, 
there is thus nothing particularly new about the current competitive 
framing of international relations. In fact, for certain realists, great-power 
competition is both a description of how their theories expect great pow-
ers to behave in any case and, by implication, a prescription of how these 
states should conduct themselves.32 To pretend that the interplay between 
great powers could ever move beyond such a world of competition would 
be a dangerous escapade in and of itself – a point of criticism raised by 
realist scholars when it comes to America’s allegedly “liberal-hegemonic” 
post-Cold War foreign policy consensus.33 
27 B. R. Posen (2003), “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International 
Security 28, no. 1, pp. 5–46.
28 Brooks & Wohlforth (2016)
29 M. Schneider-Petsinger (2019), “Behind the US–China Trade War: The Race for Global Technological 
Leadership,” in US–China Strategic Competition: The Quest for Global Technological Leadership, ed. M. 
Schneider-Petsinger et al., London: Chatham House, p. 4. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/publications/research/CHHJ7480-US-China-Competition-RP-WEB.pdf.
30 Waltz (1979); Blankenship & Denison (2019)
31 Waltz (1979); J.J. Mearsheimer (2001), “The Future of the American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs, pp. 46–61; W. 
C. Wohlforth (2008), “Realism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. C. Reus-Smit and D. 
Snidal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 131–49.
32 On these two faces of realism, the descriptive and the prescriptive, see S. Barkin (2009), “Realism, Prediction, 
and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 3, pp. 233–46.
33 J.J. Mearsheimer (2019), “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International 
Security 43, no. 4, pp. 7–50; S. M. Walt (2018), “US Grand Strategy after the Cold War: Can Realism Explain 
It? Should Realism Guide It?,” International Relations 32, no. 1, pp. 3–22.
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Relatedly, great-power competition can also be fathomed as a symp-
tom of an impending or ongoing shift in the distribution of capabilities in 
the international system. For structural realists, it is this relative distri-
bution of material endowments that defines the system as either unipolar, 
bipolar or multipolar.34 However, in the case of the unfolding US-China 
competition, there is considerable disagreement over what kind of an 
international system the world is moving towards. For some, the system 
is in the throes of a power transition, a potentially violent handover from 
one declining unipolar or hegemonic power (the incumbent United States) 
to another rising power (the challenger, China).35 As Gregory Moore 
points out in chapter three of this report, according to power transition 
theorists, such changes of the guard have historically had a tendency to 
turn violent.36 
Another argument is that the system is approaching a new era of bi-
polarity, although this will be qualitatively different from the one expe-
rienced during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, given 
the profound interdependencies that exist between the US and China.37 
The core conundrum, then, to paraphrase the question Xing Li poses in 
his chapter, is whether “two tigers can share the same mountain” in a 
situation of rough parity. Yet others see a transition to a multipolar order 
wherein various power centers compete and coexist in a world marked 
by increased regionalization as well as multiple co-existing and possibly 
competing modernities38 – an eventuality that Sanjay Chaturvedi refers 
to as the “post-post-Columbian epoch” in his chapter. In such a world, 
should the leading powers fail to agree on a mutually acceptable set of 
shared principles to maintain international order, less stability could en-
sue.39 What ties all of these future scenarios together is that the period of 
time it takes to shift to a new equilibrium is likely to entail both intensified 
great-power wrangling and increased uncertainty.
34 Waltz (1979); S. G. Brooks & W. C. Wohlforth (2008), World out of Balance, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; G. J. Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno & W. C. Wohlforth (2008), “Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, 
and Systemic Consequences,” in International Relations and the Consequences of Unipolarity, ed. G. 
Ikenberry, M. Mastanduno & W. C. Wohlforth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
35 From an “offensive realist” standpoint, a great power will only feel secure as a hegemon, as the top dog in 
the international system – its ambition is essentially insatiable until it reaches the summit. See Mearsheimer 
(2001)
36 See e.g. Gilpin (1981); G. T. Allison (2017), Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s 
Trap?, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
37 R. Maher (2018), “Bipolarity and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 3, 
pp. 497–525.
38 A. Acharya (2017), “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 31, no. 3, pp. 271–85; T. Flockhart (2016) “The Coming Multi-Order World,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 1, pp. 3–30.
39 C. A. Kupchan (2012), No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
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Another way to conceptualize the drive for material aggrandizement at 
the center of great-power competition is to appreciate that economic and 
military power may foster prestige – a “reputation for power” – and also 
function as a marker of status within a social hierarchy.40 Such clamoring 
for prestige and status may have both instrumental and intrinsic value: 
enhanced status may function as a power (and influence) amplifier in 
and of itself, or it may merely soothe the egos of status-hungry states-
people or populaces.41 This is certainly the lens through which President 
Trump views international relations. A consistent trope in his speeches 
has been the idea that the United States is not “respected” by others in 
international politics, a view apparently shared by those who have bought 
into his campaign trope to “Make America Great Again”. The proposed 
remedy for regaining that respect is to build up military and economic 
capabilities, talk and act tough, and excel in zero-sum games to gain a 
reputation for winning. For Trump, victories are important as an end in 
themselves, especially when they come at the expense and to the chagrin 
of others.42 As Gregory Moore argues in his chapter, status awareness 
certainly also pervades Chinese thinking on international affairs.43 In 
times of power transition, this kind of acute concern over prestige and 
status on the part of both the incumbent leader and the rising challenger 
may render great-power competition more conflict-prone, especially if 
the former is not willing to accord the latter the status it feels it deserves 
by dint of its growing capabilities (of course, this could also feasibly work 
the other way around).44
It is a short mental segue from appreciating the role of prestige and 
status to acknowledging that the competition between the US and Chi-
na is not only about material stocks of power, it is also about ideas – or, 
more precisely, competing systems of ideas, about ideology. In one recent 
assessment: “the competition between democracy and authoritarianism 
suffuses virtually every aspect of modern great-power rivalry […] by un-
dermining trust, complicating compromise and fostering irreconcilable 
40 Y.  F. Khong (2019), “Power as Prestige in World Politics,” International Affairs 95, no. 1, pp. 119–42; Gilpin 
(1981); D. Welch Larson & A. Shevchenko (2010), “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. 
Primacy,” International Security 31, no. 2, pp. 7–41.
41 T. Forsberg, R. Heller & R. Wolf (2014), “Status and Emotions in Russian Foreign Policy,” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 3–4, pp. 261–68.
42 V. Sinkkonen (2018), “Contextualizing the ‘Trump Doctrine’: Realism, Transactionalism and the Civilizational 
Agenda,” FIIA Analysis, no. 10, https://www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/contextualizing-the-trump-doctrine; R.Wolf 
(2017), “Donald Trump’s Status-Driven Foreign Policy,” Survival 59, no. 5, pp. 99–116.
43 See chapter 3 in this volume; also X. Pu (2019), “One Mountain, Two Tigers: China, The United States, and the 
Status Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Policy 14, no. 3, pp. 25–40.
44 Cf. Khong (2019); Pu (2019); J. Renshon (2016), “Status Deficits and War,” International Organization 70, no. 
3, pp. 513–50.
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views of international order”.45 If one accepts that there is such a link 
between a great power’s domestic ideas and its vision of how interna-
tional relations should be ordered,46 then the “normative fit” between a 
declining great power’s ideas and those of the rising challenger can have 
implications for how great-power competition plays out in an era of power 
transition.47 Other things equal, the greater the incongruity between the 
value systems of the incumbent and the challenger, the less likely it is that 
the latter will remain content with the normative parameters of the order 
that were originally midwifed by the former. It is thus hardly surprising 
that much of the debate over China’s rise centers on how revisionist Bei-
jing will eventually become vis-à-vis the liberal international order that 
has been central to America’s ascendancy in the post-World War II and 
especially post-Cold War era.48 
A case can also be made that power in international relations only 
exists by virtue of social relationships and,49 by implication, even the 
above-described material capabilities can only attain meaning in and 
through such relationships.50 If it is accepted that great-power competi-
tion has an ideational component and that relationships with other states 
matter, this implies that great-power competition is not only about build-
ing up material capabilities that can be used to coerce or buy the fealty 
of others, or that function as markers of prestige and status. Instead, it is 
45 Brands (2018), p. 63.
46 C. A. Kupchan (2014), “The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax 
Americana,” Security Studies 23, no. 2, pp. 219–57.
47 Hegemonic stability theorists, for instance, argue that the world needs a hegemon, a leader to provide certain 
“public goods” like security guarantees or functioning markets within an international order. Therefore, the 
hegemon’s position is not only a function of power capabilities. Although capabilities by definition undergird 
a hegemon’s position, in order to exercise leadership, significant others should accept the hegemon’s claim 
to and exercise of power. This is achieved through a hegemonic bargain, where the hegemon ties its power 
into an institutionalized and rules-based framework. When one hegemon’s power wanes and a challenger’s 
rises, the period of transition thus also entails contestation over the institutional frameworks and norms that 
govern the order. For discussion, see e.g. Gilpin (1981); R. O. Keohane (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press; G. J. Ikenberry (2012), 
Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; C. Norrlof (2017), “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and 
Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, https://
oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-552. 
48 On different takes, see e.g. S. Tang (2018), “China and the Future International Order(s),” Ethics & 
International Affairs 32, no. 01, pp. 31–43; G. J. Ikenberry (2018), “Why the Liberal World Order Will 
Survive,” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1, pp. 17–29; Kupchan (2012); A. Cooley, D. Nexon & S. Ward 
(2019), “Revising Order or Challenging the Balance of Military Power? An Alternative Typology of Revisionist 
and Status-Quo States,” Review of International Studies 45, no. 4, pp. 689–708; A. Acharya (2018), The End 
of American World Order, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Polity; T. Cha (2018), “Competing Visions of a Postmodern 
World Order: The Philadelphian System versus the Tianxia System,” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 31, no. 5, pp. 392–414.
49 For a concise discussion on the distinction between capabilities-based and relational definitions of power, see 
D. A. Baldwin (2013), “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. W. 
Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons, London: SAGE, pp. 273–97.
50 C. Reus-Smit (2004), “The Politics of International Law,” in The Politics of International Law, ed. C. Reus-
Smit, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14–44; D. A. Lake (2013), “Great Power Hierarchies 
and Strategies in Twenty-First Century World Politics,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. B. A. 
Simmons, T. Risse-Kappen & W. Carlsnaes, London: Sage, pp. 492–511.
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crucial to consider whether other states adopt, or at the very least regard 
as acceptable, the values and visions propounded by the great-power 
contestants.51 In fact, getting other states to buy into an institutionalized, 
rules-based “hegemonic bargain” has arguably been the greatest success 
of the US-led post-World War II liberal international order.52 Currently, 
the US and China are therefore locked in a battle over legitimacy, over the 
desirability and appropriateness of their actions, policies and values.53 This 
kind of contestation unfolds within international institutions, over core 
norms, and takes place through different justificatory narratives.54 Such 
wrangling should be viewed as an important component of great-power 
competition because the fostering of legitimacy is vital for the creation 
of authority, which, in turn, breeds followership.55 A clash over institu-
tions and the proliferation of competing narratives have most recently 
been visible over the Covid-19 pandemic. The US, for instance, has pulled 
funding from the World Health Organization (WHO), criticizing the body 
for being slow to respond to the outbreak in China. Meanwhile, both the 
US and China have engaged in verbal tirades over who is to blame for 
the pandemic.56 
An interlinked and potentially useful concept for capturing the ide-
ational, social and relational dimensions of great-power competition is 
soft power. Defined by the term’s progenitor Joseph S. Nye as “the ability 
to get what you want by the co-optive [as opposed to coercive] means of 
framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction”,57 the 
resources of soft power are therefore “intangible factors such as institu-
tions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies”.58 
The upside of soft power is that unlike the building of material capabilities 
51 Ikenberry (2012); G. J. Ikenberry & C. A, Kupchan (1990), “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 
International Organization 44, no. 3, pp. 283–315; I. Clark (2011), “China and the United States: A 
Succession of Hegemonies?,” International Affairs 87, no. 1, pp. 15–28.
52 Ikenberry (2012); G. J. Ikenberry (2001,) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding 
of Order after Major Wars, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
53 M. C. Suchman (1995), “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” The Academy of 
Management Review 20, no. 3, pp. 571–610; C. Reus-Smit (2007), “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 
International Politics 44, no. 2/3, pp. 157–74.
54 E. Goh (2019), “Contesting Hegemonic Order: China in East Asia,” Security Studies 28, no. 3, pp. 614–44; 
Reus-Smit (2007); I. Hurd (2007), “Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises 
of Legitimacy,” International Politics 44, no. 2/3, pp. 194–213; V. C. Keating (2014), “Contesting the 
International Illegitimacy of Torture: The Bush Administration’s Failure to Legitimate Its Preferences within 
International Society,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16, no. 1, pp. 1–27.
55 D. A. Lake (2009), Hierarchy in International Relations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
56 D. G. McNeil Jr. & A. Jacobs (2020), “Blaming China for Pandemic, Trump Says U.S. Will Leave the W.H.O.,” 
The New York Times, May 29, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/health/virus-who.html; Y. Huang 
(2020), “U.S.-Chinese Distrust Is Inviting Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracy Theories,” Foreign Affairs, 
March 5, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-03-05/us-chinese-distrust-
inviting-dangerous-coronavirus-conspiracy.
57 J. S. Nye (2011), The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, p. 13.
58 ibid., p. 21.
22    SEPTEMBER 2020
or using said capabilities to compel others, it is relatively cheap.59 At the 
same time, however, from the standpoint of the great power rivals, the 
inherent difficulty with soft power is that the states themselves are not in 
control of many of the resources necessary for creating this kind of power. 
Moreover, as soft power works through co-optation, it again depends on 
the willingness of others to be attracted or persuaded in the first place.60
These different viewpoints on power also open the door to an appre-
ciation of the different tools available to the rivals when they craft strat-
egies for great-power competition. On the one hand, recent scholarship 
has placed much emphasis on its geo-economic aspects, where great 
powers harness various economic tools to achieve political ends.61 Here, 
the toolbox of different instruments is vast, ranging from investments 
through preferential trade agreements all the way to different types of 
sanctions and restrictive measures,62 expertly addressed by Clara Portela 
in her chapter. When it comes to strategies that reside predominantly 
in the “ideational” domain, the traditional tools of bilateral and multi-
lateral diplomacy can be augmented with public diplomacy campaigns 
designed to enhance soft power and legitimacy. At the less benign end of 
the spectrum reside tools associated with “hybrid” strategies, like target-
ing the domestic political arena of a rival through the spreading of false 
information on social media platforms.63 In addition, the ubiquity of the 
cyber domain has created novel avenues for exploiting the vulnerabilities 
of adversaries through industrial espionage, the planting of malware, or 
even hacking election systems.64 In fact, the oft-evoked notion of hy-
bridity underlines how different military, economic, “ideational” and 
cyber-based tools can be used in unison to weaken the adversary.
Finally, it should be abundantly clear that great-power competition 
poses conundrums for other states. Given that allies are central to bal-
ancing strategies, they function as ample force multipliers in a world of 
great-power competition. Here, the US is well ahead of China with its 
59 J. S. Nye (2016), “Limits of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 2, p. 276–77.
60 Nye (2011), p. 83.
61 M. Wigell (2016), “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geoeconomic Strategies: Neo-Imperialism, Neo-
Mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism,” Asia Europe Journal 14, no. 2, pp. 135–51.
62 D. A. Baldwin (1985), Economic Statecraft, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
63 M. Wigell (2019) “Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal 
Democracy,” International Affairs 95, no. 2, pp. 255–75.
64 J. Limnéll (2016), “The Cyber Arms Race Is Accelerating – What Are the Consequences?,” Journal of Cyber 
Policy 1, no. 1, pp. 50–60; Nye (2011); N. Choucri (2012,) Cyberpolitics in International Relations, Cambridge 
MA; The MIT Press; M. Aaltola (2016), “Cyber Attacks Go Beyond Espionage: The Strategic Logic of State-
Sponsored Cyber Operations in the Nordic-Baltic Region,” FIIA Briefing Paper, no. 200, https://www.fiia.fi/
en/publication/cyber-attacks-go-beyond-espionage. 
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elaborate global network of alliance and partnership arrangements.65 
However, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, the traditional 
alliance dilemma also applies to Washington’s friends. Allies can nev-
er be absolutely certain about the intentions of alliance partners. They 
may fear being abandoned or, alternatively, becoming entrapped in bat-
tles embarked upon by an overeager ally.66 Currently, it seems many of 
America’s allies and partners are indeed stuck between a rock and a hard 
place, especially if the competition between the great-power antagonists 
assumes an increasingly zero-sum bent. Good relations with China may 
thus come at the expense of angering the US (risk of abandonment), while 
a conflict that turns hot between Washington and Beijing, even one that 
the giants sleepwalk into, risks pulling the allies in as well (risk of en-
trapment). In a different vein, the emerging great-power rivalry might 
also provide smaller states with options. In some cases, they may have 
the possibility of substituting “goods” provided by one great power with 
those provided by the other or, for those willing to gamble, playing the 
antagonists against each other in hopes of a better “deal”.67 
This section has thus far sought to capture complexity. Its purpose has 
been to illustrate that while many scholars, politicians and pundits are 
willing to assert that great-power competition is the new order of the day, 
it is much less clear how the concept should be defined and what this new 
state of affairs will actually entail for the future of the US-China relation-
ship. It seems clear that both countries will continue to amass capabilities 
and harness a plethora of tools (military, economic, and “soft”) to allow 
them to excel in this great game. Hence, while great-power competition 
transcends the material trappings of power, it is crucially also a contest 
over hegemonic ideas. Likewise, the contest between the two powers 
will undoubtedly unfold differently across disparate domains – land, sea, 
air or cyber, and have different implications in the various regions of the 
globe and disparate issue areas of global governance. It is obvious that if 
the two most materially powerful states in the international system find 
it increasingly difficult to establish common ground on vital strategic, in-
stitutional and normative questions, this will have profound implications 
for the future shape of the global order.
65 C. Norrlof & W. C. Wohlforth (2019), “Raison de l’Hégémonie (The Hegemon’s Interest): Theory of the Costs 
and Benefits of Hegemony,” Security Studies 28, no. 3, pp. 422–50.
66 G. Press-Barnathan (2006), “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity,” Security Studies 15, no. 2, 
pp. 271–309.
67 A. Cooley & D. Nexon (2020), Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
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STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT
The chapters in this FIIA report are divided into three thematic parts. 
Part I provides three connected and complementary takes on the evolu-
tion of the US-China relationship in the era of great-power competition, 
and considers the potential implications for the future of world order(ing) 
in the process. 
The first chapter by Carla Norrlof identifies four “traps” that apply 
historical analogies in order to dissect the current state of US-China ri-
valry. The “Thucydides Trap” refers to an impending military conflict as a 
hegemon and challenger approach parity in material power, the “Kindle-
berger Trap” to the undersupply of public goods by a hegemonic challeng-
er, and the “Kennedy Trap” to military overextension by the incumbent 
hegemon. However, for Norrlof, the fourth “Ibn Khaldun Trap”, building 
on cycles of dynastic rule in the Islamic Golden Age by socially cohesive 
groups with leaders that demand deference and loyalty, is best suited to 
illuminate the current state of the US-China relationship. By drawing an 
analogy between Khaldun’s thesis and cycles of rule in the US republic, 
the chapter analyzes how polarization, particularly racial antagonism, 
became explicit during Donald Trump’s ascent to office. Overt and un-
apologetic racist statements were part and parcel of the “social glue” that 
became the backbone of Trump’s rise to power. Norrlof also illustrates 
how Trump’s initially cohesive identity-based group of loyal appointees 
ultimately became embroiled in bitter power struggles, just like Khaldun’s 
theory would suggest. At the international level, these two dynamics have 
led to an “us versus them” stance towards other countries in general, and 
zero-sum thinking vis-à-vis China in particular.  
Xing Li, in the second chapter, offers a conceptual framework for 
understanding the complex dynamics of China’s rise and the concurrent 
waning of US hegemony. In his reading, the current stage of great-pow-
er competition appears particular to a transitional period in the historical 
ebb and flow of different hegemonic cycles. Li terms this novel interreg-
num “interdependent hegemony”, and posits that it has been brought 
about not only by China’s meteoric rise, but also the various crises – of 
“functionality”, “scope”, “legitimacy” and “authority” – that plague the 
liberal international order. The possession of requisite material capabil-
ities or dominance of the relevant structures of global power are thus no 
longer the sole purview of the US and its predominantly Western allies 
and partners. Instead, maintaining world order necessitates accommo-
dation with other rising powers, most immediately China. Within this 
novel state of flux, the US and China remain intertwined in complex ways, 
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especially economically, and these ties are so pervasive that severing them 
may prove impossible, or at least extremely detrimental for both Wash-
ington and Beijing. Yet both sides also remain intent on thwarting the 
other’s gains, whether in the military, economic or ideational domains. 
This dilemma of “riding a tiger while being unable to get off”, as Li terms 
it, will inevitably define the US-China relationship for decades to come, 
bringing with it instances of cooperation, contestation and even outright 
conflict. The only resolution, it appears, would be an overarching and 
mutually satisfactory accommodation that defines the global and region-
al roles of each great power within a renegotiated world-ordering bargain.
Chapter three, by Gregory Moore, assesses to what extent the hegemon 
and its challenger can escape “Thucydides’s Trap” – a military conflict that 
has historically tended to occur when a hegemonic challenger approaches 
parity in material power capabilities with an incumbent hegemon. Moore 
argues that the US lead in terms of traditional economic and military 
power indicators renders such a scenario not yet imminent. However, 
he posits that there are other non-material indicators that may be more 
relevant when considering the prospects of a violent confrontation. There 
are lingering historical factors, such as the US tendency to frown upon 
dictatorial regimes and the narrative of national humiliation being cur-
rently propounded in China. Sociological factors also play a role. While 
careful to avoid cultural essentialism, Moore refers here to the Chinese 
disposition towards a hierarchical organization of society and the con-
comitant drive for the validation of social status, which is arguably also 
manifest in Beijing’s foreign policy. He also points to political factors, 
particularly the differences in the American and Chinese political systems 
captured, for instance, by the opposition between liberal democracy and 
communist-informed authoritarianism. Moreover, China’s authoritarian 
model also implies different (political-) economic approaches. Beijing has 
continued to pursue a state-led approach to economic development, and 
issues like export-led growth and protection of domestic industries have 
been key grievances raised by Washington in the ensuing US-China trade 
chasm. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic has opened a new frontline in the 
US-China confrontation. The clash between Washington and Beijing has 
already had corrosive effects on the global health regime, especially with 
respect to the WHO, while contending narratives of blaming and shaming 
are being propounded on both sides. Moore’s chapter illustrates that a 
US-China military conflict does not necessarily require the rough mate-
rial parity that certain power transition theorists view as an important 
predictor of the occurrence of a hegemonic war. It is entirely possible 
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that non-material factors might drive these two great powers, almost 
inadvertently, into a hot confrontation.
Part II examines the status of US alliances and partnerships in the 
Indo-Pacific, a new strategic denomination for the wider Asian region, 
adopted by the US, Japan, ASEAN and other regional actors. This concep-
tual reframing grants a key role to India as a regional power and denotes 
a wider conception of the region, potentially to the detriment of China. 
In chapter four, James Przystup takes an in-depth look at the shifting 
structure of US alliances and strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific 
region in the face of an increasingly assertive China. He argues that in the 
post-Cold War era the US has gradually moved towards a more robust and 
networked approach from what has traditionally been termed a bilateral 
hub-and-spoke system. The region’s growing strategic importance in 
Washington D.C. is reflected not only in US strategic documents, including 
the 2017 NSS and the Indo-Pacific strategy of 2019, but also in concrete 
practices. These include freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), 
military exercises and joint declarations with core allies like Japan, South 
Korea and Australia, and the development of strategic partnerships with 
states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. The US has also 
been pushing its allies to engage in building up strategic partnerships 
with each other. In fact, despite the surface-level flux raised by Donald 
Trump’s unorthodox approach to diplomacy and economic statecraft in 
the region, including his assertions that allies should be paying more in 
return for US protection and the decision to abandon the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, the US has continued to signal its willingness to develop and 
enhance its alliance structure during the past three and a half years. This 
reflects the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific as the regional front-
line in great-power competition, a reality that remains regardless of who 
happens to inhabit the White House. Any long-term US strategy to check 
China’s rise in the region and thus achieve America’s stated ambition of 
a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) necessitates a well-functioning 
and better integrated alliance structure.
Chapter five, by Sanjay Chaturvedi, provides a perspective from and on 
India. For him, the discourse of the Indo-Pacific denotes a transformation 
in India’s role as a regional power as the world enters a “post-post-Co-
lumbian” epoch. In this new era, Asia, and especially the maritime do-
main in Asia, is becoming a focal point in the redefinition of 21st-century 
geopolitics and geo-economics. The emergence of the term “Indo-Pacific” 
is part and parcel of the redefinition process that the region is currently 
undergoing. In Chaturvedi’s view, the term implies considerable “car-
tographic anxiety” on the part of regional powers, and this is especially 
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true for India. For some, this new narrative appears to imply containment 
of China and a stronger partnership with the US as a “strategic imper-
ative”, while others would rather view India’s role as a “strategically 
autonomous” actor with a cautious approach to the emerging reality of 
great-power competition. How India comes to define the notion of “In-
do-Pacific”, and how this fits (or indeed does not fit) with the approach 
assumed in Washington will thus inevitably have a bearing upon the 
level of “estrangement” and engagement that will exist between these 
two democracies in the future. In this way, Chaturvedi’s contribution 
illustrates how great-power competition is not merely about material 
capabilities. The conceptual frameworks that are used for making sense 
of the world “out there”, even apparently fixed and material entities like 
geographical space, are also central points of contention with real-world 
implications. In fact, the rise of the Indo-Pacific as a label for a “me-
ta-regional” constellation consisting of various subregions shows that 
the ability to introduce, and ultimately entrench, meanings is a form of 
power in and of itself. Powerful actors may therefore set the boundaries 
of the imaginable, precluding some strategic options, whilst simultane-
ously enabling others.
In chapter six, Liselotte Odgaard explores how Europe could play a 
potentially meaningful role in the Indo-Pacific. Although the European 
Union must contend with the rise of nationalist populist forces in various 
member states and deal with the fallout of Brexit, Odgaard argues that 
these internal challenges have actually made the Union more determined 
to pursue an active approach to the region. Moreover, the EU’s approach, 
focused on multilateralism and broad-based trade agreements deviates 
from the Trump administration’s current bilateral transactionalist bent. 
For the Union the sine qua non thus remains fostering a liberal (i.e. mar-
ket-based and democratic) order underpinned by the rule of law in the 
Indo-Pacific region. This is also the case in the maritime domain, where 
the Union, despite some internal sticking points, emphasizes freedom of 
navigation and adherence to the Law of the Sea. However, as Odgaard 
points out with respect to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
the EU’s rather general positions on maritime questions are turned into 
practice by member states, with France currently taking the lead in Eu-
rope’s “maritime diplomacy”. Such efforts, including patrolling in the 
South China Sea as well as a recent tour by a French carrier group with 
involvement from other member states in the Indian Ocean, illustrate a 
European resolve to put meat on the bones of its strategic partnerships 
with regional states. Moreover, and particularly relevant for the over-
all theme of the report, Odgaard points out that while the EU’s designs 
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vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific maritime order are by and large complemen-
tary to those of the US, the European approach to maritime operations 
in the region is more attuned to strict compliance with international law, 
thus avoiding unnecessary confrontation with China. In this sense, Europe 
is trying to craft an independent path in the midst of the rising US-China 
rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. 
Finally, Part III of the report zooms in on the role of deterrence and 
the dynamics of economic contestation and coercion that are becoming 
ever more prominent in the era of great-power competition.
Morghane Farghen, in chapter seven, argues that China is engaged in 
making a grand play for global primacy, and this overarching policy aim 
is reflected in regional flashpoints, including the nuclear tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, as well as in China’s approach 
to national economic statecraft. In the case of North Korea, she perceives 
China’s commitment to denuclearization and support for the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty (NPT) as being far from sincere. Instead, it is paramount 
for Beijing’s regional designs to keep the defiant hermit regime in place. 
China looks to be succeeding in this ploy, as Western capitals seem unable 
to collectively put sufficient pressure on either Beijing or Pyongyang to 
push North Korea towards “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denu-
clearization”. A similar dynamic, with the US and Europeans working at 
cross purposes, is unfolding in the case of Iran. These nuclear flashpoints 
may be harbingers of a grander shift from the countering of nuclear pro-
liferation towards establishing nuclear deterrence. This sea change may 
occur almost unintentionally, as a by-product of the policies pursued by 
the “challenging states” of North Korea and Iran along with China, on the 
one hand, and the divided approaches of the US and the Europeans, on 
the other. However, as Farghen shows with respect to China’s national 
economic statecraft, including Chinese investments in Western democra-
cies and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the imperative of establishing 
deterrence against Beijing’s designs has seeped into non-nuclear and 
non-military domains as well. Farghen’s analysis thus comes to underline 
the holistic nature of great-power competition, how different regional 
and domain-specific manifestations of great-power wrangling converge 
into a complex global-level phenomenon.   
Chapter eight, by Deborah McCarthy, analyzes the evolution of US-Chi-
na economic and trade relations. She argues that the era of engagement, 
beginning in the Nixon years, was founded on the dual expectations of 
increased market access for US companies and the entrenching of an 
open economy and free market norms in China. Even the US-China Stra-
tegic and Economic Dialogue – launched in the early days of the Obama 
SEPTEMBER 2020    29
administration and designed to address qualms like competitive currency 
devaluation, the opening up of the Chinese economy, and IP protection – 
was ultimately premised on establishing a well-working relationship with 
Beijing, and coaxing it into the role of a responsible stakeholder in the 
global economy. While Obama’s approach did include attempts to pres-
sure China through “enforcement and encirclement”, most prominently 
through the WTO and the TPP that the US has since rejected, the Trump 
administration has increasingly resorted to full-blown competition. The 
shift has meant attempts to drive down Chinese imports via the imposi-
tion of tariffs, more intensive screening of Chinese investments and even 
branding China a currency manipulator. This shift, however, is not merely 
a Trumpian whim, but enjoys bipartisan support in Washington D.C. The 
problem with the approach assumed by Trump and his team, McCarthy 
argues, is that the shift to competition is not making the US more com-
petitive. Instead, it is, among other things, costing the US export markets, 
placing increased burdens on American consumers and driving down 
foreign direct investment in the United States. Likewise troubling, with its 
bilateral transactionalist bent the Trump administration has managed to 
alienate allies and downgrade the WTO. In McCarthy’s assessment, getting 
Beijing to play by the rules necessitates the support of allies and the ability 
to work through multilateral channels, whilst also maintaining channels 
of communication with China on various levels. In other words, there is 
space for engagement even in the era of great-power competition, and a 
mixed approach might even constitute the strategically prudent option.
In chapter nine, Clara Portela complements McCarthy’s analysis by ex-
ploring the proliferating use of coercive geo-economic tools, most notably 
sanctions and tariffs, in the new age of great-power competition, and by 
assessing the implications for Europe of this on-going strategic shift in 
the conduct of great powers. The US in particular has begun to utilize its 
structural advantages in the global economic and financial systems to excel 
in the new power game. Sanctions, particularly those with extraterritorial 
consequences, have become a key tool in this respect. Through the use of 
these secondary sanctions, the US can effectively weaponize its control over 
global financial flows and access to the US markets to force other states – 
or more specifically their businesses – to toe the American line, even in 
cases where these states are expressly in disagreement with the American 
policy of imposing said sanctions. Recently, this has been most evident 
in US sanctions against Iran after President Trump pulled the US out of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; Iran Nuclear Deal) and 
Senate-approved legislation that allows the US to target the Nordstream 
2 pipeline project. At the same time, Washington has also begun to utilize 
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tariffs in a sanction-like manner, namely to achieve political goals rather 
than for purposes of mere commercial defense. Portela argues that in such 
a situation, the EU is faced with three different options. The Union could 
remain a fairly passive bystander and go along with US policies. It could also 
try to utilize international fora to denounce US sanctions and perhaps even 
use international legal channels like WTO arbitration to challenge American 
unilateralism. Finally, the EU might resort to open contestation by trying 
to circumvent US sanctions or enhancing its ability to pursue enforcement 
action. The establishment of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges 
(INSTEX) to facilitate some trade with Iran and the activation of a blocking 
statute to prohibit European companies from complying with US sanctions 
represent possible opening salvos for such an approach. All of these strate-
gic choices come with their attached dilemmas: Should the Union sacrifice 
policy autonomy and opt for passivity to remain in Washington’s good 
books? Were the Union to pursue the multilateral route, would this lead the 
current White House – or any future one – to shun such fora altogether? 
Would further transatlantic cracks emerge if the EU undertook more en-
forcement action against American companies? Portela’s chapter thus amply 
illustrates how difficult the choices are for US allies caught in the crosshairs 
of a more assertive (but also declining) hegemon, which is in the process of 
recalibrating its policies in the face of hardening great-power competition. 
 
***
 
In sum, all of the chapters in this report by and large concur with the 
emerging consensus narrative in the policy world and academia: none of 
the authors refutes the claim that the world is crossing (or in some cases 
has already crossed) the threshold to a new age of great-power compe-
tition. However, it is through their different takes on this novel state of 
affairs that the contributors come to underline both the complexity and 
contested nature of the notion, as reflected against the backdrop of the 
US-China relationship. For instance, there are clearly differences when it 
comes to emphasizing the material versus the ideational underpinnings 
of great-power competition. Norrlof’s framework of four traps subjects 
the material drivers of a great-power struggle to due scrutiny, and she 
ultimately sees the foreign-policy consequences of the Ibn Khaldun Trap – 
with its emphasis on domestic struggles for power by cohesive social groups 
within the United States – as the most relevant of these for illuminating 
the current state of US-China rivalry. Li sees the waning of US “structural 
power” and its pre-eminent position within the global political econo-
my as paving the way for interdependent hegemony. Moore emphasizes 
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historical, cultural and ideological factors that may add fuel to the fire of 
great-power competition and render the functioning of any such US-China 
arrangement tenuous. Chaturvedi, in turn, takes the ideational route to its 
conclusion and emphasizes the productive power inherent in the crafting 
of new conceptual categories like “the Indo-Pacific”.68 
There is also division regarding the strategic merits of competition as 
a framework for informing the policies of the US and its allies and part-
ners, and, relatedly, over how well the US and said states are dealing with 
the challenges posed by China. Farghen, for her part, perceives a divided 
collection of liberal states that are lacking in competitive assertiveness, 
incapable of putting sufficient pressure on China to uphold the non-prolif-
eration regime or to hold the “challenging powers” of North Korea and Iran 
accountable for their actions. Przystup sees things differently. For him, the 
US alliance network in the Indo-Pacific is actually strengthening in the face 
of Chinese assertiveness, and this is so despite president Trump’s disrup-
tive agency. McCarthy, in her take, views engagement not as an antonym 
for, but as a vital complement to, competition – the two approaches may, 
even must, coexist if the US and the West at large are to craft a prudent 
strategy for dealing with China on trade and economic matters. When it 
comes to Europe, Odgaard’s chapter speaks to the tension between US-EU 
complementarity and (strategic) autonomy when it comes to the Union’s 
role in the Indo-Pacific amidst the emerging US-China rivalry. Portela’s 
contribution provides another take on this dilemma, by pointing out the 
pros and cons of challenging and accommodating the US as it has embarked 
on a more assertive sanctions policy.  
The different emphases of the chapters thus reflect not only the dif-
ferent theoretical, methodological and thematic choices of the authors of 
this volume, but also the inherent complexity of unfolding great-power 
competition in the 21st century. In fact, the best, albeit imperfect, antidote 
for dealing with the uncertainty and anxiety of this novel era is engage-
ment in lively and rigorous conceptual, theoretical and policy-relevant 
discussions. It is through such debates over the meanings, causes, policy 
implications and future prospects of great-power competition that scholars, 
practitioners and policymakers can come to devise the requisite tools and 
strategies for the ensuing decades. Only by engaging in such escapades 
can the scholarly and policymaking communities become more aware of 
the rosiest and gloomiest prospects associated with this “new normal” in 
global politics, and thus navigate a safe course through the choppy waters 
and treacherous currents of great-power competition and concomitant 
US-China rivalry.
68 On productive power, see M. N. Barnett & R. Duvall (2005), “Power in International Politics,” International 
Organization 59, no. 1, pp. 39–75. 
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1. FOUR US-CHINA TRAPS: THUCYDIDES, 
KINDLEBERGER, KENNEDY AND 
IBN KHALDUN
Carla Norrlof
1.1. INTRODUCTION
The return of great power rivalry has been the defining feature of the 21st 
century. Since the beginning of the new millennium, Russia and China 
have openly defied the United States and upset the stability of the liberal 
international order. For most scholars and pundits China is the bigger 
threat to US interests and the US-led order. Russia and China share phys-
ical and material attributes possessed by the United States and required 
for great power status: land mass, a sea portal, a large population and 
technology to field and develop a competitive military capability. For the 
foreseeable future, all eyes will remain on China. Growth in the middle 
kingdom, both economically and militarily has been astounding, and has 
largely surpassed Russian growth. Perhaps more importantly, Chinese 
growth, unlike Russia’s advances, is more multidimensional and not 
predominantly resource-based.
Despite general agreement regarding China’s emergence as the United 
States’ principal rival, disagreement exists as to the nature of US-China 
relations as well as the causes and consequences of any rivalry between 
them. This chapter evaluates two well-known “traps” –the Thucydides 
Trap and the Kindleberger Trap. The former was popularized by Graham 
Allison and the latter by his long-time colleague and friend Joseph S. Nye.69 
69 G. Allison (2015), “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. And China Headed for War?”, The Atlantic, September 
24, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-
trap/406756/; G. Allison (2017), Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, 
Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; J. S. Nye (2017), “The Kindleberger Trap”, Project Syndicate, 
Prague.
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To this great-power debate, I introduce two new traps – the Kennedy 
Trap and the Ibn Khaldun Trap. My objective is to analyze the relevance 
of these four traps for understanding US-China rivalry.
1.2. THE FOUR TRAPS
All four traps are based on empirically-driven historical analogies. Im-
portant differences exist in the ease with which their historiography can 
be transposed onto the present time. Two of the traps – the Thucydides 
Trap and the Ibn Khaldun Trap – originate from the 5th century BC and 
the 14th century. By contrast, the Kindleberger Trap and the Kennedy trap 
are born out of 20th century experiences, which more easily apply to the 
21st century despite technological and structural changes. Mindful of the 
difficulty in interpreting classical texts outside of their own socio-ecolog-
ical system, and of the care required of international-relations scholars 
to interpret political philosophy from classical and medieval times, I 
rely on authoritative understandings of these works instead of my own 
understanding of the original texts.70 
1.2.1. The Thucydides Trap
The most famous of the traps is the deadly Greek trap in which the fear 
of a hegemonic power sparks catastrophic war with a rising power. In 
the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes “What made 
war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which 
this caused in Sparta.”71 A great deal of controversy exists as to whether 
this really reflects what Thucydides meant. Quite regardless of Thucy-
dides’ meaning, Donald Kagan disputes that Athens was rising, punching 
a rather big hole in the principal causal factor driving the ‘Thucydides 
Trap’.72 Scholars have generally been unhappy with how international 
relations theorists have interpreted Thucydides’ work to fit their own 
purposes, without the requisite knowledge to understand classical texts 
(or China’s rise).73 Whether true to its original meaning, Thucydides’ 
statement has been widely adopted as a metaphor for great-power tran-
sition, particularly its dangers. Both Organski’s power transition theory 
and Gilpinian realism see great-power wars as most likely to occur when a 
70 See D. A. Welch (2003), ‘Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides’, Review of 
International Studies 29: 3, pp. 301–319.
71 M. I. Finley & R. Warner (1972), Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War, New York: Penguin.
72 D. Kagan (1969), The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 345–6.
73 Welch (2003); J. Lee (2019), “’Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian 
War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations”, Journal of Chinese Political Science 24: 1, pp. 67–86.
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rising challenger is about to surpass a declining hegemonic power.74 Some 
debate exists as to whether the rising power attacks first in an attempt to 
turn the tables on the dominant power or whether the dominant power 
launches a preventive war against the rising power. The former perspec-
tive is associated with Organski and Kugler’s power transition theory, the 
latter with Gilpin.75 Both perspectives stress the rising power’s incentives 
to establish, and then take advantage of, its own rules of the game, more 
explicitly conceptualized as status quo dissatisfaction in Organski and 
Kugler’s theory.
1.2.2. The Kindleberger Trap
The Kindleberger Trap refers to the failure of the rising power to provide 
international public goods once the dominant power has lost the abil-
ity to singlehandedly provide them. Public goods have two properties, 
non-rival benefits and non-exclusion.76 They are goods everyone can 
enjoy without diminishing anyone else’s enjoyment. Since no one can be 
excluded from the benefits, this creates a dilemma. When everyone is able 
to benefit from public goods without limitation, no one will contribute 
to their realization. If no one contributes, public goods will fail. Exam-
ples of international public goods are free trade, international security 
and international financial stability. While everyone has an interest in 
their realization, the extent to which any single country can afford to 
contribute will depend on its size. Despite having an interest in seeing 
public goods succeed, small countries cannot afford to make the sizeable 
contributions required to fully provide the good. Even if they contribute 
to their utmost ability, the good will not become available. They simply 
cannot enjoy the public good unless large actors also contribute. Since 
small countries’ contributions do not significantly affect the availability 
of the good, they face weak incentives to chip in with their small con-
tributions and strong incentives to freeride on large contributions. By 
contrast, an exceptionally large actor has the wherewithal to make the 
big contributions required to fully provide the good. Since systemically 
large countries’ independent contributions are sufficient for everyone to 
enjoy the public good, they have strong incentives to contribute even as 
smaller countries freeride on their big contributions.
The lessons drawn by Charles Poor Kindleberger of the failed he-
gemonic transition during the interwar years inspired Joseph S. Nye’s 
74 A. F. K Organski (1968), World Politics, New York: Alfred A. Knopf; R. Gilpin (1981), War and Change in 
World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
75 Organski (1968); A. F. K Organski & J. Kugler (1980), The War Ledger, Chicago: Chicago University Press; 
Gilpin (1981).
76 M. Olson (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
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Kindleberger Trap.77 Kindleberger blamed the severity of the Great De-
pression on the United States’ failure to lead when the flailing Great Brit-
ain no longer had the capacity to fully provide the public good of financial 
stability.78 Had the United States stepped in to cover the public good 
burden of ensuring financial stability, the Great Depression may have 
been averted. By analogy, as the United States declines and is unable to 
provide the public goods undergirding the contemporary international 
order, China should pitch in to ensure their adequate supply.
1.2.3. The Kennedy Trap
Perhaps better known as the “imperial overstretch myth”, I introduce 
a second quagmire, the Kennedy Trap, which sees the dominant actor’s 
international security role as triggering economic decline, sparking rel-
ative decline and ultimately absolute decline.79 According to the British 
historian Paul Kennedy, all great powers in the West from the 16th century 
onwards have succumbed to a similar quandary: military expansion has 
driven a downward security-economic spiral towards absolute decline. 
In his magisterial work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, he charts 
the well-trodden path whereby military over-extension results in a higher 
defense-to-GDP burden, higher budget deficits and public debt with a 
squeeze on productive investment.80 The detrimental consequences roll 
over into ensuing economic decline, which continues to reverberate 
negatively on the country’s military capability. Emphasizing the favora-
ble effect of a strong economy on military might while de-emphasizing 
the favorable impact of a strong military capability on economic might, 
the Kennedy Trap dooms the dominant military power to failure and 
decline. Kennedy famously predicted that the United States would meet 
the same fate.
1.2.4. The Ibn Khaldun Trap
In the Ibn Khaldun Trap, networks support each other and rise to power 
under a dominant leader, only to see group loyalty recede as they fight 
over the spoils of conquest and the leader of the pack seeks to consolidate 
power, resulting in the group’s ousting by another network with stronger 
social ties. Ibn Khaldun proposed a cyclical theory of the rise and fall of 
77 Nye (2017).
78 C. P. Kindleberger (1973), The World in Depression 1929-1939, Berkeley: University of California Press.
79 I note only one prior use of the term “Kennedy Trap”, although it is entirely different, applied to China’s rise 
while focusing only on the limits. Y. Qin (2015), “Major-Country Diplomacy Must Steer Clear of Three Traps 
That Could Hinder China’s Rise”, Chinese Social Sciences Today, Beijing: Social Sciences in China Press, 
June 11, http://www.csstoday.com/Item/2179.aspx.
80 P. Kennedy (1987), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000, New York: Random House.
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dynasties. The concept of Asabiyyah, a strong group feeling, esprit de 
corps and shared identity, is central to his theory. A tribe held together 
by Asabiyyah conquers a polity and succumbs to weakness, profligacy 
and declining solidarity, making it easy prey for a more socially cohesive 
tribe.81 Scholars of Arab literature and Islam, as well as geographers and 
anthropologists, have seen leadership as integral to Ibn Khaldun’s Asa-
biyyah.82 For them, leadership is required for social cohesion. A leader 
is critical to the success of the ascendant group, which will fail to “form 
a harmonious whole except when arranged hierarchically with an un-
disputed leader at the top”.83 However, once the summit of power has 
been attained, the leader propels dynastic decline by undermining “the 
solidarity of his own supporters as he seeks to assert his royal domi-
nance”.84 In the West, Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory has been interpreted 
as pertaining to tribal societies based on “blood ties”, namely “family 
ties”, although it is unclear whether such ties were essential to Khaldun’s 
theory. According to Alrefai and Burn, Ibn Khaldun repeatedly says so-
cial cohesion, “… derives more from a long history of companionship 
and joint efforts than from genealogies based on blood ties”.85 While 
it is clear that Ibn Khaldun’s social cohesion does not exclude affinity 
based on “blood ties”, his theory likely includes affinity based on ties 
other than blood, particularly broader “ethnic ties”, including ties not 
based on kinship as well as ties beyond ethnicity based on other forms 
of social cohesion.
1.3. RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOUR TRAPS
This section discusses the relevance of the four traps for contemporary 
international relations, particularly for US-China rivalry, and what is at 
stake from (mis-)attributing either trap to current events.
81 I. Khaldun (2005), The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History – Translated from the Arabic by Franz 
Rosenthal. Abridged Edition, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
82 M. Mahdi (1964), Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the 
Science of Culture, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Y. Lacoste (1966), Ibn Khaldoun. Naissance De 
L’histoire, Passé Du Tiers Monde, Paris: Maspéro; F. Rosenthal (1987), “Ibn Khaldun”, in M. Eliade (ed.), 
The Encyclopedia of Religion, New York: Macmillan, p. 566; L. Rosen (2005), “Theorizing from Within: Ibn 
Khaldun and His Political Culture”, Contemporary Sociology 34: 6.
83 Mahdi (1964), p. 197.
84 Rosen (2005), p. 598.
85 A. Alrefai & M. Brun (1994), ”Ibn Khaldun: Dynastic Change and Its Economic Consequences”, Arab Studies 
Quarterly 16: 2, pp. 73–86.
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1.3.1. Assessing the Thucydides Trap
US-China rivalry has undoubtedly heated up over the last decade, and 
has reached boiling point under the Trump presidency. Competition 
between the two great powers is real but is it inevitably deadly? Many 
reasons suggest not. The Thucydides Trap is highly relevant insofar as 
we have a clear incumbent power, the United States, and according to 
several metrics of great powerhood – military capability, manufacturing 
as well as commercial and corporate power – we also have a clear rising 
power, China. But even disregarding the fact that the incumbent power 
was the authoritarian land power, Sparta, which feared the rise of the 
democratic maritime power, Athens, the uneasy fit in regime type is not 
the biggest problem with the analogy. In order for the Thucydides Trap 
to apply, China has to significantly narrow the power gap with the US. 
That is clearly not the case. While China has caught up with the US in 
important respects, it has not caught up in the most important respects 
required for power transition.
Nonetheless, for the sake of probing the Thucydides Trap more fully, 
let’s simply assume that China is catching up with the US materially. Even 
so, a power grab should only occur if the US fears China because China 
aspires to supplant the US as the reigning power in the world. China may 
have such ambitions to reach the number one spot on the global power 
ladder. For if China aspires to become the primary superpower, it must 
indeed rein in the current primary power, the US. Since the US shows no 
signs of wanting to renounce its top dog position, China is clearly bound 
to clash with the US under this scenario. But it is also possible that China 
has more limited ambitions, and will be satisfied as long as it is able to 
realize key interests. Under this second scenario, we must not only pay 
attention to what China wants. To assess what China wants, we need to 
look at what China does. Indicators of revisionism and status-quo seek-
ing behavior have been developed. If China is revisionist, it should seek 
to challenge the rules enshrined in international institutions and close 
unfavorable power gaps.86 These indicators may, however, be less helpful 
for establishing whether China is revisionist with respect to the regional 
space China inhabits or with respect to global order. Assuming China is re-
visionist, attempts to establish regional hegemony would certainly qualify 
as a more restrained form of revisionism without triggers for great-power 
war necessarily being pulled. China’s policies towards Taiwan and Hong 
Kong certainly reflect this. For quite some time, foreign policy experts 
have concluded that the more limited ambition of regional hegemony 
86 A. I. Johnston (2003), “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, International Security 27: 4, pp. 5–56.
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is precisely what China has sought to achieve.87 It would, however, be 
foolish to turn a blind eye to China’s more assertive posturing beyond 
its region – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), and its cyber-security attacks.
The Thucydides Trap is a powerful analogy for the way in which a he-
gemonic power reacts to a rising power, to devastating effect. However, 
on balance, a war between the US and China seems rather unlikely. Apart 
from the obvious inhibiting factor of nuclear weapons, several other 
reasons point to a rather poor fit. Clearly, the US and China are not close 
to the power parity alleged to make a major power war likely between 
them. We cannot know China’s intentions for sure, but we can infer them 
based on the country’s behavior, and the more belligerent aims appear 
to be directed towards forging a regional rather than a global hegemony.
1.3.2. Assessing the Kindleberger Trap
While the Kindleberger Trap is seductive, and has some relevance in the 
trade area, as an overall assessment of US-China relations, it has two major 
drawbacks. First, China has not really failed to provide public goods when 
required to do so. The 2007 financial crisis serves as a notable example 
of China assisting the US with global public goods provision.88 Second, 
although the United States has clearly lost the willingness to lead under 
the Trump presidency, it has not lost the ability to do so. The US remains 
the single most powerful country in the world, with a continued capacity 
to provide global public goods. China may have grown strong enough to 
contribute in certain areas, but the US remains fully able to provide global 
public goods in times of duress. Even during the current low point for US 
hegemony, American monetary leadership limited the global economic 
fallout of the pandemic.89
The best fit for the Kindleberger Trap is in the free trade area, where 
the US has wavered on providing public goods, imposing tariffs on China 
and a host of other countries including the countries of the European 
Union, its North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico, as well as some 
Asian countries. Since China has surpassed the US on some conventional 
measures of commercial power, such as export performance, there is a 
case to be made that China should bear more of the burden in support of 
open trade and that its failure to contribute more poses a risk for the free 
87 A. L. Freidberg (2005), “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?”, International Security 
30: 2, pp. 7–45.
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trade system. Beijing’s “Made in China 2025”, launched in 2015, seeks to 
promote Chinese manufacturing and innovation in information technolo-
gy (IT), telecommunications, advanced robotics and artificial intelligence 
(AI) towards the fourth industrial revolution.90 Heavy state involvement to 
advance this goal is seen as undercutting WTO-style free trade, although as 
authors at the Council of Foreign Relations point out “favoritism for local 
production and ‘indigenous’ innovation” began several decades ago.91 In 
particular, the US has targeted Chinese firms and government entities in 
order to deal with China’s policy of forcing foreign multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) to transfer technology to local firms in exchange for access 
to the Chinese market and for dealing with China’s failure to protect the 
intellectual property of foreign firms operating in China. Both practices 
contravene WTO provisions. If not entirely reversing these policies, mut-
ing them would certainly increase the sense of reinforcing the global free 
trade system rather than undermining it.
1.3.3. Assessing the Kennedy Trap
As far back as the 1960s and certainly by the 1970s and 1980s, scholars 
began to fear that the US was entering a cycle of hegemonic decline.92 
Many of them shared the Kennedy Trap’s assumption that security out-
lays were parasitic on economic performance. With the US bearing rising 
costs to sustain its global role, even as its economic capability relative to 
challengers was declining, US military power would eventually under-
mine its economic power. Strong mutually reinforcing security-economic 
tradeoffs can certainly chip away at a strategic advantage under certain 
circumstances. But as I have argued with William C. Wohlforth, they di-
minish power under all circumstances.93 Whether the net benefits of he-
gemony reflect tradeoffs or complementarities depends on two conditions 
based on the relationship between economics and security.94 First, the 
degree to which military power is necessary for economic strength and 
90 PRC (2015), “’Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued”, Beijing: The State Council, The People’s Republic of China.
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I. Wallerstein (1984), The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; P. Kennedy 
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the degree to which economic strength is necessary for military power. 
Second, the global economy’s sensitivity to insecurity.
In the pre-modern era, military power was necessary to keep the 
rewards from a productive economy. A productive economy was not 
necessary for military power. Militarily powerful actors could simply 
take the spoils from a productive economy and thus plunder their way to 
sustaining military prowess. Eventually, however, states relying on booty 
to fund military power were outcompeted by states that both raided and 
relied on a productive civilian economy to fund military power. Even 
though looting continued up until the mid-20th century, the empires of 
Athens and Rome as well as the European colonial empires had to maintain 
a productive economy in order to become great powers.95 In the postwar 
international order, looting was no longer tolerated. A productive civilian 
economy was in principle required for maintaining military power.
Despite being unproductive, the Soviet Union managed to hold onto 
great-power status by drawing down oil and natural gas. With time, this 
became untenable. As the Soviet Union collapsed, it became clear that 
a productive economy was crucial for sustaining a world class military 
power. That meant any resources spent on maintaining military power 
were being diverted from productive activity. In the system that had 
emerged, many scholars assumed all powers would eventually succumb 
to this security-economic tradeoff with its attendant demise. Moreo-
ver, they believed the great powers were particularly vulnerable to the 
Kennedy Trap because the costs of sustaining a military power would 
naturally increase with the scale of activity and protection, heightening 
economic risks for major powers. The academic conclusion, and policy 
recommendation, was for the US to dodge the Kennedy Trap by reducing 
its military apparatus and security commitments.96
These scholars failed to understand that the Kennedy Trap hinged on 
the set of conditions described above. Whether scaling down militar-
ily makes economic sense depends on whether it will ultimately gen-
erate higher economic costs. In a world of economic interdependence, 
where the international economy is highly sensitive to insecurity, scaling 
down militarily fails to protect the international economy from inse-
curity, lowering the economic gains from international exchange. Of 
95 R. Findlay & K. H. O’Rourke (2009), Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second 
Millennium, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
96 C. Layne (1997), “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy”, 
International Security 22: 1, pp. 86–124; E. Gholz, D. G. Press & H. M. Sapolsky (1997), “Come Home, 
America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation”, International Security 21: 4, pp. 5–48; B. R. 
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course, the era of international economic interdependence differs from 
other environments – of either predominantly closed economies as in 
the ancient world or the 19th century period of interdependence where 
sensitivity to insecurity was low. Back then, large-scale military power 
was not required to protect the international economy from insecurity 
and thereby the gains from open exchange, either because there was no 
‘open international economy’ or because the ‘open international economy’ 
was not particularly sensitive to security disruptions. Today, the ‘open 
international economy’ is sensitive to security disruptions and requires 
armed protection. Our current world is marked by security-economic 
complementarities, and maintaining military strength reduces net long-
term security costs while facilitating higher output and exchange. As a 
result, military power cannot be dismissed as an unmitigated drain on 
the economy.
Aside from having limited applicability under conditions of interna-
tional economic interdependence, yet another problem limits the rele-
vance of the Kennedy Trap for predicting US decline. Much of the debate 
in the international security community, implicitly invoking the Kennedy 
Trap, emphasizes the ticking debt bomb, and prospects for financial insol-
vency arising from higher military spending.97 However, this discussion 
entirely side-steps another feature of the postwar era, the dollar’s unri-
valled rise to international prominence, and the advantages it affords the 
US in terms of issuing debt and laxer spending constraints.98
All this is not to say that there are no limits on US military spend-
ing and expansion, nor that all forms of spending and expansion have a 
positive economic dividend. But it is to say that scholars have been far 
too downbeat as regards the sustainability of US hegemony arising from 
these particular dynamics. Today, there are many reasons to fear that 
the US might be in jeopardy, but the security-driven Kennedy Trap is 
not one of them.
1.3.4. Assessing the Ibn Khaldun Trap
The most illuminating trap employs a domestic analogy between earlier 
cycles of dynastic rule in the Islamic Golden Age and cycles of Republic 
rule in the US, with consequences for US-China rivalry. As with the 
97 E. Gholz & D. G. Press (2001), “The Effects of Wars on Neutral Countries: Why It Doesn’t Pay to Preserve the 
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other metaphors, the fit is as imperfect as it is evocative, yet speaks to our 
current moment to a greater extent than the other traps. Political elites 
in the US have become increasingly polarized over time, encompassing 
social and cultural value conflicts in addition to the more traditional 
liberal conservative dividing line.99 For partisans, elections have become 
“group competitions” in a struggle to preserve partisan identity.100
Racial antagonism rose sharply during President Obama’s first term 
to become increasingly partisan, despite his 2008 victory being widely 
seen as ushering in a post-racial society.101 Political identities could be 
race-based, but need not be. Party polarization based on affect has been 
shown to be just as strong as polarization based on race, and cross-party 
discrimination greater than race-based discrimination.102 Whatever the 
basis for strong partisan identities – race, class, ideology – they pose sig-
nificant problems due to their ability to divide society on issues where no 
strong polarization exists in substantive terms.103 Extreme polarization 
creates life and death incentives to seize power and implement preferred 
policies without compromise, and for opposing groups to work hard to 
oust the incumbent without seeking any middle ground.
Donald Trump’s rise to office exemplifies how two features, which 
form the backbone of Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the dynastic cycle, facili-
tate conquest: social glue and the demand for deference by bold leaders. 
The most defining aspect of Trump’s campaign and presidential term, 
distinguishing him from all previous presidents, is his overt racial an-
imus. Previous presidents did not make public racist statements, but 
rather used coded language, “dog whistles”, to signal anti-blackness to 
a target audience, which broader audiences might not understand and 
could choose to ignore. A classic example was Ronald Reagan’s plea for 
social welfare cuts by evoking the “welfare queen”, referencing how 
black women cheated the system.104 The efficacy of dog whistles lies in 
their simultaneous ability to make racist imagery stick while denying 
any intended racism. Yet from the recently released Nixon-Reagan tapes, 
99 C. Hare & K. T. Poole (2014), “The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics”, Polity 46: 3, pp. 411–429.
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United States”, Political Research Quarterly 68: 2, pp. 225–239.
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Polarization”, Polity 46: 3, pp. 449–469.
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Polarization”, American Journal of Political Science 59: 3, pp. 690–707.
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we know that both Nixon and Reagan harbored racist sentiments even 
though they were careful not to voice them publicly.105
The novelty of Donald Trump’s campaign strategy lies in his unapolo-
getic racism. While alienating some Republicans, this strategy, which has 
carried into his presidency, has been acceptable to a sufficient number of 
Republicans, while also appealing to some Democrats. The glue holding 
together the coalition behind him is an identity-based ‘Jacksonian revolt’ 
to protect ‘white identity’ from other identity-based coalitions encroach-
ing on their economic, social and cultural rights.106 From the start, Trump 
gained support from the alt-right and from evangelical Christians. The 
alt-right is predominantly white nationalist.107 Evangelical Christians are 
more likely to deny racial discrimination than any other religious group.108
Below I offer some examples of Donald Trump’s racism, both during 
his campaign, and as President of the United States. Tough immigration 
policies against countries with predominantly dark-skinned people would 
become a centerpiece of his campaign and incumbency. Even before his 
official announcement to run for president, Trump took to Twitter in 
2014 to launch the idea of a US-Mexico border wall, tweeting “SECURE 
THE BORDER! BUILD A WALL!”.109 When announcing his candidacy in 
June 2015, he called Mexicans rapists and thugs.110 In February 2016, he 
waited before disavowing support from David Duke and the Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK) and only did so after receiving massive rebuke.111 Up until 
September during his 2016 campaign, Trump continued to sow doubts 
about the “birther” lie he had helped to spread since 2011 – claiming the 
incumbent President Obama was born in Kenya.112
Once elected, the president quickly moved to put in place harsh im-
migration policies, including an executive order to construct a wall on 
the Mexican border. Meanwhile, his soft approach to white supremacy 
105 T. Naftali (2019), “Ronald Reagan’s Long-Hidden Racist Conversation with Richard Nixon”, The Atlantic, July 
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108 R. P. Jones, D. Cox & R. Lienesch (2017), “Who Sees Discrimination? Attitudes on Sexual Orientation, Gender 
Identity, Race, and Immigration Status | Findings from American Values Atlas”, Washington, D.C.: PRRI.
109 D. J. Trump (2014), “Secure the Border! Build a Wall!”, in @realDonaldTrump, Twitter.
110 M. Ye Hee Hee (2015), “Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime”, 
Washington Post, July 8, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-
trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/.
111 E. Bradner (2016), “Donald Trump Stumbles on David Duke, KKK”, CNN, February 29, https://edition.cnn.
com/2016/02/28/politics/donald-trump-white-supremacists/index.html.
112 G. Krieg (2016), “14 of Trump’s Most Outrageous ‘Birther’ Claims – Half from after 2011”, CNN, September 16, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/09/politics/donald-trump-birther/index.html.
SEPTEMBER 2020    49
continued and, in August 2017, he insisted on moral equivalence in refer-
ence to the leftist protesters who opposed the white supremacist rally in 
Charlottesville, Virginia.113 In September 2017, President Trump called on 
the National Football League (NFL) to fire their quarterback player, Colin 
Kaepernick, and others who took a knee peacefully protesting oppres-
sion and police brutality against people of color.114 In January 2018, he 
opposed immigration from El Salvador, Honduras and African countries, 
describing them as “shithole countries”.115 Echoing the birther conspiracy 
theory, in July 2019 he told four newly elected female congresswomen to 
go back where they came from, although the majority were born in the 
US. Birtherism made a reappearance as soon as Kamala Harris made the 
2020 presidential ticket. Law professor John Eastman raised doubts about 
whether Harris was a “natural born” US citizen and therefore whether 
she was eligible to serve as vice president.116 Trump quickly seized the 
opportunity to sow uncertainty as to whether Harris was indeed entitled 
to the VP position, even as constitutional law professors dismissed the 
claim.117 Yet more than any single event, the watershed moment in May 
2020 when a police officer killed George Floyd in plain sight along with 
the ensuing police brutality, and use of the National Guard to suppress the 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests during the country’s racial awakening, 
epitomizes the administration’s racialized identity politics.
Rallying around ‘white America’, the President’s supporters are 
known for being fiercely loyal, creating a cohesive identity-based group. 
Before coming to Washington, Trump made it clear how much he valued 
loyalty. “I value loyalty above everything else – more than brains, more 
than drive and more than energy.”118 Shortly after his inauguration, he 
said to James Comey, then director of the FBI, “I need loyalty, I expect 
loyalty”.119 The president is known to have a loyal base, and to surround 
himself with loyal appointees and advisors, some of whom are family 
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members. Trump has been remarkably successful in securing party loy-
alty, especially during the first two years of his term.120 This initial cohe-
sion eventually gave way to decadence and bitter power struggles. The 
in-fighting ended in a number of erstwhile supporters resigning, some of 
them voluntarily, others terminated. Scandal and debauchery also marked 
his presidency. His confidante counsellor, Hope Hicks, resigned after her 
previous boyfriend and former campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, 
allegedly leaked domestic violence allegations against her then boyfriend, 
former White House staff secretary Robert Porter.121 According to an un-
disclosed source, “This had been planned and choreographed and coordi-
nated and known long in advance by a group of people who were trying 
to play political games”.122 The turnover within Trump’s inner circle is 
unprecedented. Examples of people who have either quit or been fired 
include Steven Bannon, Michael Flynn (US National Security Advisor), H. 
R. McMaster (US National Security Advisor), Rex Tillerson (US Secretary 
of State), James N. Matthis (US Secretary of Defense), Nikki Haley (US 
Ambassador to the UN), John R. Bolton (US National Security Advisor), 
Geoffrey Berman (US Attorney for the Southern District of New York) and 
others such as his personal lawyer Michael Dean Cohen.
Internationally, the discriminatory nature of the Trump presidency 
manifests in an ‘us vs them’ sentiment that is also evident towards other 
countries. The US-China relationship is the primary example and casualty 
of this form of zero-sum thinking. Despite talking tough, the president 
has not been successful in managing great-power rivalry with China, 
neither economically nor in the security realm.
On the economic front, Trump’s trade wars have failed to close the 
bilateral trade deficit with China, to create a manufacturing boom, or 
to incentivize China to change its WTO-inconsistent trade policies on 
subsidies, intellectual property and forced technology transfers.123 The 
technology wars allegedly mix economic and security concerns, and have 
uncertain outcomes. For example, the administration’s ban on TikTok and 
WeChat in the US cites national security concerns. In reality, the measures 
are less about cyber-security threats than economic threats. Cyber-se-
curity threats are just as likely threats, regardless of the nationality of 
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the company collecting and storing data.124 Dealing with them therefore 
requires strict enforceable standards for data protection.125 The motive 
behind the ban is more likely to bait a Chinese reaction and thereby to 
show US companies the political risks of doing business in China.126 It 
could also be an attempt to deter Chinese technology firms from investing 
in the US.127 Either way, the strategy is intended to force a decoupling 
from China, and to coercively manage global economic interdependence. 
The strategy carries great risks because “dismantling international supply 
chains will make U.S. businesses less competitive and will blunt their 
global technological edge”.128 If economic interdependence unravels, the 
international economy will become less sensitive to insecurity, making 
war less costly in economic terms, thus removing a major constraint on 
war including a great-power war between the US and China. Consistent 
with the discussion under the Kennedy Trap, US incentives to protect 
the international economy militarily in order to reap an economic divi-
dend will weaken, even as incentives to protect itself from great-power 
attack intensify.
In other dimensions of the security ledger, the United States labeled 
China a “strategic competitor” in its National Defense Strategy.129 Cit-
ing both economic and security concerns, the document accuses China 
of “using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while milita-
rizing features in the South China Sea”.130 China has been jockeying for 
power in Asia. China’s expansion continues in the South China Sea, with 
freedom of navigation exercises, while a Chinese border dispute erupt-
ed with India in June 2020.131 While the administration has ramped up 
the US naval dispatch to the South China Sea with freedom of navigation 
exercises, no sustained attempt has been made to build an international 
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coalition, which China views as required to stop its maritime expansion.132 
The obvious danger here is a deadly collision between President Trump’s 
and President Xi Jinping’s strongman rule, where the cult of personality 
is more highly valued than mutual cooperation.
President Trump’s rise to office was born out of resistance to the 
perceived identity politics of the Obama presidency. Opposition was 
fierce despite President Obama’s care in forging broad coalitions and 
his “commitment to non-race-specific policies”.133 Four years of Presi-
dent Trump’s policies have led to a reckoning. His proposed policies and 
demeanor have emboldened an anti-racist counter-movement, “… a 
revolution against racism”.134 However, while a liberal backlash against 
the Trump administration has been in the making for a long while, the 
emphasis on racial equality is unlikely to have been as pointed without 
the wake-up call that George Floyd’s murder inspired. If race becomes a 
major future flashpoint, these cycles are likely to continue, with power 
oscillating between “in” and “out” groups, producing sharp swings in 
US foreign policy. A more stable foreign policy will require breaking with 
the Ibn Khaldun Trap to forge broader coalitions. 
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2. THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE US-LED 
WORLD ORDER: CAN TWO TIGERS 
SHARE THE SAME MOUNTAIN?
Li Xing
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The Chinese proverb “yi shan bu rong er hu” (一山不容二虎) translates 
literally as “two tigers cannot share a mountain.” The connotation is that 
two equally powerful rulers (two kings) cannot co-exist. The two tigers 
will fight it out until one of them gives up (and leaves the mountain). 
The proverb heuristically reflects the discussion raised in Graham Alli-
son’s recent book – Destined for War: Can America and China Escape 
Thucydides’s Trap?135 The book reviews, in historical retrospect, a noxious 
pattern of structural constraint in the international system whereby war 
was often the consequence when a rising power began to challenge the 
existing hegemon. According to the findings by Allison’s research team, 
over the past 500 years conflicts between a rising power and an existing 
power have occurred sixteen times, and war has broken out in twelve of 
the cases. The cause of these wars pointed to what is historically known 
as “Thucydides’s Trap,” referring to the Peloponnesian War that devastat-
ed ancient Greece. In the words of Thucydides: “It was the rise of Athens 
and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”136 
Is the world witnessing a repeat of the Thucydides’s Trap phenomenon 
today? When an ascending China is gradually becoming as powerful as 
the US, and when both countries are struggling to make their countries 
“great again,” will we see an unstoppable clash between Xi Jinping’s 
“Chinese Dream” and Donald Trump’s “make America great again”? Will 
135 G. Allison (2017), Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
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the current China-US confrontations in trade, security and internation-
al leadership become the seventeenth case of a clash between great pow-
ers? How will China approach its global expansive ambitions such as 
“Made in China 2025,” “Belt and Road,” and the dispute in the South 
China Sea, among other issues? Will the US accept the rise of China and 
its continuously growing position from the No. 2 world economy to No. 1? 
Will world disorder in the current nexus of China-US clashes eventually 
lead to a new world order or world reorder?
Acknowledging that these questions are very difficult to resolve, this 
chapter attempts to provide a framework for approaching or approximat-
ing some answers. The chapter starts by conceptualizing the architecture 
of the postwar US-led world order in terms of its strategic objectives 
and its core institutional pillars that sustain order. Secondly, the author 
argues that the major crises of the world order in the post-Cold War era 
were brought about by US liberal triumphalism and unilateral foreign 
policy. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on the rise of China, the impact of 
which is not only a contributing factor to global crises and disorder, but 
is also pushing the existing world order towards a reordering process. 
The chapter conceptualizes the reordering process as one in which the 
existing world order is changing from unilateral hegemony to interde-
pendent hegemony. This reordering process is far from easy and will be 
characterized by confrontations between hegemonic forces (the existing 
powers represented by the US) and counter-hegemonic forces (the rising 
powers represented by China). The conclusion of this chapter is twofold: 
1) it posits that China’s rise requires not just applying the existing theories, 
but generating new insights for new theorization; 2) it emphasizes the 
duality of structural barriers and ideational differences that will contin-
uously shape the direction of China-US relations in the foreseeable future.
2.2. CONCEPTUALIZING THE US-LED WORLD ORDER
The analysis begins by discussing what is meant by “world order” and 
how the term can be defined. A world order is well conceptualized by 
Susan Strange as fixed “social, political, and economic arrangements.”137 
Since “those arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they the 
fortuitous outcome of blind chance,” rather “they are the result of human 
decisions taken in the context of man-made institutions and sets of self-
set rules and customs.”138 What then constitutes “international relations” 
137 S. Strange (1988), States and Markets. California: University of California.
138 ibid., p. 18.
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under a particular world order? What are the order’s constituents (state, 
market, society) and how do they cohere globally? Can we find any kind 
of general principles that govern the way in which international relations 
function and change, and are there any causal factors that lead to change?
Recognizing the fact that the postwar world order was the outcome of 
many unfolding events, challenges, policies and institutions rather than 
the result of a master plan,139 we need to understand the key roles that the 
US played in shaping the postwar world order. In the aftermath of World 
War II, one of the key US objectives was to maintain a world order under 
which the capacity and sustainability of its overwhelming superpower 
and hegemony could continue to enjoy a dominant position. To realize 
these objectives, the US endeavored to set up an architecture of the world 
order supported by four institutional pillars: 1) the construction of a cap-
italist world economic system: establishing the Bretton Woods system 
of trade liberalization, stable currencies, and expanding global economic 
interdependence; 2) the creation of a global/regional collective security: 
forming an American-European-Asian military alliance to resist and block 
the expansion of communism; 3) the strengthening of the global trade 
regime: consolidating a Eurasia-centered global trade network; and 4) the 
alignment of US-shaped liberal norms and values: a universal system of 
values under American liberalism dubbed the “American Dream.” These 
four pillars represent the postwar reconstruction of a world order that 
is the foundation of the temporary “US structural power”. Seen from 
this perspective, the US intentionally created “a system of security ar-
rangements and economic regimes that cohered with American ideas and 
favored US interests.”140 What then are the core aspects of US “structural 
power”? Structural power refers to “the power to shape and determine 
the structures of the global political economy within which other states, 
their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their 
scientists and other professional people, have to operate” and “the power 
to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within 
which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate 
enterprises.”141 The core tenets underlining Strange’s conceptualization of 
structural power142 consist of four interconnected features ranging from 
security and production to finance and knowledge. These four aspects of 
139 F.J. Gavin (2020), “Asking the right questions about the past and future of world order.” The National 
Security Review January 20. Available at https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/asking-the-right-questions-
about-the-past-and-future-of-world-order/.
140 N. Kitchen & M. Cox (2019), “Power, structural power, and American decline.” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 32(6), p. 743.
141 S. Strange (1988), pp. 24-25.
142 S. Strange (1987), “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.” International Organization, 41(4), p. 565. 
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structural power overlap with Samir Amin’s identification of structur-
al power as “five monopolies.”143 They refer to the areas of technology, 
finance, natural resources, communication and media, and weapons 
of mass destruction. In particular, among these areas “global finance 
and production are perhaps the most significant areas where structural 
power shapes the conditions under which other states must operate to 
the advantage of the United States.”144 
Although the immediate US strategic goal in the aftermath of the 
Second World War was to resist the expansion of Soviet and Chinese 
communism, the rational objective of the US global strategy was to de-
fend the gross inequalities in the world order and the tremendous priv-
ilege and power this global disparity of wealth brought to the United 
States. This seemingly unconscionable endeavor was vividly spelt out by 
George Kennan:
We have 50 percent of the world’s wealth but only 6.3 percent 
of its population ... In this situation we cannot fail to be the 
object of envy and resentment. … Our real task in the coming 
period is to devise a pattern of relationships that will allow 
us to maintain this position of disparity, …We should cease to 
talk about the raising of the living standards, human rights, 
and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going 
to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are 
then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. 145 
Kennan’s candid statement was highly descriptive of the line taken by 
US foreign policy in the decades that followed. The statement was par-
ticularly revealing on two counts:146 First, it specified that the strategic 
objective of US foreign policy during the Cold War was not so much to 
battle the expansion of the “communist threat,” but to defend its struc-
tural power, more specifically the gross inequalities in the postwar world 
order and the tremendous privilege and power this global disparity of 
wealth brought for the US. Second, it indicated that democracy/human 
143 S. Amin (1997), Capitalism in the Age of Globalization: The Management of Contemporary Society. New 
York: Zed Books, pp. 4-5.
144 Kitchen and Cox (2019), p. 745.
145 Kennan (1976), The National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 68. George Kennan was the former Head 
of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff. His selected quotations are taken from the complete text 
of the section on Policy Planning Staff/23 (1948). The complete paper was published in T.M. Campbell (1976), 
“Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Volume 1, Part 2. General; The United Nations”, Department of 
State Publication 8849. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
146 W.I. Robinson (1995), “Pushing Polyarchy: the U.S.-Cuba case and the Third World.” Third World Quarterly, 
16(4), pp. 643-659.
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rights abroad was not a major concern for the US in the formative years 
of the postwar world order.
Understanding its own prosperity as being tightly bound to the func-
tioning of the world system and the success of its allied countries, the US 
was willing to develop the security protection and economic prosperity of 
its allied nations. This could be seen from the US involvements and roles 
in the Bretton Woods monetary system, the Marshall Plan, the Korean 
War, NATO, the Vietnam War, and so forth. In postwar Europe, concerned 
that the massive destruction and poverty would eventually facilitate the 
communist expansion, the US postwar “Marshall Aid” was aimed at re-
suscitating Western European industries in the possibly shortest time. In 
East Asia, the central theme of the US postwar policy was basically similar 
to its policy in Europe – to revive the Japan-centered regional economies 
including South Korea and Taiwan. Under US protection, external military 
threats and the internal danger of communist expansion were substan-
tially reduced in these two regions. The burden of the allied countries’ 
military expenses was also greatly reduced by the US military presence. 
American military bases have been documented as not only protecting 
these countries but also as providing them with economic benefits such 
as employment. Even now, the withdrawal of American military forces 
would be regarded as a considerable economic loss.
Accordingly, the structural power that the US gained after the Second 
World War provided it with solid leverage to assume the responsibility 
of a “hegemonic stabilizer” of the international system and to fully de-
velop a liberal global market and trading system through “providing 
global public goods in the form of security, opposition to communism, 
aid for economic development, and the strengthening of international 
institutions”.147 The US leadership during this period was termed struc-
tural leadership, namely “the ability to direct the overall shape of world 
political order” based on resources, capital, technology, military forces 
and economic power.148 The entire role of global public goods provider 
played by the US in the postwar era is conceptualized by the realist school 
of international relations as “hegemonic stability theory.”149 The theory 
claims that world order is more likely to remain stable when the world 
is led by a single state, or hegemon. 
147 S. Huntington (2001), “Japan’s role in global politics.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1(1), 
pp. 131-142.
148 J.G. Ikenberry (1996), “The future of international leadership.” Political Science Quarterly, 111(3), p. 389. 
149 C. Kindleberger (1973), The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California Press;  
R. Gilpin (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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2.3. FROM THE POST-COLD WAR “NEW WORLD ORDER” 
TO WORLD ORDER CRISES
Following the end of the Cold War with the demise of the Soviet Union 
and with the development of China into “a rationally authoritarian state 
that observed more or less normal rules of international relations,” the 
Washington-centered alliance system lost both its compelling rationale 
and its legitimacy.150 These transformations raised some fundamental 
questions for the United States: how to maintain the US-centered core 
structure in the post-Cold War world system?151 What were the persuasive 
grounds for continuing a US-led security network in the Triad (North 
America – Europe – Japan) when former enemies no long exist? What 
would the new political force be after the USSR that could be identified 
as a threat to the US “new world order”?152
Apart from the rise of China, the United States is now facing what 
Bergsten153 predicted – two-front economic conflicts with both Europe 
and East Asia. The disappearance of the Soviet threat together with the 
growing renationalization of the world economy has reduced the vi-
tal role of the US security umbrella over the two regions. As a result of 
these developments, “The security glue that traditionally encouraged the 
postwar allies to resolve their economic differences no longer exists.”154 
Today, the wide differences between the US and its allies in bilateral or 
multilateral economic issues as well as global and regional security and 
environment concerns matter more than their traditional alliances vis-
à-vis the environment, trade, NATO, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, 
Syria, Israel-Palestine, and so forth.
The end of the Cold War prompted the US, the single remaining su-
perpower, to design a new form of hegemony, termed transnational 
liberalism by Agnew and Corbridge.155 On the economic front, the power 
base of the new hegemony was the market (marketization and market ac-
cess). The strategy of the new US hegemony transformed from hegemonic 
stability in terms of balance of power under the nation state structure in 
a bipolar world to hegemonic liberalism and market capitalism in terms 
of imbalance of power in a unipolar world. The US hegemonic objective 
150 W. Pfaff (2001), “The Question of Hegemony.” Foreign Affairs, 80(1), p. 227. 
151 S.R. Schwenninger (1999), “World order lost: American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.” World 
Policy Journal, 16(2), pp. 42-71. 
152 R. Kagan & W. Kristol (2000), “The present danger.” The National Interest, (59), pp. 57-69.
153 F.C. Bergsten (2001), “America’s Two-Front Economic Conflict.” Foreign Affairs, 80(2), pp. 16-27.
154 ibid., p. 21. 
155 J. Agnew and S. Corbridge (1995), Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy. London: Routledge, pp. 164-207. 
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was not only to impose order among nation-states, but also to structure 
a universal global economic system that was meant to dismantle other 
types of economic system, such as the East Asian “crony capitalism,” the 
Russian “mafia capitalism,” the Chinese “state capitalism,” and even the 
European “welfare capitalism.” The establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was understood as an effort to reshape the world 
economy in line with neoliberal economic principles and as an effective 
tool to force the non-free market economies to change their internal 
governance system. 
On the political front, US post-Cold War foreign policy was essentially 
based on liberal hegemony, which is criticized by Mearsheimer’s realism 
as “a great delusion.”156 Such criticism is shared by a number of other re-
alists.157 The concept of liberal hegemony, derived from Fukuyama’s “end 
of history” triumphalism158 and inspired by the “democratic peace theo-
ry,”159 refers to a purposeful foreign policy strategy aimed at remaking the 
world in America’s image and making the world safe for democracy. In 
other words, the strategy was designed to create an ideal convergence be-
tween US power/dominance and the US value system of democracy, free 
market, and human rights.160 Seen from today’s perspective, this is not 
what has happened, and liberal hegemony has been short-lived. Instead, 
since 9/11, the United States itself has become a highly militarized state 
and has been propelled into implementing a unilateral regime change, and 
securitization-driven foreign policies. It has been fighting wars every-
where, undermining peace, harming human rights, and threatening 
liberal values both at home and abroad. It has had a more enduring impact 
on America’s inward-looking and self-centered approach to international 
affairs. Furthermore, it has dramatically transformed US foreign policy 
from a policy of “unilateral globalism,” namely providing global public 
goods for security and economic development, to “global unilateralism,” 
that is, promoting self-interest at the cost of others.161 
156 J. Mearsheimer (2018), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
157 C. Layne (2006), The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press; S. M. Walt (2018), The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the 
Decline of U.S. Primacy. New York: Macmillan. 
158 F. Fukuyama (1992), The End of History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton.
159 A theory which assumes that democracies are reluctant to engage in armed conflict with other identified 
democracies because democratic leaders and governments tend to be responsive to public opinion, and their 
behavior and policy tend to be constrained by a voting public.
160 Such a strategy was clearly factored and reflected in the foreign policy of a number of US Administrations, 
such as Bush Sr’s “New World Order”, G.W. Bush’s “Freedom Agenda”, as well as Obama’s reaction to the 
Arab Spring.
161 S. Huntington (2001), “Japan’s role in global politics.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1(1), 
p. 138. 
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As a result of the global unilateralism of US foreign policy, the existing 
world order is suffering from a number of crises, which can be summa-
rized on at least four different counts:162 Firstly, international cooperation 
under multilateralism and international institutions has been weakened 
to such an extent that it is unable to achieve and sustain what the existing 
order had anticipated, symbolizing that the world order is in a “crisis of 
functionality.” Secondly, due to the disfunctioning of multilateralism, the 
world is witnessing serious problems and challenges across the globalized 
world beyond the governing capacity of the existing order, suggesting 
that the order is experiencing a “crisis of scope.” Thirdly, the failure of 
the existing order to deliver a promising, secure and just world order 
as conveyed by American/liberal values and expectations is leading the 
existing order towards a “crisis of legitimacy.” Last but not least, the rise 
of emerging powers, such as China in particular, is affecting the global 
power balance, indicating that the existing world order is experiencing 
a “crisis of authority.”
Some of the above crises and world disorder symptoms are intricately 
connected with various factors stemming from the rise of China and other 
emerging powers. There are clashes and confrontations between existing 
(the US) and rising powers (represented by China) due to disagreements 
and conflicts of interest. As a result, the existing world order is suffering 
from the weakening of international regimes and institutions. Such a crisis 
situation is explicitly described by Schweller163 as follows:
Its [the order] old architecture is becoming creakier and 
more resistant to change. New rules and arrangements will 
be simply piled on top of old ones. And because there will 
be no locus of international authority to adjudicate among 
competing claims or to decide which rules, norms, and 
principles should predominate, international order will 
become increasingly scarce. 
In line with Schweller’s accurate description, the existing world order 
is in “the age of entropy” in which “International politics is transforming 
from a system anchored in predictable, and relatively constant, princi-
ples to a system that is, if not inherently unknowable, far more erratic, 
unsettled, and devoid of behavioral regularities.”164
162 F. Trine & X. Li (2010), Riding the Tiger: China’s Rise and the Liberal World Order. DIIS Policy Brief – 
December, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.
163 R. Schweller (2011), “Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder.” Global Governance, 17(3), p. 287. 
164 R. Schweller (2014), “The Age of Entropy: Why the New World Order Won’t Be Order.” Foreign Policy, June 
16. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-16/age-entropy.
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2.4. THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE RISE OF CHINA 
What kind of impact is the rise of China having on the existing world or-
der? During the past four decades, China’s remarkable economic success 
has reverberated worldwide. China achieved an average 9–10% economic 
growth for three decades, and it has been the largest contributor to global 
economic growth; the Chinese currency, the Yuan, has been a subject 
of contention, and is once again an issue during the current China-US 
trade war; Chinese trade competitiveness has affected the livelihood of 
workers and companies in both developed and developing countries; Chi-
na’s demand for energy and resources has led to price fluctuation, global 
competition and conflict; Beijing has, for many years, rivaled Washington 
and developing countries as the largest destination for foreign direct 
investment; the global expansion of Chinese overseas investments and 
outsourcing has become a source of major anxiety for existing Western 
powers; and above all, China’s technological advancement in some leading 
areas and the Chinese state-led development model are, rather than a 
trade imbalance, the real factors behind the recent China-US trade war. 
The Phase One trade deal between China and the US signed in early 2020 
was seen by most analysts and commentators as a ceasefire, not a long-
term solution. Some of the factors underlining China’s global rise are 
structural, such as the Chinese state-led development model. It remains 
to be seen whether the structural issues can be resolved in the China-US 
Phase Two negotiation.
The world is gradually accepting the fact that Beijing’s policies on 
finance, currency, investment, trade, security, environmental issues, 
resources, food security, raw materials, and prices are increasingly con-
nected with the life and well-being of millions of people outside of China’s 
borders. Any shift in China’s supply and demand will cause changes in 
prices and adjustments by most countries. As a result, China is increas-
ingly being seen as an “indispensable country” in the way that the US has 
been.165 China has generated incremental growth in the global economy 
that has made its success significant for the welfare of other countries.
In particular, an “alarming” factor underlining the impact of Chi-
na’s global rise is its economic outward expansion to the Global South, 
mainly Africa and Latin America. These two continents were historically 
Western colonies and within the Western sphere of interest. On the one 
hand, China’s investment and outsourcing is bringing about tangible so-
cio-economic and socio-political transformations in these two continents, 
while on the other hand, it also raises questions regarding how to define 
165 J. Feffer (2007), “China the Indispensable?” Foreign Policy In Focus, March 9. Available at http://www.fpif.
org/fpiftxt/4070.
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China-Africa relations – as a South-South partnership or a North-South 
dependency? Various trade data indicate that the economic relations be-
tween China and the Global South show signs of regenerating the “unequal 
exchange” thesis166 of the dependency theory (manufacturing vs com-
modity product) that has led to a debate on whether China’s economic 
relationships with the Global South can be characterized as “neo-colo-
nialism,” “neo-imperialism,” or “creditor imperialism.”167
Currently, two ongoing Chinese grand development strategies, which 
are seen as “affecting” and “disturbing” the power structure of the exist-
ing world order are “Made in China 2025”168 and the Belt and Road Initi-
ative (BRI). The latter in particular, which involves billions of China-led 
investment programs covering a web of infrastructural projects, including 
roads, railways, telecommunication systems, energy pipelines, ports, 
and so forth, aims to enhance economic interconnectivity and facilitate 
development across Eurasia, East Africa and more than 60 partner coun-
tries. These Chinese global ambitions are interpreted by Washington as 
Beijing’s attempt to re-divide the already divided world. In other words, 
the rise of China is altering the conventional distribution of power and 
the ways in which the interplay between states and markets are shaped 
by the arrangements or structures that have evolved to connect them.
Today, the Trump Administration claims that it is losing the com-
petition with China both economically (market share), technologically 
(pharmaceutical industry, automotive industry, aerospace industry, sem-
iconductors, IT and robotics), and ideologically (the “Chinese model” is 
becoming internationally attractive). The China threat is perceived to have 
begun with its WTO membership in 2001 and the transformative changes 
that ensued for China and its trading partners, especially the US, as well 
as for the global trading system as a whole. China’s WTO membership 
with a “developing country” status is seen as a crucial factor in fueling its 
economic growth and prosperity, making it possible for China to “rip off 
the US” through a cheap currency, cheap labor, misconduct in intellectual 
property, and heavy-handed state intervention. The Chinese development 
model is perceived as being unfairly successful because it disadvantages 
foreign competitors and circumvents WTO rules. It is an open agenda that 
166 The notion of “unequal exchange” refers to a trade pattern in which rich and strong countries always export 
manufactured products while weak and poor developing countries always export commodities and raw 
material. This trade pattern is seen as a mechanism that led to the constant economic primarization or 
peripherization of countries in the Global South.
167 X. Li (2019), “China’s Global Rise and Neoimperialism: Attitudes and Actualities.” In I. Ness & Z. Cope (eds.) 
Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism & Anti-Imperialism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–15.
168 “Made in China 2025” (in Chinese “中国制造 2025”) is a Chinese national blueprint to strengthen China’s 
manufacturing capabilities in higher value products and services. The grand objective is to increase the 
Chinese-domestic content of core materials, and to enlarge China’s share and upgrade its dominant position 
in global supply and value chains within the world’s major strategic industries, such as pharmaceuticals, 
automotive, aerospace, semiconductors and, most importantly, IT and robotics.
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one of the US’s fundamental objectives in the current US-China trade 
war is that the US Administration has a strong intention to “restructure” 
or “remold” the Chinese economic system and its mode of production. 
Yet it is perhaps too late for the US to do so because the Chinese economy 
has grown to such a large extent that it is able to absorb volatilities.
2.5. HEGEMONIC CYCLES? FROM UNILATERAL HEGEMONY TO 
INTERDEPENDENT HEGEMONY
When studying international relations, it is important to identify an an-
alytical mechanism that is helpful in conceptualizing and analyzing the 
interplay between nation states. In this context, the notion of “hegemony” 
is a useful instrument and a good diagnostic tool for understanding the 
different enduring aspects of order in the international system. Being 
integrated into the US-led world economy, Chinese global objectives have 
been guided by a series of strategies – accommodating, circumventing 
and expanding.
At present, when looking through the lens of neo-Gramscian hegem-
ony understanding, which emphasizes the role of economic, political and 
cultural leadership and broad consensus in the course of forming, legit-
imizing and sustaining order, we realize that the world is indeed witness-
ing the process of America’s “global retreat” of hegemony in terms of 
dismantling the architecture of world order and relinquishing America’s 
international commitments. In many ways, the Trump Administration’s 
“America First” foreign policy is orchestrating fundamental changes to 
American grand strategy and the existing order. The country is not only 
turning inwards but also abandoning the leadership role it has played 
since the end of World War II. Causing dismay around the world, the 
Trump Administration has been showing its contempt for free trade and 
international treaties and institutions. In recent years, the US has with-
drawn its membership from many international treaties and institutions.
Does the current situation imply that the world is undergoing a con-
junctural shift whereby the historical hegemonic cycles of the world 
system are being repeated? According to world system theory,169 the 
capitalist world system has been characterized historically by “cyclical 
rhythms” including hegemonic cycles, namely the upsurge and decline 
of different guarantors of the capitalist world system. These cycles were 
169 I. Wallerstein (1974), The Rise and Future Demise of the World-Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis. Comparative Studies in Society and History. 16, pp. 387-415; I. Wallerstein (1979), The Capitalist 
World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press; I. Wallerstein (2004), World-Systems Analysis: 
An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press.
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caused by gradual but significant structural changes or shifts in the pat-
terns of capital accumulation and the distribution of power, resulting 
in geographical dislocations. Nevertheless, despite the cycles, the law 
of the system in terms of capital accumulation and surplus value has 
remained unchanged. The capitalist world system has been successful in 
forcing untapped parts of the world into the logic of capitalism without 
fundamentally changing the relations of inequality within the system. 
However, due to the size of its economy and population, China’s economic 
integration into the world system since the 1980s is causing modifications 
to world system theory’s conventional stratification in terms of the core 
semi-peripheral-peripheral relationships, and in terms of the composi-
tion and proportional size of the three economic zones. 
Accordingly, seen from the perspective of world system theory, the 
rise of China represents the continuous cycles of the world system’s evo-
lution in which nation states have quite different development stages 
within a seemingly unified global economy and international division of 
labor. However, world system theory does not suggest that a peripheral 
position is necessarily a destiny that cannot be changed. It is indeed pos-
sible for countries to achieve advancement within the system by changing 
positions and stratifications within the systemic-structural morpholo-
gy. This can be done by taking advantage of global capital mobility and 
relocation of production as well as chains of production and exchange 
that may have altered the patterns of comparative advantages. With this 
understanding, China is evolving to become a competitor for global he-
gemony following its great success in changing its economic positions 
within the system.170 The rise of China, together with its capital outward 
expansion, seemingly represents another rhythmic cycle of the rise of a 
new hegemon, which is an opportunity in terms of room for maneuver 
and upward mobility for some countries, but a challenge and downward 
mobility for others.
By claiming that the world order is in a reordering process, this chapter 
proposes an alternative concept – “interdependent hegemony”171 – in 
order to capture the features of the transition that is underway. Interde-
pendent hegemony is argued to be a better concept when describing, un-
derstanding and analyzing the ongoing transformation process. It implies 
that the sources and capacities to maintain the world order’s structural 
170 S.F. Christensen & R. Bernal-Meza (2014), “Theorizing the Rise of the Second World and the Changing 
International System.” In X. Li (ed.) (2014), The Rise of the BRICS and Beyond: The Political Economy of the 
Emergence of a New World Order? Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publisher, pp. 25–51.
171 X. Li (2016), “From ‘Hegemony and World Order’ to ‘Interdependent Hegemony and World Reorder.’” In 
S.F. Christensen & X. Li (eds.) Emerging Powers, Emerging Markets, Emerging Societies: Global Responses. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30–54; X. Li & S. Zhang (2018), “Interdependent Hegemony: China’s Rise 
Under the Emerging New World Order.” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 4(2), pp. 1-17.
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power and monopoly are no longer dominated exclusively by the US/West, 
and that they are dependent to a large extent on contributions from China 
and emerging powers. Interdependent hegemony signifies a dialectic 
process of mutual challenge, mutual constraint, mutual need, and mutual 
accommodation that is shaping the direction of the relationship between 
the existing and rising powers. The notion symbolizes a dynamic situation 
in which the system’s defenders and the new powers are intertwined in 
a constant interactive process of shaping and reshaping the world order, 
whereby nation states, global governance, transnational actors, civil 
societies and interest groups are incorporated into the dominant project 
of transnational capitalism.
Conceptually, “interdependent hegemony” highlights that China’s 
rise has brought about a reconsideration of the defined tenets of hegem-
ony that are conventionally taken for granted, such as productive hard 
power, ideational soft power, institutional leadership, symbolic capital, 
norm diffusion, and so on. Not surprisingly, the development of a Chi-
nese school of IR theory has been ongoing steadily for many years both 
inside and outside of China.172 According to Pan and Kavalski,173 the rise 
of China requires not just applying the existing theories, but innovative 
effort in generating theorization beyond the conventional IR theories, 
while adding new insights for rethinking world politics more broadly. 
This is because China’s rise is “a complex and still evolving global and 
regional phenomenon encompassing broader political, economic, and 
social changes, dynamics and challenges.”174
2.6. CONCLUSION: THE “RIDING TIGER” DILEMMA
The answer to this chapter’s research question articulated by applying a 
Chinese idiomatic expression “two tigers cannot share the same mountain” 
is simultaneously intertwined with another Chinese idiomatic expression 
“riding a tiger while being unable to get off” (Chinese “Qi Hu Nan Xia 
骑虎难下”). “Riding a tiger” has a dialectical connotation, namely being 
empowered by riding on the back of a tiger while finding it too dangerous 
to try to get off. The combination of these two Chinese expressions heu-
ristically indicates a complex situation in which, on the one hand, the US 
172 Y. Qin (2016), “Recent Developments toward a Chinese School of IR Theory.” E-International Relations, 
April 26. Available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2016/04/26/recent-developments-toward-a-chinese-school-
of-ir-theory/. 
173 C. Pan & E. Kavalski (2018), “Theorizing China’s Rise in and beyond International Relations.” International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 18(3), pp. 289–311.
174 ibid., p. 291. 
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economy (the US tiger) and the Chinese economy (the Chinese tiger) are 
mutually integrated and interdependent with high complementarity. For 
some decades, both have felt greatly empowered by riding each other’s 
tiger, but now they find they are unable to get off (decouple). On the 
other hand, the existing hegemon (Washington) and the emerging pow-
er (Beijing) are engaged in a political, economic and security competition 
with the former attempting to constrain or delay the latter’s further rise, 
and with the latter struggling to catch up and outcompete the former.
The conclusion of this chapter is that both China and the US are com-
peting for global leadership in the course of shaping the emerging world 
anew. China-US relations are transitioning from a “marriage of conven-
ience” relationship in the previous period to the current stage of “riding 
a tiger” dilemma in which both sides are caught up in a complicated and 
complex relationship from which they do not know how to extricate 
themselves. The present situation seemingly proves that the warning of 
“Thucydides’s Trap” is becoming more real than ever before.
Table 1. Major events in the history of China-US relations (1949–2019) (collected and listed by 
the author).
Year Major direct and indirect events in China-US Relations, 1949–2019
1949 The Founding of the People’s Republic of China
1950 The Korean War 
1954 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis
1955 The Vietnam War
1959 The Tibetan Uprising
1964 China’s First Atomic Test
1969 The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict
1971 Ping-Pong Diplomacy
1972 Nixon’s Visit to China
1979 Diplomatic Relations and the One-China Policy
1989 The June 4th Tiananmen Square Incident
1999 The US Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade 
2001 China’s WTO Membership
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2008 China Became Largest US Foreign Creditor
2010 China Became World’s Second-Largest Economy
2011 The US “Rebalancing Asia” Policy
2013 The Obama-Xi Sunnylands Summit
2014 The China-US Joint Climate Announcement
2015 The South China Sea Conflict
2018 China-US Trade War with Trump Raising Tariffs against China
2019 China-US Trade War Extending to Huawei and the Financial Market
2020 (Jan.) China-US Phase One Treaty Signed
2020 China-US Relations Being Further Strained by the Covid-19 Pandemic
As the above Table shows, the historical evolution of the relationship 
between China and the US since the foundation of the People’s Republic 
of China, and especially since the establishment of diplomatic relations 
in 1979, has been in a constant state of flux mixed with periods of forward 
movement (integration and accommodation) and periods of backward 
movement (conflict and war). The current China-US relationship can 
be characterized as a dialectic complexity containing both positive and 
negative forces of waxing and waning. The multifaceted interactions 
between these two countries will continue to be in flux and reflux due to 
the fundamental structural differences between them. At present, these 
two tigers seem to be unwilling to share a mountain, but eventually they 
will have to learn to do so and to find a fitting regional and global role that 
each side is willing to accept.

3
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3. THE TRUE ORIGINS OF THE SINO-
AMERICAN THUCYDIDES TRAP
Gregory J. Moore
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The “Thucydides Trap” was a term coined in 2015 by Harvard Professor 
Graham Allison in his Atlantic article on that topic,175 an article later 
expanded into a book with the same dark overtones.176 Are the US and 
China doomed to war as China rises? This is probably the most important 
international relations question of the millennium. Allison posits that as 
a rising power begins to rival or surpass the extant status quo power in 
its region or in the international system, measured in terms of material 
power, in 12 of 16 cases (rising and status quo power dyads) Allison and 
his team studied ranging over the last five hundred years or so, war was 
the result. The analysis presented here concludes that based on material 
power indicators, China is not yet in a position to rival or surpass the US 
on material indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP/capita, 
and/or military spending. Based on such indicators one might conclude 
that China and the US are, therefore, not in much danger of succumbing 
to any such traps. This analysis concludes, on the contrary, that there is 
indeed a serious danger at the present time that the US and China could 
slip into the morass of militarized conflict for a number of other reasons 
found in history, sociology, politics, economics and now virology, which 
Thucydides and Allison under-accounted for.
175 G. Allison (2015), “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, Sept 24, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-
trap/406756/.
176 G. Allison (2018), Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? New York: Mariner.
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3.2. THE THUCYDIDES TRAP AND POWER TRANSITION
First, what is the premise of the Thucydides Trap, as Allison explains it? 
Thucydides, the Greek historian, wrote a remarkable history of the wars 
among the Greek city-states in the fifth century BC, most notably between 
Athens, the rising power, and Sparta, the prevailing power of the time.177 
Perhaps the most famous line from Thucydides’s study comes from the 
rising Athenians as they appeal to power, saying to the Melians that they 
would soon vanquish,178 “the strong do what they can, the weak accept 
what they must.” Thucydides argued that Athens’ rising power created a 
fear in Sparta such that war between them was all but inevitable, hence 
the trap Allison saw, naming it after Thucydides. Allison and his team 
of researchers studied all scenarios wherein rising powers threatened 
to upset the status quo power(s) in a region or system over the last five 
hundred years, from the rise of the Hapsburgs in the face of France, to the 
rise of Germany in the early twentieth century against Britain, Russia and 
France, to the rise of a united Germany in Europe after the end of the Cold 
War. He found that in twelve of sixteen of these pairings the rise of the new 
power ended in war. In only four cases, as was perhaps most famously 
the case with the rise of the US over and against Great Britain’s hegem-
ony in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, did the rise of 
the new power not lead to war. Bringing the Thucydides Trap forward 
into our current situation, a seventeenth dyad/pairing in Allison’s study 
would be the United States as it faces the prospect of a rising China, about 
which Allison concludes, “Based on the current trajectory, war between 
the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but 
much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the 
historical record, war is more likely than not.”179
Arguably supporting Allison (and Thucydides) is power transition the-
ory. Writing in this tradition, Jack Levy says, “A key proposition of power 
transition theory is that war is most likely when a dissatisfied challenger 
increases in strength and begins to overtake the dominant power.”180 
Power transition theory is a material-driven story underpinned by IR’s 
Realist worldview. As Levy puts it, “Power transition theory posits that 
national power is a function of population, economic productivity, and 
177 Thucydides (1972), History of the Peloponnesian Wars. New York: Penguin Books.
178 The Melians took a stand against Athens and were threatened with invasion after they refused to join Athens 
against Sparta. In Thucydides’s recounting, before the conflict between Athens and Melos ensued, the two 
sides parleyed, wherein the leaders of Melos made an appeal to right, eliciting the famous appeal to power 
from the Athenians cited here. 
179 Allison (2015), p. 2.
180 J. Levy (2015), “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.” In R. Ross and Z. Feng (2015), China’s 
Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 13.
SEPTEMBER 2020    77
the political capacity to extract resources from society and transform 
them into national power.”181 Based on this definition of power, China 
is undoubtedly a formidable power based on its population of 1.4 billion 
people, its mercantilist, export-led statist economy, and its authoritarian 
system with its impressive mobilization capabilities. Has China reached 
parity with the US, or is the US being overtaken by China, however?
3.3. MATERIAL INDICATORS OF PARITY (OR NOT)
If parity is the important indicator, which it is for Levy, Organski, Gil-
pin182 and others in the power transition tradition, as well as Allison, 
where is China at the moment as it relates to the United States? In addition 
to those factors Levy lists above, GDP, economic growth rates, GDP/capita, 
and defense spending are the most common indicators of the strength of 
a country in material terms.
Let us consider each of these indicators here. Regarding GDP, based on 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data from 2018, the US has the world’s 
largest economy with a GDP of $20.5 trillion annually, with China second 
at $13.5 trillion US dollars. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China 
is number one already, at $25.4 trillion US dollars adjusted for purchasing 
power, with the US at $20.5 trillion US dollars, both based on 2018 World 
Bank numbers. A convincing argument can be made, however, that since 
an enormous amount of China’s foreign holdings, foreign trade and for-
eign debt are denominated in dollars, and the dollar remains the most 
widely traded currency on the planet, the GDP numbers in US dollars 
remain the best benchmark and most widely used indicator of China’s 
economic status. Having said this, China is also number one in growth 
rates, again in US dollars based on 2018 data, at 6.6%, with the US at 
2.9%. If one looks at GDP/capita, the numbers shift quite a bit, however, 
with the US at $62,795/person and China at $9,771/person based on 2018 
World Bank numbers in US dollars. While some might argue that China 
has reached parity with the US, or has surpassed it based on PPP numbers, 
GDP and GDP/capita are more commonly used indicators, and in these 
cases it is not yet close. The GDP/capita numbers show a particularly stark 
difference between the two economies. 
181 ibid., p. 18.
182 See A.F.K. Organski (1958), World Politics. New York: Knopf; and R. Gilpin (1981), War and Change in World 
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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What about defense spending? Using International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies (IISS) data from 2018, the United States is again ahead of China 
with defense spending of $643.3 billion, with China coming in second 
(excluding NATO Europe) at $168.2 billion.183 China’s year-on-year defense 
spending growth rates are significant, however, such that while in 2013 
China’s defense spending was 15.8% of America’s, by 2016 it was 24.4% 
of America’s.184 Based on current trajectories, with the continued growth 
of China’s economy and continued increases in its defense spending as 
a percentage of its overall economy, Chinese and US defense spending 
may converge at some point in the future. An important additional point 
here is that there are differences in how defense spending is computed in 
Washington and Beijing, such that most experts believe China’s defense 
spending is significantly higher than what is reported here, which is based 
on officially reported budget information. Be that as it may, based on the 
183 International Institute of Strategic Studies (2018), The Military Balance 2018, London: Taylor & Francis. 
184 For details, see G.J. Moore (2017), “Avoiding a Thucydides Trap in Sino-American Relations (… and 7 Reasons 
why that Might be Difficult),” Asian Security 13/2, pp. 98-115.
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most commonly used material indicators of a nation’s strength, speaking 
here of GDP, GDP/capita, and defense spending, the US is still quite far 
ahead of China. Parity with the United States has not been reached based 
on these indicators and thus, if power transition theory and Thucydides 
Trap conflict scenarios are based on material indicators, as they are, we 
should not (at least yet) have much to worry about. 
3.4. WHAT THE THUCYDIDES TRAP AND POWER TRANSITION 
THEORY MISS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
We should not limit ourselves to such material indicators, however, if we 
are trying to understand the potential for Sino-American conflict in the 
coming decade, or even in the next year or two. In fact, it is argued here 
that there are a number of historical, sociological, political, non-material 
economic and now even virological185 factors that must be considered, 
and which make a conflict between China and the United States unfor-
tunately all too possible. Each will be elaborated upon below. None of 
185 The novel coronavirus is undeniably material, but its story is not the sort of material factor Allison or power 
transition theorists factor in.
Figure 2: Top defence budjets 2018 (US$bn), including total European NATO spending
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018.
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them is meant to rule out the importance of the material factors above, 
especially if or when China does approach something closer to parity with 
the US in material terms.
3.4.1. Historical factors
There are a number of historical factors that impact Sino-American rela-
tions today (reflecting a path dependency that includes much Cold War 
baggage), which in and of themselves do not catalyze conflict, but which 
certainly complicate matters and tend to get amplified in troubled times. 
On the US side is a long and unfortunate history with dictatorial leaders, 
from King George III to Napoleon to Wilhelm to Hitler to Stalin to Kim 
Il-sung to Saddam Hussein, and so on. China’s top leadership has been 
dictatorial since its inception in 1949, but the present leader has amassed 
more central power than any leader since Mao, and China is much more 
powerful today than it was under Mao. With Xi dispensing with term 
limits in 2018, American observers are concerned about absolute power 
corrupting absolutely. Adding to this for Americans is the legacy of the 
Cold War, given that China, however non-traditionally “communist” 
the country is today, is still run by a Communist Party with a red flag, 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, goose-stepping soldiers and near total 
power over society. The Cold War was a dark time for Americans and the 
Chinese polity has, since approximately 2010, been making “reforms” that 
appear more like the Maoist totalitarian centralism of the worst seasons 
of the Cold War than the reforms of Deng and the more cheerful post-
Cold War period.
For China’s part, the Party has always invoked the country’s “bad 
history” as a rallying point to mobilize the masses, but its more recent 
invocations of the “victimization narrative” have been more pointed, 
following the analysis of scholars such as Peter Gries and Wang Zheng.186 
Wang argues, in fact, that in the most recent decade, the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) has made “never forget national humiliation” its raison 
d’être, its primary mantra. It is based on the notion that today’s China 
would still be in a state of national humiliation were it not for the CCP, that 
the CCP is all that stands between the Chinese people and new rounds of 
national humiliation, and so forth. This narrative is based on a very real 
and very sad period of history endured by the Chinese people. What is 
being pointed out here does not seek to undermine that truism (nor does 
Gries’s or Wang’s work, it should be pointed out). However, the recent 
186 See P. Hays Gries (2005), China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, Berkeley: University of 
California Press; and W. Zheng (2012), Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese 
Politics and Foreign Relations, New York: Columbia University Press.
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concerted and muscular invocation of history187 makes it very difficult for 
China to be flexible on territorial and other issues, and it has made Chi-
nese foreign policy quite “prickly” as regards relations with the US, given 
America’s status as a formal ally with three of China’s neighbors with 
which it has territorial disputes (South Korea, Japan and the Philippines) 
and as an arms supplier for Taiwan, as well as being the leading power in 
a system that still remains suspicious of authoritarian powers like China.
3.4.2. Sociological factors
A much less discussed but pertinent issue as regards China’s rise and its 
relations with the world is the sociological predisposition for hierarchies 
in the Chinese social milieu and in whatever weltanschauung emanates 
from Beijing in a given era, and the implications of this for China’s rise. 
This chapter follows the view that Chinese society is hierarchical,188 and 
that it is very difficult for Chinese leaders to see the world in non-hier-
archical terms. China’s historical tributary system is a case in point – 
a system with China at the apex, other members next, and non-Sinic 
others (barbarians) outside of it. In China historically, if a boy is born the 
second son in a family, he will be known in that family as “lao er” (second 
son) for the rest of his life, whereas the oldest will be known as “lao da” 
(eldest or pre-eminent son), and the eldest will have the rights and re-
sponsibilities of caring for the parents in their final years. When Chinese 
students apply to universities, the “paiming” or ranking of the univer-
sity is of the utmost importance, so Chinese applicants pay greater atten-
tion to rankings than most other applicants. When students in Chinese 
schools and universities finish a course at the end of the semester, most 
institutions post the grades and rank the students, normally in a desig-
nated corridor in the institution for all to see, so everyone knows who is 
number one and who is last. Business cards are very important as well, 
because it lets one know the social standing/rank of a person in their 
profession and in society. In Chinese society it is also quite common to 
ask about salaries, so each knows where one ranks in financial terms with 
one’s peers, neighbors or relatives. With all of these measurements of 
hierarchy come certain status and certain privileges and responsibilities, 
for hierarchy is in the end about status.189
187 See also M. Mayer (2018), “China’s Historical Statecraft and the Return of History,” International Affairs 
94/6, pp. 1217-1235.
188 For examples, see H. Kwang-Kuo (2012), Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations, 
New York: Springer; and D. Bell & W. Pei (2020), Just Hierarchy: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China 
and the Rest of the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
189 For an excellent study of status in Chinese foreign policy, see X. Pu (2019), Rebranding China: Contested 
Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
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The Chinese leadership have been saying for decades that they do not 
seek hegemony or superpower status, or to be number one in the world. 
An understanding of the sociology of Chinese society and the importance 
of hierarchy therein, however, makes this rather unbelievable. Michael 
Pillsbury argues that China has a long-term (100-year) plan to surpass and 
unseat the United States and to replace it as the world’s greatest power.190 
While trying to be careful to avoid cultural essentialism or cultural deter-
minism, for these can be problems, my understanding of China – which is 
itself based on 15 years of living in the country and almost three decades 
studying it – tells me Pillsbury is probably right about the importance 
to Chinese policymakers of surpassing the US to become number one in 
the international system, although I am less sure about the existence of 
a 100-year plan to do so. Every Chinese child wants to be top of the class. 
Every member of a Chinese family wants to make the most money in the 
family. Every Chinese company wants to be number one. So why would 
we believe a rising China would disavow the notion of becoming number 
one in international relations, the pre-eminent power in the world? If 
Chinese leaders do aspire to be number one, it does not mean China will 
necessarily become an imperialist power, an important distinction,191 but 
based on many studies and indicators, there is much evidence that China 
under the CCP does seek to displace the US in Asia, and in time seeks to 
rise to pre-eminence globally. This might mean conflict with the US, or 
not, but we should not assume China does not seek to be the world’s 
leading power. That would contradict thousands of years of sociology 
and tradition. This is to say that we should not believe China has so little 
global ambition or such a benign view of its relations with the US or its 
place in the world as the peaceful rise narrative suggests.192
3.4.3. Political factors
The material-driven Thucydides Trap also overlooks myriad political fac-
tors, which likewise complicate matters in bilateral relations, and make it 
more difficult for China and the US to avoid war, whether China achieves/
approaches parity with the US or not. There are a number of these at work 
in the Sino-American equation and each will be discussed below.
190 M. Pillsbury (2015), The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global 
Superpower. New York: Henry Holt.
191 What is meant here is that we have no indications that China has plans to invade other countries, establish 
colonies, or expand its borders beyond claims such as the South China Sea, Diaoyudao/Senkakus and Taiwan.
192 For advocates of the peaceful rise narrative, see Z. Bijian (2005), “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power 
Status,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-
09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status; Z. Feng, “China’s Rise Will be Peaceful: How Unipolarity 
Matters,” in R. S. Ross & Z. Feng, (eds.) (2008), China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of 
International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 34-54.
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US politics has been anti-communist for decades, and while Marxism 
is arguably more alive in US universities than anywhere in the world, as 
regards Washington politicians the media and the American public in 
general it is still quite common to depict communist countries (no mat-
ter how un-“communist” most of them actually are now) in dark tones. 
Communist countries are regularly portrayed as being rife with human 
rights abuses, inflexible party apparatchiks out of touch with their peo-
ple, stifled religion and free discussion, controlled media, and the like. 
China’s political realities play all too well (unfortunately for the CCP) 
in the anti-authoritarian, anti-communist fabric of American popular, 
intellectual and political sentiment. It is very difficult for Americans to 
trust leaders of such polities, and far easier to demonize them, making 
trust and cooperation more challenging.
We might add to this what I call “the flipside of the democratic peace 
theory” (DPT). DPT is an elegant theory stating that democracies do not 
go to war with other democracies.193 Most international relations schol-
ars, myself included, take it at face value, as a truism. The flipside of DPT, 
however, is that democracies do go to war with non-democracies, and 
the difference between the two types of regimes is sometimes part of the 
reason why they find themselves at odds with each other. All of this is 
to say, regime types matter in IR. While Realists would rightly point out 
the strange bedfellows made in/by politics historically, DPT theorists 
have provided a strong canon of research that shows democracies are 
highly unlikely to go to war with each other, and that China and the US 
do not have DPT working for them. China and the United States have been 
friends historically, during the Republican era (1921–1949, with Taiwan 
since then), and with the PRC (from 1971 until the Tiananmen incident of 
1989).194 Therefore, while friendship between the two can certainly devel-
op again, they must overcome the poisonous statements they both make 
about each other’s regime types and the mutual distrust195 their dissonant 
regimes help engender. China sees democracy and full human rights as 
a threat to its autocratic regime. The US, on the other hand, increasingly 
sees China’s leaders as engaging in anti-democratic activities inside the 
US,196 as well as becoming increasingly bold in attacking democratic values 
and the advantages of free societies in its official statements abroad as 
193 For perhaps the best, most comprehensive one-stop shop on this topic, see M. E. Brown (ed.) (1996), 
Debating the Democratic Peace, Boston, MA: MIT Press.
194 See G.J. Moore (2014), “The Difference a Day Makes: Understanding the End of the Sino-American ‘Tacit 
Alliance,’” International Studies Review 16/4, pp. 540-574.
195 K. Lieberthal & W. Jisi (2012), Addressing China-US Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Monograph 
Series #4, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
196 See L. Diamond & O. Schell, (eds.) (2019), China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting 
Constructive Vigilance, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
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well as at home. Washington sees China as seeking to export high-tech 
platforms that could extend China’s surveillance capabilities and illiberal 
technological and information/media values to other countries, noting 
here debates over Huawei in particular.
In China, the CCP regime is perpetually insecure and has always found 
it difficult to work closely with democratic regimes whose leaders speak 
openly about its problems of governance. Whether dealing with Europe, 
Japan, India, the US or other democratic polities, the CCP uses its financial 
and political clout to silence critics of its practices there because of its 
political insecurity at home. In some ways, the regime is more insecure 
now than at any time in its history, even while its military is stronger, its 
economy bigger, and its people living more comfortable lives than at any 
time in its political history. This is in part because it is more integrated 
with the rest of the world today and so its practices are more exposed 
than ever before. Most fundamentally, this tension arises from a lack of 
democratic legitimacy at home, and a centralized political system (despite 
its reforms since the 1970s), which mean every problem in the country 
is ultimately President Xi’s problem given the centrality of the Party in 
the lives of everyone and in the governance of nearly everything in China. 
US political leaders can blame officials below them for problems or blame 
economic problems on the wiles of the market or consumer behavior. 
But in China all problems potentially land on Xi’s desk (or the desks of 
China’s top leaders) because the Party is the ultimate arbiter of almost 
everything (and hence every problem) in China. Consequently, the Party 
has an interest in using the state-run media to generate anti-Ameri-
can sentiment (especially) at home and increasingly abroad, and it has 
shown an ever-increasing willingness to do so, most recently calling US 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo “an enemy of humanity” because of his 
argument that the coronavirus started in a Chinese laboratory. Given 
its cyber-totalitarian197 abilities inside China today, its ability to sway 
public opinion against the US is more formidable than at any time in PRC 
history. Its recent and increasing use of such tools is one more reason why 
conflict between Washington and Beijing is more likely and cooperation 
more difficult.
197 I coin this term here to signify a new form of totalitarianism based on cyber-technologies. It conforms to 
the traditional definitions of the term, as found in political science textbooks and works such as H. Arendt’s 
(1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken Books, but it is more subtle than 1930s Stalinism, 
1940s Hitlerism or 1960s Maoism, using web-based, closed-circuit television and AI cyber-technologies 
to do what thugs once had to do. The political result is largely the same, however – state-enforced political 
conformism and the all-policing state.
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3.4.4. Economic factors
The Thucydides Trap and power transition theory also overlook several 
important aspects of China’s economy that make Sino-American coop-
eration more challenging. This concerns China’s regime type (as regards 
China’s political economy), the structure of China’s economy (increas-
ingly state-centered, with increasing prominence given to State-Owned 
Enterprises or National Champions), and a practice-related variable (as 
regards several practices of the Chinese state economically). While the 
Thucydides Trap and power transition theory certainly both account for 
the raw economic numbers, as was outlined at the outset of this chapter, 
they do not account for the types of factors to be discussed here.
First, influencing Sino-American economic relations is an aspect of 
China’s regime type, in this case its political economy, which I would 
label a mercantilist, export-led, increasingly statist or even state-planned 
economy, albeit still with underlying market principles. Although schol-
ars like Elizabeth Economy and Nicholas Lardy might have more nuanced 
labels, their conclusions are not different from my own in the sense of 
their worries over the increasingly state-led, illiberal nature of China’s 
political economy in the past decade.198 They would both agree that Chi-
na’s economy is focused on maximizing exports, minimizing imports, 
favoring domestic companies over foreign companies inside China, and 
limiting competition inside China. Consequently, the CCP has led cam-
paigns, in some cases widespread and in other cases narrowly targeted, to 
obtain key advanced technologies from abroad through mergers, acquisi-
tions, hacking, theft and other means, some legal, some illegal.199 China’s 
Thousand Talents program has also been in the news of late, having been 
alleged by the US to have been used to transfer vast amounts of technol-
ogy from the US to China, in some cases illegally. These practices by the 
Chinese state are seen by the US and other Chinese trading partners as 
increasingly problematic, if not downright illegal. Despite many bilateral 
agreements and some cases playing out in the WTO, China’s practices 
have not changed, nor are they likely to given the country’s weaknesses 
in innovation and its growing scientific and technological needs and as-
pirations. Moreover, China’s “Made in China 2025” campaign, often seen 
by the US as a blatant attempt to further increase Chinese exports while 
further curtailing Chinese imports, has further raised Washington’s ire. 
These sorts of issues comprise much of the basis for President Trump’s 
trade war against China, and the Phase One Sino-American trade deal 
198 E. Economy (2018), China’s Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the Chinese State, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; and N. Lardy (2019), The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China?, 
Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
199 See Diamond and Schell (eds.) (2019), China’s Influence and American Interests.
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does not really address them in any fundamental way. They appear ex-
tremely difficult to resolve in the near or long term, and so must be con-
sidered another likely source of any potential Sino-American collision. We 
would do well to remember that the war between Japan and the US could 
be said to have started with the sweeping trade embargoes the US placed 
on Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, which is simply to say trade disputes can 
create existential crises for one or both parties, which can lead to war.
3.4.5. Pandemic pandemonium
The most recent sphere of conflict between China and the United States is 
the arrival and spread of the new coronavirus, Covid-19, and the global 
pandemic it has spawned. The global consensus, including initially in 
China where the government originally called it “the Wuhan virus” (or 
wuhan feiyan), a term it now disavows, is that Covid-19 started in Wuhan 
and spread to other parts of China and subsequently to the rest of the 
world, where it has hit the United States with particular ferocity, the US 
now leading the world both in numbers of cases and numbers of deaths 
by far. By most accounts, the Trump Administration has not handled the 
crisis as well or as early as it should have. Yet the Trump Administration 
has pointed the finger squarely at China, blaming it for 1) not confirming/
admitting person-to-person transmission early enough, 2) not acting 
early enough to contain the virus before it got out of Wuhan and out of 
China, 3) for suppressing (even arresting) those in China who warned 
early on of the dangerous new virus, and 4) for resorting to what the 
US might call exceedingly draconian measures in late January such that 
frightened Wuhan residents and others fled the city and China before the 
forced quarantines could be put strictly into place, measures which may 
have spurred the spread of the disease to other parts of China and the rest 
of the world. China has been striving to gain soft power with the later 
successes it met in managing the crisis, portraying itself as the responsible 
power that got the virus under control and is now giving away masks and 
training others, while portraying the US as the irresponsible power that 
didn’t take the virus seriously, let it get out of control domestically, and is 
now blaming others for its problems. Washington has responded, saying 
Beijing is now using thuggish diplomacy and Pavlovian financial tactics 
to engender positive narratives about itself. For example, Washington is 
charging the CCP with buying off the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and so has cut off funding to and is now withdrawing from the organi-
zation (while China has increased its funding in response), and China is 
blocking Australian beef imports to punish Australia for asking for an 
investigation into the origins of the virus. 
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In fact, these competing narratives have begun to have an existentially 
threatening dimension for both the CCP and for President Trump. The CCP 
is portraying its authoritarian power as the right system to deal with the 
pandemic and keep the economy humming, arguing that democracy can 
do neither. Trump, on the contrary, is arguing that it is exactly the CCP’s 
authoritarian tendencies that led to the lies and coverups that resulted in 
the failure to contain the virus early and prevent it from spreading beyond 
China’s borders, and all the death, suffering and economic breakdown 
that has followed. If it is shown that Trump is right and the Chinese people 
come to believe this, it could have grave consequences for the Party, per-
haps shaking the foundations of trust that the Party desperately desires to 
maintain and leading to unrest in China. However, if the CCP comes out 
on top in this battle of narratives, Trump could lose the November election 
and Covid-19 (and the cracks in the US system it has exposed) could be a 
grave blow to any notion of the US as a model of efficient, market-based 
democratic governance, a major stain on the reputation of democratic 
governance writ large, and a boon for authoritarians everywhere. Given 
the profound damage Covid-19 is doing to the US economy and to the 
world economically, and the horrendous suffering and death it has caused, 
this is not an issue that will easily go away (nor is the virus for that mat-
ter). China clearly has an interest in controlling the coronavirus narrative, 
arguing that the US has ulterior motives in its criticisms. The US is clearly 
suspicious of the Chinese government’s actions on Covid-19 before, dur-
ing, and after its emergence, and sees the CCP’s recent, aggressive “wolf 
warrior diplomacy”200 in defense of its reputation as highly problematic. 
Conspiracy theories abound on both sides201 and Sino-American trust is 
now at a new nadir. 
200 S. Jiangtao (2020), “China wants its diplomats to show more fighting spirit. It may not be intended to win 
over the rest of the world,” South China Morning Post, 12 April. Available at https://www.scmp.com/news/
china/diplomacy/article/3079493/china-wants-its-diplomats-show-more-fighting-spirit-it-may-not.
201 On the US side are narratives that China was working on coronavirus bio-weapons, or that one of China’s 
two Wuhan-based virology labs (both of which were researching bat-based coronaviruses) mishandled 
biohazard protocols and accidentally let the virus escape. Chinese officials, on the other hand, have 
suggested US military personnel may have intentionally introduced the virus into Wuhan in October during a 
world military forum. There is no firm evidence to substantiate any of these narratives to date, but proliferate 
they do. For more, see J. Rogin (2020), “State Department Cables Warned of Safety Issues at Wuhan Lab 
Studying Bat Coronaviruses,” Washington Post, April 14. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2020/04/14/state-department-cables-warned-safety-issues-wuhan-lab-studying-bat-
coronaviruses/); E. Wong, M. Rosenberg & J. E. Barnes (2020), “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages 
That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” New York Times, April 22. Available at https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html; Xinhua News Agency (2020), 
“Reality Check of US Allegations Against China on COVID-19”, May 10. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2020-05/10/c_139044103.htm.
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3.5. CONCLUSION: WHERE MATERIAL ASPECTS OF CHINA’S RISE 
MAY BE LESS WORRISOME THAN NON-MATERIAL ASPECTS 
The material rise of China is no doubt one of the most important interna-
tional relations matters of the twenty-first century. Based on indicators 
presented here, China has not, however, reached or approached parity 
with the United States in economic or military terms. The framing provid-
ed by Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap, along with the purveyors of the 
power transition theory, both of which rely primarily on material indica-
tors of parity or overtaking, might leave us with the cheerful conclusion 
that we have, for now, little to fear in terms of a war between the two.
This analysis does not allow us to be so sanguine, however. The chapter 
has argued that there are a significant number of historical, sociological, 
political, economic and now virological reasons why the US and China 
are highly likely to clash significantly in the coming year or two, possibly 
even leading to war. This conclusion clearly goes against the grain for 
many of us who have been trained to believe states are rational actors 
(that no rational great power would choose war in this day and age), and 
that interdependence makes war between large, highly interdependent 
trading states unthinkably expensive and hence highly unlikely. Yet we 
might do well to re-read E.H. Carr’s classic, The Twenty Years’ Crisis.202 
Carr lamented what he saw as a dangerous idealism that (to his mind) 
blinded most of the foreign policy experts and statespersons of his time 
(the book was written in the late 1930s), who thought that the great pow-
ers had learned from the horrors of the Great War, and that war between 
such powers was a thing of the past. Then came 1939.
202 E.H. Carr (1964), The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939, New York: Harper Perennial.
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4. UNITED STATES ALLIANCES AND 
SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY
James Przystup203
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1990, as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the 
Department of State, the author of the present chapter spent a week in 
Tokyo researching trends in the economies of the Asia-Pacific region. 
At Keidanren and Keizaidoyukai, economists had run the numbers and 
were anticipating that China would surpass Japan as the world’s second 
largest economy sometime in the first decade of the 21st century. They 
were unanimous in their conclusions: managing the rise of China would 
be Japan’s and Asia’s defining strategic challenge through 2050.
In GDP numbers, China passed Japan at the end of 2010. Moreover, as 
the number one trading partner of US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, 
China has not been shy in using its economic power as leverage to express 
dissatisfaction with policy decisions that have challenged Chinese interests.
In the 2010 fishing boat incident, Beijing cut off rare earth exports to 
Japan, slowed customs procedures and issued tourist guidance to protest 
Japan’s seizure of a Chinese fishing boat in the Senkaku Islands. In 2012, 
Beijing banned the import of Philippine bananas to show its displeasure 
over the confrontation between a Philippine warship and Chinese fish-
ermen in the area of Scarborough Shoal within the Philippines Exclusive 
Economic Zone. In 2017, to protest the deployment of the THAAD mis-
sile defense system by the Republic of Korea, the Lotte company, which 
had provided land for the THAAD deployment, was boycotted; Korean 
203 The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent the views or policies of the 
National Defense University, of the Department of Defense and of the United States Government. 
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products were disfavored; and group tours to the ROK suspended (they 
remain suspended to date).
At the same time, China, over the past three decades, has increased 
defense spending at double-digit rates, albeit falling off in recent years.
Over the past decade, China has constructed artificial islands in the 
South China Sea, causing serious environmental degradation in the pro-
cess; militarized the artificial islands contravening a commitment made 
by President Xi to President Obama; ignored the ruling of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration denying China’s assertion of historic rights within 
its claimed nine-dash line; and engaged in confrontations with Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia over natural resources.
The objective of this chapter is to focus on United States post-Cold War 
security strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region and, in this context, the 
central role of its alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philip-
pines, Australia and Thailand. The chapter will also address the evolution 
of the bilateral alliance structure – from the “Hub and Spokes” structure 
of the Cold War era to a more networked structure of the contemporary 
Indo-Pacific. For the United States and its allies across the region, the US 
alliance structure has been an essential element in managing relations 
with a now risen and increasingly assertive China.
A brief review of key US policy documents will set the strategic context 
for the Indo-Pacific strategy of June 1, 2019 and for the consideration 
of the present state of US alliances with Japan, the ROK, Australia, the 
Philippines and Thailand.
4.2. US ALLIANCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is but the latest in a se-
ries of policy documents, issued by the Department of Defense since the 
end of the Cold War, that address the role of alliances in U.S. strategy 
toward the Asia-Pacific (now Indo-Pacific) region.
In a 1992 report to the Congress, “A Strategic Framework for the 
Asia-Pacific Rim,” the Department of Defense defined the United States 
alliance structure as “perhaps our nation’s most significant achieve-
ment since the end of the Second World War. This system of alliances and 
friendships constitutes a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented 
zone of peace…In the long run preserving and expanding these alliances 
and friendships will be as important as the successful containment of the 
former Soviet Union or the Coalition defeat of Iraq.”204
204 Department of Defense Report to the Congress, “A Strategic Framework for the Asia-Pacific Rim,” 1992, 1.
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The report noted that “with the end of the Cold War, the United States 
regional roles, which had been secondary in our strategic calculus, have 
now assumed primary importance in our security engagement in the 
Pacific theater…the key to our military presence has been and remains 
a network of largely bilateral security alliances.”205
Three years later in 1995, the Department of Defense issued “The United 
States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” reiterating the 
importance of the alliance structure and asserting that “America clearly 
has a stake in maintaining the alliance structure in Asia as a foundation 
of regional stability and a means of promoting American influence on key 
Asian issues.”206 In 1998, the Department of Defense updated the 1995 
document, reaffirming “the critical role our alliances play in securing 
peace and stability in Asia.” In contrast to the alliances of the Cold War, 
the strategy document posited that the alliances of the late 20th century 
are “not directed at any third party but serve the interests of all who 
benefit from207 regional stability and security.”
In its National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017, the Trump 
administration defined the Indo-Pacific as an arena of “geopolitical com-
petition.” To deal with the challenges posed by China and North Korea, 
the NSS explains that “U.S. allies are critical to responding to mutual 
threats…and preserving our mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific.”208 On 
June 1, 2019, the Department of Defense released the Indo-Pacific Strategy 
Report. The document reaffirms the US commitment to a rules-based in-
ternational order and the centrality of “our unique network of Allies and 
partners.”209 In doing so, the Indo-Pacific strategy reflects the historic 
commitment of the US to the bilateral alliances that have been the foun-
dational building blocks of the United States regional security strategies 
for close to seventy years.
The alliance structure, however, has not been static. Over the past dec-
ade, the “hub and spokes” bilateral alliance structure, Cold War in origin, 
has been evolving toward a more comprehensive and inclusive architec-
ture, one that features increased cooperation between US allies and active 
efforts on the part of the United States and its allies to engage non-aligned 
countries of the region in the building of strategic partnerships. This net-
worked structure is now a central element of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
205 ibid.
206 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region, 1995, 2.
207 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, 19.
208 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the White House, December 2017, pp. 45–46, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
209 Department of Defense, the Indo-Pacific Strategy (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/
Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
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4.3. CHINA AND THE ALLIANCES
In the decade following the end of the Cold War, China returned to its 
long-standing opposition to alliances and military blocs. President Jiang 
Zemin, in his 1997 report to the 15th Party Congress, stated that “ex-
panding military blocs and strengthening military alliances will not be 
conducive to safeguarding peace and security.” China’s New Security 
Concept called for an end to Cold War thinking and opposition to alliance 
politics.210 In 1998, the People’s Daily observed that with the end of the 
Cold War “military alliances had lost much of their cohesive force as the 
enemies they were directed at containing no longer existed” but found 
the United States attempting to “maintain old alliances, hoping to act as 
their hegemonic leader.”211
In 2014, President Xi Jinping announced his New Asian Security Con-
cept. Speaking to the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Xi argued that “Asia has come to 
a crucial stage in security cooperation where we need to…strive for new 
progress...to move from the 21st century with the outdated thinking from 
the age of the Cold War and zero-sum game…to innovate our security 
concept to establish a new regional security cooperation architecture…
that is shared by and win-win to all.”
Xi observed that “Security must be equal…No country should attempt 
to dominate regional security affairs” and that it “must be inclusive…to 
beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not 
conducive to maintaining common security.” Xi went on to say that “In 
the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia and 
uphold the security of Asia.”212 An accompanying Xinhua article charac-
terized the US alliances as the “‘Achilles heel’ of and major impediment 
to ‘a peaceful Asia.’”213
210 D. M. Finkelstein (2003), “China’s ‘New Concept of Security’” in Flanagan, S. & Marti, M. E. The People’s 
Liberation Army and China in Transition. National Defence University, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, pp. 197-210. 
211 C. Shulong (1999), “China and the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia”, 
Shorenstein APARC, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/china_and_the_usjapan_and_uskorea_
alliances_in_a_changing_northeast_asia.
212 J. Xi (2014), “New Asian Security Concept for Progress in Security Cooperation” remarks at the Fourth 
Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Expo Center, May 21, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml.
213 A. P. Liff (2018), “China and the U.S. Alliance System,” The China Quarterly, vol. 233, pp. 137-165. 
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4.4. ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT – AT THE WHITE HOUSE
President Trump has taken a very personal approach to foreign policy 
and the management of alliances – one that has frequently tested one 
of the long-standing and cardinal principles of diplomacy, the doctrine 
of “No Surprises.”
The challenge to diplomatic orthodoxy, on more than one occasion, 
has been manifest in the management of relations with Japan and Korea 
and has raised questions regarding the constancy of US leadership. The 
announcement that President Trump had accepted an invitation to meet 
with Kim Jong-un completely blind-sided Prime Minister Abe, and allies 
across the globe. 
In Japan, the political opposition cast Abe as being disregarded and 
disrespected – out of the loop – and President Trump as acting with little 
regard for Abe, Japan, and the alliance. Within Japan’s security communi-
ty, this, in turn, raised questions as to whether the President and “Amer-
ica First” diplomacy would take into account Japan’s security concerns 
in talks with Kim Jong-un. 
Following the Singapore Summit with Kim Jong-un, President Trump 
again tested the doctrine of “No Surprises.” The President’s decision to 
suspend US-ROK military exercises caught everyone, including General 
Vincent Brooks, commander of United States Forces Korea, by complete 
surprise. Moreover, the President’s acceptance of North Korea’s defi-
nition of the US-ROK military exercises as provocative war games and 
his expressed intention, sometime in the future, to withdraw US forces 
from the Peninsula was unsettling at best, calling into question the US 
commitment to the alliance and extended deterrence – not only in Korea 
but in Japan and elsewhere. 
Recent examples of the unexpected in alliance management include 
the President’s out-loud musing that allies should pay cost plus 50% in 
host nation support for US forces stationed abroad and his judgment that 
the US-Japan alliance places an “unfair” defense burden on the United 
States – and should be revised. 
Recognizing the concerns raised by the President’s statements and his 
transactional view of alliances, the Congress in the 2018 Defense Author-
ization Act inserted language that expresses the “unwavering” commit-
ment of the United States to “treaty obligations and assurances including 
defense and extended deterrence to South Korea, Japan, and Australia.”214
Notwithstanding the unexpected surprises from the White House, the 
US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region nevertheless continues 
214 National Defense Authorization Act (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2810.
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to strengthen, a reality recognized by China in its 2019 Defense White 
Paper – “United States is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances 
and reinforcing military deployment and intervention…”.215
4.5. THE ALLIANCES: STATUS REPORT 
4.5.1. Japan
Under Presidents Obama and Trump and the Abe government in Japan, 
the US-Japan alliance has continued to evolve and strengthen.
Since 2017, the alliance has been reinforced by the close personal re-
lationship between the President and the Prime Minister. They have met 
during G-7 and G-20 convocations, on the golf course, and, according 
to a senior State Department official, speak frequently and at length on 
policy issues by telephone. The Prime Minister has consistently supported 
the President’s “Maximum Pressure” policy toward North Korea, and the 
President has, as he had promised, raised the issue of Japan’s abductees 
with Kim Jong-un.
As for the US-Japan free, fair, and reciprocal trade negotiations, it 
should be noted that bilateral trade imbalances have long marked the 
US-Japan relationship. The auto wars of the late 1970s and 1980s resulted 
in Japan’s acceptance of voluntary restraints on auto exports and in-
vestment by Japanese companies in production facilities in the US. The 
Structural Impediments Initiative followed in the late 1980s, succeeded 
by the Clinton administration’s Framework Agreement. 
Heated political rhetoric in both countries has frequently accompa-
nied the negotiations, but successive governments in Washington and 
Tokyo have worked successfully to isolate the alliance from the polit-
ical-economic debate. The October 7, 2019 US-Japan trade agreement 
again speaks to this continuing commitment. Strategic realities then, as 
now, serve to reinforce and strengthen the alliance. In the face of security 
challenges posed by North Korea and an increasingly assertive China, this 
still holds true.
As for the alliance itself, the Joint Statement of the “Two-Plus-Two” 
Security Consultative Meeting of April 19, 2019 called attention to “the 
alignment of the strategic policy documents” – the United States National 
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and Japan’s National 
215 The State Council Information Office of  the People’s Republic of China (2019), China’s National Defense in a 
New Era, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/whitepaperonnationaldefenseinnewera.doc.
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Defense Program Guidelines – on key security challenges facing the al-
liance partners.216
The Joint Statement, without identifying China, expresses “serious 
concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts 
to alter the status quo in the East and South China Sea.” The document 
reaffirms that Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty applies to the 
Senkaku Islands and that “both nations oppose any unilateral action that 
seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.”217
At the operational level, the US and Japan have continued to implement 
the 2015 Defense Guidelines. Indicative of initiatives to strengthen the 
alliance, bilateral training exercises have been expanded in the East and 
South China Seas. In 2017, the US and Japan conducted 74 joint exercis-
es – almost four times the 19 exercises conducted in 2015, before the Abe 
government’s security laws were enacted.218 Looking to the future, both 
governments have committed to cooperation in “space, cyber, and the 
electromagnetic spectrum as priority areas to better prepare the Alliance 
for cross domain operations.”219
The Abe government’s security laws have also enabled Japan to par-
ticipate in trilateral exercises with the US and Australia, with the US and 
the ROK, and with the United States, India and Australia. This broadening 
engagement is central to the evolution of a networked security structure 
envisioned in the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Furthermore, the Abe government has increased defense spending for 
seven consecutive years in terms of initial budget request. In its FY 2020 
budget submission, the Ministry of Defense requested a record increase 
of 5.3 trillion yen, 50 billion yen higher than the FY 2019 initial budget 
request of 5.2574 trillion yen. A significant part of the increase will cover 
the acquisition of Aegis Ashore batteries, F-35 purchases, and additional 
defense equipment that would serve to increase Japan’s defense capability 
and reduce its trade imbalance with the United States. 
Collectively, the defense policies of the Abe government have all been 
aimed at making Japan a more attractive alliance partner, and at anchor-
ing the United States in Asia, in Japan. 
216 Japan Ministry of Defense, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2019), April 19, https://
www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/.
217 ibid.
218 Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, effective March 2016, allows Japan “to play a more proactive 
role for peace and stability in the world.” The legislation aims to “enhance the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. 
Alliance” and “help to deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within/outside 
the region”, enabling Japan “to provide necessary logistics support and search and rescue to armed forces 
of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s peace and security…”. For a more detailed 
explanation, see Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, https://mofa.go.jp/files/000143304/pdf.
219 Japan Ministry of Defense (2019).
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4.5.2. Korea
In the October 2018 “Two-Plus-Two” meeting of the Security Consultative 
Committee, the Joint Communique pronounced the alliance “stronger 
than ever.”220 Commander of the US Forces Korea, General Robert Abrams, 
testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the force is suffi-
ciently postured to deter aggression and defeat any adversary, if necessary. 
We continue to train at echelon to maintain readiness…”.221
Public support for the alliance in both the ROK and the United States 
remains strong. In February 2018 an Asan Institute poll put Korean public 
support at over 90% across all age cohorts, including the 386 generation. 
Moreover, an October 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll indi-
cated that 64% of Americans were prepared to defend Korea in the event 
of a North Korean attack.
Beginning in 2003, successive governments in Washington and Seoul 
have worked to expand the focus of the alliance – to transform it from its 
traditional rationale, deterrence of North Korea and defense of the ROK, 
into a broader regional and global construct.
In 2005, Presidents George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun approved 
the evolution of the alliance into a “comprehensive” alliance that would 
address regional and global issues. In the Joint Vision Statement of 2009, 
the two governments recognized the Mutual Defense Treaty as the “cor-
nerstone” on which the United States and the ROK would “build a com-
prehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope…”. The 
development of a Comprehensive Alliance has been reaffirmed at annual 
Security Consultative Meetings. 
As for the denuclearization of North Korea, prospects are problematic 
at best. After three Summits, the President and Kim Jong-un have yet to 
agree on a definition of denuclearization. The President’s post-Singapore 
statement – that he had pressed Kim to accept Final and Fully Verified 
Denuclearization but that there was “not sufficient time to write down 
details of the agreement,” suggests a fundamental lack of understanding 
of diplomacy 101 – there is no agreement without text. Added to this, 
the President’s claim that he has “solved that (North Korea) problem” is, 
many months after the Singapore Summit, premature. 
Despite political pressures from President Moon’s support base to 
advance economic engagement with North Korea, both governments re-
main committed to the Final and Fully Verified Denuclearization of North 
220 Joint Communique of the 50th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (2019), October 18, https://www.usfk.
mil/Media/News/Article/1679753/joint-communique-of-50th-us-rok-security-consulta.
221 Statement of General Robert Abrams to Senate Armed Services Committee (2019), February 12, https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/19-02-12-united-states-indo-pacific-command-and-united-states-
forces-korea.
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Korea, and the full implementation of UN Security Council sanctions until 
denuclearization is realized. 
For the ROK, beyond the immediate security challenge posed by North 
Korea, the long-term strategic challenge involves managing relations 
with China, through and after unification. The strategic equation in-
volves maintaining the economic ties to China, critical to Korean pros-
perity, while ensuring Korean sovereignty against Chinese influence and 
a demonstrated willingness to use economic leverage to advance Chinese 
interests on the Peninsula. China’s commercial retaliation against Kore-
an products, following the 1997 THAAD deployment, stands as a case in 
point; even in 2020 restrictions on group travel to Korea remain in force.
David Helvey, now Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pa-
cific Security Affairs, in his study “Korean Unification and the U.S.-ROK 
Alliance,” observes that the alliance fits into a traditional Korean foreign 
policy framework, associated with a “greater power that would offer 
security but not be so close geographically that it would threaten Korean 
sovereignty.”222 
In 2000, President Kim Dae Jung met with a Council on Foreign Re-
lations task force of which the author was a member. When asked, in 
light of his historic visit to Pyongyang, whether the alliance had a future, 
the President responded affirmatively. He advanced his views along the 
following lines: “Korea is faced with two great land powers to the north, 
and they’re not going away; to the east, Korea is faced with a great mar-
itime power, and it’s not going away. The United States is strong; you 
are far away; and you have no designs on Korea. That’s why the alliance 
has a future.” The President’s remarks were reminiscent of the author’s 
University of Chicago advisor, Hans Morgenthau. 
4.5.3. Australia
President Obama took the occasion of his remarks to the Parliament of 
Australia to announce the US “Rebalance to Asia.” He described the rebal-
ance as a “deliberate and strategic decision” to increase the priority placed 
on Asia in US policy. In 2018, Australia and the United States, speaking to 
the closeness of historic security ties, celebrated “100 Years of Mateship,” 
dating from the battle of Hamel on July 4, 1918.
Today, a lively debate is ongoing in Australia about US leadership in the 
Asia-Pacific region and the uncertainties regarding the US commitment 
to the Indo-Pacific region.
222 D. Helvey (2016), “Korean Unification and the Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance”, National Defense 
University Press, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News?Article/699426/korean-unification-and-the-future-
pf-the-us-rok-alliance/.
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Reflecting those concerns, Peter Jennings, a former senior defense of-
ficial, has called for a “Plan B for Defence.” Mr. Jennings set out a 10-step 
plan calling for Australia to do more for its own security, play a stronger 
leadership role in the region, reconsider the size and strength of the de-
fense force and “posture for even darker threats ahead – without confi-
dence in the US security umbrella.”
The reason: “It’s mostly luck that we haven’t yet been on the end of 
some Presidential verbal spray that could hugely undermine Australian 
confidence in the future of the alliance.”223
Former Minister of Defense and Ambassador to the United States Kim 
Beazley expressed a more optimistic view of the US commitment to Aus-
tralia. Writing on the 75th anniversary of the Coral Sea, at a time when, 
like today, the power distribution in Asia was changing – moving from 
an era of US dominance to one of greater power diffusion – he asked his 
readers to consider whether Australia should continue to invest in what 
may be perceived as a relationship of diminishing value.
In addressing the security challenges of post-Cold War Asia, he sug-
gested that Australians should consider two lessons from the Coral Sea, 
the first being the type of ally the United States may be in “an era in which 
it is not necessarily preeminent”; and the second being “what the US 
default position in our region is when its saliency in our broader region 
is under pressure.” 
With the US well aware that a major battle at Midway was in the offing 
in the spring of 1942, Beazley wrote that a cautious move for the United 
States would have been to concentrate forces in Hawaii. However, in the 
Coral Sea, the United States “put its territory at risk to support an ally.” 
As he phrased it, this was “risk taking of a high order.” The lesson here 
was that “The US will go a long way for a friend – whether or not it’s the 
preeminent power.” Furthermore, Beazley argued that the US default se-
curity position in Asia remains, as it was in 1942, anchored in Australia.224
During a September 2018 research visit made by the author of this 
chapter to Australia, a senior official observed that “the rise of China 
represented the greatest security challenge Australia has faced since the 
Coral Sea.” Of particular concern are China’s efforts to expand its influ-
ence to the Southwest Pacific island states; China’s militarization of bases 
in the South China Sea, in effect unilaterally changing the status quo and 
putting at risk Australia’s oil from the Middle East; and, to the west, its 
growing presence in the Indian Ocean region and Africa.
223 P. Jennings (2018), “With Trump at large, Australia needs a Plan B for Defence”, July 21, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/author/peter/jennings//.
224 Government of Australia, Foreign Policy White paper (2017), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/2017/australia_2017_foreign_policy_white_paper.pdf.
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As for the United States and the alliance, Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy 
White Paper judged that “United States long-term interest will anchor 
its economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” and major 
alliances will “remain strong.”225 A senior official with long experience in 
relations with the United States remarked that the alliance “at operational 
levels is solid.” He observed that democracies like the United States and 
Australia go through “uncertain political periods” but was confident that 
the alliance would endure. 
On the ground, the operational strength of the alliance is reflected 
in its history of joint and coalition operations, training and exercises, 
intimate intelligence cooperation, capability development, and a shared 
commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific region.
The already close alliance cooperation and coordination was enhanced 
by the 2014 Force Posture Agreement. The agreement provided for En-
hanced Air Cooperation, improving interoperability through more sophis-
ticated training exercises and the rotational deployment of US Marines 
to training areas in Australia’s Northern Territory. The United States 
continues to enhance alliance coordination by partnering with Australia 
in cyber, space, defense science and technology, and intelligence. 
The August 4, 2019 AUSMIN meeting in Sydney underscored the breadth 
and strength of the alliance. The Joint Statement addressed cooperation 
and coordination relating to Indo-Pacific prosperity and stability; South-
east Asia and Pacific engagement; the US-Australia Global Partnership; the 
transnational challenge; defense cooperation; economic relations; youth, 
and the future. At the end of August 2019, Australia committed to joining 
the United States in protecting maritime commerce in the Persian Gulf. 
4.5.4. The Philippines
North of Australia, the Philippines have come face-to-face with an in-
creasingly assertive China in contested waters in the South China Sea. In 
2014, President Obama declared that the US commitment to the defense 
of the Philippines was “iron clad” but ambiguity remained as to whether 
the US defense commitment extended to the South China Sea.
Amid growing Philippine concerns, Secretary of State Pompeo trave-
led to Manila and, on March 1, 2019, in a joint press conference with the 
Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Teodoro Locsin, Jr., reaffirmed 
Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty that “any attack on Philippine 
forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
225 J. Gehrke (2019), “Pompeo reassures Philippines that US will defend if China attacks”, March 1. Washington 
Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/pompeo-reassures-
the-philippines-that-us-will-defend-it-if-china-attacks.
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defense obligations.”226 The US ambassador later told the Philippine press 
that he believed that Secretary Pompeo’s statement extended to any at-
tack by China’s maritime militia on Philippine forces and public vessels.
Under the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2014 Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement, US forces continue to support the Phil-
ippine armed forces against ISIS-aligned extremists. Today, joint exercises, 
arms transfers, and training are operating at historic levels. This year, 280 
bilateral exercises are scheduled with the Philippine armed forces, the 
most bilateral exercises with any country in the INDOPACOM region.227 The 
United States (along with Japan) is also working to assist the Philippines 
in maritime and air capacity building.
In February 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte announced his intention 
to withdraw from the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The decision set in 
motion a 180-day countdown period that would terminate the agreement 
in August. If terminated, the alliance would remain in effect but bilateral 
security cooperation would be significantly affected. 
As for the future of the US security strategy toward Southeast Asia, 
it is perhaps worth looking to the past, namely the 1991 decision by the 
Philippine Senate to terminate US access to Subic Bay. In Washington, 
the Philippine decision produced a major shift in US strategy toward 
Southeast Asia, emphasizing “access” and characterized as “Places not 
Bases.” This began with Lee Kwan Yew’s offer to provide the US with 
access to Singapore’s naval and air facilities. Further, in the evolution of 
this concept across Southeast Asia, the US security strategy, over three 
decades, has demonstrated the capacity to adapt to the challenges of an 
ever-changing environment.
4.5.5. Thailand
The United States alliance with Thailand dates back to the signing of 
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833. Today, Thailand is a major 
non-NATO ally. The 2014 military coup complicated the US-Thailand 
relationship, but military engagement continues through joint exercises, 
and Thailand continues to host the Cobra Gold exercise, the largest mili-
tary exercise in the region. Thailand also provides the United States with 
access to the Utapao Air Base and the Sattahip Deep Water Port. Utapao 
provides logistics support for US HA/DR operations in the region.228
226 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (2019), June 1, https://media.defense.gov/2019/
Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
227 ibid. 
228 ibid.
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4.6. ALLIANCE EVOLUTION
As noted above, the US “hub and spokes” bilateral alliance structure, Cold 
War in origin, has been evolving toward a comprehensive and networked 
architecture, one that includes increased cooperation between US alliance 
partners and active efforts to engage other regional security partners in 
the building of strategic partnerships.
Examples include the following. The United States has encouraged 
increased bilateral security cooperation between US allies, most notably 
between Japan and Australia and Japan and the Philippines; trilateral 
security cooperation among Australia, Japan and the United States; and 
among Japan, the ROK and the United States; as well as quadrilateral en-
gagement involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Exercis-
es that began in the context of US bilateral alliances have been expanded 
to include a wide range of regional participants.
At the same time, the United States has developed Comprehensive 
Partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, and a Strategic Part-
nership with Singapore, while Japan and Australia have developed similar 
partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.
Today, Australia, Japan and the United States are focusing on mari-
time issues in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, particularly mar-
itime capacity building, maritime domain awareness, joint training and 
exercises, and port calls across the region. Indicative of the increasing 
alliance-based cooperation, in November 2018 the United States, Japan 
and Australia joined together to promote “high quality” infrastructure 
projects across the Indo-Pacific region.
There is one caveat to the positive developments outlined above, namely 
President Trump’s idiosyncratic approach to alliance management, his 
transactional view of alliances, and rejection of the multilateral manage-
ment of trade policy. When it comes to the latter, President Trump’s deci-
sion to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has placed the United 
States outside the rules-setting norms of the TPP Eleven, at a time when 
the administration, in its Indo-Pacific strategy, is emphasizing support for 
a rules-based order, and at a time when the economic dynamic of the re-
gion is moving toward integration, thus disadvantaging the United States.
The uncertainties arising from the trade war with China are causing 
alliance partners to consider alternative trade structures – the Japan-EU 
FTA, RECEP, and the ongoing discussions among Japan, China and the ROK 
for a trilateral FTA. Hedging against the downside of the Trump admin-
istration’s trade war approach to commerce may have long-term, now 
unforeseen, political and strategic consequences.
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4.7. THE INDO-PACIFIC: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The concept of the Indo-Pacific has a long policy heritage – one predating 
the Trump administration. In 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso called for 
an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity to extend from Northeast Asia to Cen-
tral Asia and the Middle East; governed by “values-oriented diplomacy, 
with emphasis on universal values, democracy, freedom, human rights, 
rule of law and the market economy” – all values lacking in China.229 
In 2007, Prime Minister Abe, in remarks to the Parliament of India, 
spoke of the Confluence of the Two Seas, emphasizing fundamental 
values: freedom, democracy, human rights as well as strategic interests, 
particularly freedom of the sea lanes. Nine years later, in 2016, Prime 
Minister Abe, in remarks delivered in Nairobi, Kenya, asserted that “Ja-
pan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, 
rule of law and the market economy, free from force or coercion and 
making it prosperous.”230
At the November 2017 APEC meeting in Danang, President Trump 
adopted a similar vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as his own. 
A month later, the administration issued the National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America, followed in short order by a Summary 
of the National Defense Strategy. Both documents highlight a US-China 
relationship moving from cooperation to competition, defining China 
as a revisionist power and a strategic competitor, pursuing a military 
modernization program that seeks to limit US access to the region and 
secure Indo-Pacific regional hegemony. The Indo-Pacific strategy fol-
lowed in June 2019.
In remarks to the Shangri-La Dialogue, then Acting Secretary of De-
fense Patrick Shanahan addressed the Indo-Pacific strategy. Referring to 
the remarks by Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis at Shangri-La 
in 2018, Shanahan told his audience “to reiterate, the Indo-Pacific is our 
priority theater.”231
The Acting Secretary explained that the Indo-Pacific strategy is based 
on “enduring principles of international cooperation: respect for sover-
eignty and independence; peaceful resolution of disputes; free, fair, and 
229 T. Aso (2007), Speech: The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, March 12, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
pillar/address0703.html.
230 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2016), Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development, August 27, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
231 Remarks by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan at the Shangri-La Dialogue (2019), June 1, 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-
shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/.
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reciprocal trade and investment; and adherence to international rules 
and norms, including freedom of navigation and overflight.”
The principles are to be advanced by continuing to strengthen his-
toric alliances and develop strategic partnerships; by enhancing inter-
operability with allies and partners – both hardware and software; by 
supporting multilateralism – ASEAN centrality in the regional security 
architecture, thus reaffirming Vice President Pence’s 2017 commitment 
to build a strategic partnership with ASEAN; and building on shared 
values and strategic interests with India.
As for China, the Acting Secretary noted that “some in our region are 
choosing to act contrary to the principles and norms that have benefited 
us all.” He went on to define the greatest long-term threat to the region 
as coming from “actors who seek to undermine, rather than uphold, 
the rules-based international order,” actors seeking to “undermine the 
system by using indirect, incremental actions, and rhetorical devices to 
exploit others economically, diplomatically, and coerce them militarily.” 
In contrast to the “broadly shared” vision of a free and open region, he 
observed that “some seem to want a future where power determines 
place and debt determines destiny.” 
Recognizing the prosperity-security dilemma facing countries in 
the region, the Acting Secretary stated that “for this reason, the Unit-
ed States does not want any country in this region to choose or forgo 
positive economic relations with any partner.”232 A year earlier, then 
Secretary Mattis was more direct: “we do not ask any country to choose 
between the United States and China.”233
4.8. CONCLUSION
The United States-China relationship is entering a new era. The bipar-
tisan consensus that has guided a partnership-oriented China policy, 
from the Nixon opening through visions of a Responsible Stakeholder, 
has eroded. A new relationship is now in the process of being defined. 
It will be one in which decades of United States pre-eminence will 
be challenged.
232 Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue (2019), June 1, https://
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-
remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dia.
233 Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue (2018), June 2, https://
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-
plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/.
110    SEPTEMBER 2020
The Trump administration’s trade war is just the beginning of efforts to 
define and restructure the economic relationship toward market-based 
policies and greater reciprocity. This approach is likely to continue ei-
ther during a second Trump administration or in a successor Democratic 
administration, backed by strong bipartisan political support on Capitol 
Hill. One needs only to recognize the strong general support for President 
Trump’s trade war from Democratic Minority Leader Chuck Schumer. 
While disagreeing with the specifics of Trump’s Phase One of the US-Chi-
na trade deal, Schumer has consistently supported Trump’s “get tough” 
approach to China. 
In the Indo-Pacific region, the Trump administration has taken a more 
activist posture in the South China Sea, as evidenced by an increase in 
Freedom of Navigation Operations. This is both an assertion of historic 
US national interests as well as a challenge to China’s excessive maritime 
claims. But Freedom of Navigation Operations alone will not address 
China’s growing influence across the region.
Over the past two years, the United States has started to react, be-
ginning with President Trump’s adoption of an Indo-Pacific vision and 
an Indo-Pacific strategy. In effect, the Indo-Pacific strategy is making a 
bet: by strengthening alliances and strategic partnerships, by developing 
trilateral alliance-based security and economic cooperation with Japan, 
Australia and the ROK, by supporting ASEAN centrality, by developing 
US-India relations and by exploring the potential of the Quad, the strat-
egy aims to create a free-standing but interlocking set of policy-building 
blocks that will support a balance of power or a countervailing dynamic 
aimed at advancing the values that the United States, its allies, and stra-
tegic partners espouse. The strategy is making a bet that our values can 
prevail if we invest in and marshal the economic, diplomatic, and military 
resources to support an open-rules-based international order. 
There is much work to be done – starting with committed and con-
sistent leadership from Washington. In the words of former Secretary of 
Defense Mattis “bear with us, after we’ve exhausted all possible alterna-
tives, we’ll do the right thing.”234 
The pursuit of enduring US economic and security interests in the 
Indo-Pacific region has shaped US strategy for over two centuries. This 
chapter has focused on the US post-Cold War strategy toward the In-
do-Pacific and the US alliance-based security structure, which has served 
as the foundation of US strategy.
Notwithstanding the present impasse with the Philippines, the author 
believes that US interests will endure, and that the alliance-based security 
234 ibid.
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structure will likewise endure and continue to evolve, as it has over the 
past three decades.235
235 For other studies on US strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region, see R.G. Stutter (2019), “The United States 
and Asia Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First Century Relations,” Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; 
A. Yeo (2019), “Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century,” Stanford 
University Press; M. J. Green (2017), “By More Than Providence,” Columbia University Press; W. T. Tow and 
D. Stuart (2014), “The New US Strategy Toward Asia,” Abingdon: Routledge; T. Mahnken & D. Blumenthal 
(eds.) (2014), “Strategy in Asia,” Stanford University Press.
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5. ‘ESTRANGED DEMOCRACIES’ IN THE 
GEOPOLITICS OF SHIFTING ALLIANCES 
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: PERSPECTIVES 
FROM AND ON INDIA 
Sanjay Chaturvedi
5.1. INTRODUCTION
As the ‘Asian Century’ unfolds somewhat unsteadily, underpinned by 
geopolitical power shifts, the metageography236 as well as the geographs237 
of international relations are in a state of flux. Destabilized in the process 
of transition are the dominant cartographies of the Cold War-induced 
geopolitical demarcations and depictions of regions and sub-regions 
on the face of the globe, such as South Asia, South-East Asia, and East 
Asia. The nature, extent and direction of this multifaceted 21st century 
interregnum238 are yet to be fully mapped and theorized. The question of 
how well equipped the IR/geopolitical theories239 that grappled with the 
Cold War power play240 are to explain power shifts that are fast changing 
the societies, economies and polities on the Asian rimland also remains 
largely unanswered. In this conundrum of shifting alliances, partnerships, 
236 “The set of spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the world”. See M. L. Lewis, 
and K. E. Wigen (1997), The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. These spatial structures, largely uninterrogated, retain their seductive character on account 
of their usefulness in reducing complex lived-in geographies to highly simplified but seductive mental maps. 
237 Geographs are “particular frequently used descriptions of the world” or the “ontological and geopolitical 
presuppositions that structure particular modes of peace, security and defence discourse”, S. Dalby 
(1993) ‘The ‘Kiwi disease’: geopolitical discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific’, Political 
Geography, vol. 12, no. 5, September 1993, p. 440.
238 “In world order terms … a new, stable order … has not been established but significant elements of the old 
order remain in place”, G. Sørensen, (2006). What Kind of World Order?: The International System in the 
New Millennium. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(4), p. 358.
239 K. He (2018), Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the “Indo-Pacific” from an IR Theory 
Perspective. East Asia 35, pp. 149–161.
240 V.D. Cha (2016), Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
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relocations, repositionings, reorientations, realignments and rebalanc-
ing, one of the most keenly observed ‘strategic’ relationships of the 21st 
century is the one that is evolving between India and the United States 
of America.
A term that has captured the serious attention of both scholars and 
practitioners of late, especially in the so-called QUAD241 countries – the 
USA, India, Australia, and Japan – as a possible solution to the post-Cold 
War geopolitical vertigo242 is the ‘Indo-Pacific’. In mid-2018, the US Pa-
cific Command, the oldest and largest American military command,243 
was renamed the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In April 2019, 
the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, established a new 
Division for the Indo-Pacific244 in view of “the increasing salience of the 
Indo-Pacific concept in global discourse”.245 Against the backdrop of a 
rather aggressive territorialization of the South China Sea by China in 
the form of land reclamation and the construction of artificial islands 
in the ongoing dispute over the Senkaku Island chain,246 Prime Minister 
Abe advocated a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.247 In the case of Australia, 
the 2017 ‘Foreign Policy White Paper’248 underlined the growing salience 
of “Maritime and land border disputes” as a “growing source of potential 
instability in a more contested Indo-Pacific”, drawing in the “region’s 
three big Asian powers – China, Japan and India – as well as Southeast 
Asian nations and Pakistan.” Referring to the South China Sea as a “major 
fault line in the regional order”, Australia has expressed its commitment 
to region-building through the peaceful resolution of disputes, in ac-
cordance with international law.
241 The Quadrilateral consultative forum, which comprises Australia, India, Japan and the United States. 
242 “A state of confusion where the old nostrums of the Cold War were redundant and new ones had not yet 
been invented, issued and approved”, G. Ó Tuathail (1998), “New World Order Geopolitics”, in (eds.) G. Ó 
Tuathail, S. Dalby The Geopolitics Reader, London: Routledge, p. 103.
243 It covers more of the globe than any of the other geographic combatant commands and shares borders with 
all of the other five geographic combatant commands. See: https://www.pacom.mil.
244 The Indo-Pacific Division deals with matters relating to the Indo-Pacific, India-ASEAN relations, the East 
Asia Summit, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC) and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). 
The purpose in doing so was said to be twofold: “to help consolidate India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific across 
the Government of India, in line with the elements set out by the Prime Minister of India in June 2018, and to 
provide substantive policy elements and programmes to that vision.”
245 MEA (2020), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Indo-Pacific Division Briefs, https://mea.gov.
in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf.
246 B. Hayton (2014), South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press; M. G. Koo (2009), The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese political-economic relations: cold 
politics and hot economics? The Pacific Review, 22: 2, pp. 205-232; M. E. O’Hanlon (2019), The Senkaku 
paradox: risking Great Power war over small stakes. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
247 B. Chellaney (2018), “Japan’s Pivotal Role in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order,” Asia Pacific Review, 25(1): 
pp. 38-51; Y. Hosoya (2019), ‘FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’, Asia-
Pacific Review, 26(1), pp. 18-28.
248 Australian Government (2017), ‘Chapter three: A stable and prosperous Indo–Pacific’, Foreign Policy White 
Paper, pp. 37-47. 
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With the notion of the ‘Indo-Pacific’249 having been officially embraced 
and enthusiastically flagged, as indicted above, the extent to which these 
narratives actually converge and/or diverge with regard to what and 
where the major challenges are and how these could be effectivity ad-
dressed needs to be explored further. At the same time, the gap between 
the reality and the rhetoric of the Indo-Pacific appears to be widening, 
notwithstanding the burgeoning scholarly literature on the subject.250
‘Estranged Democracies’251 no longer, the United States and India, 
while talking to each other at various levels on the question of the In-
do-Pacific, seem to be struggling in their own ways with understanding 
the hardcore reality of an increasingly ambitious, assertive and, according 
to some, even insecure252 China. In the whirlpool of shifting post-Cold 
War geopolitical alliances, both find themselves in an unprecedented 
geopolitical and geostrategic embrace. The evolving strategic equations 
between the two largest democracies in the world in the vast, complex 
and dynamic Indo-Pacific space-place are seen by some as holding the key 
to the success of QUAD and its mandate of securing a rule-based ‘inclu-
sive’, ‘peaceful’ and stable order – both on land and at sea. Now that the 
US and India are no longer estranged, is there a narrative convergence 
when it comes to their respective understandings of the Indo-Pacific? The 
key argument in this chapter is that while searching for an answer to this 
question, views from and on India on the question of the Indo-Pacific – 
entangled as they are in an intricate manner – should be addressed in 
conjunction with and not divorced from each other. 
249 The telling title of a recent seminal book: see T. Doyle and D. Rumley (2019), The Rise & Return of the Indo-
Pacific, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
250 See R. J. Heydarian (2020), The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery, 
Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan; Doyle & Rumley (2019); W. Choong (2019), “The return of the Indo-Pacific 
strategy: an assessment”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 73 (5), pp. 415-430; C. Mahapatra 
(2019), Rise of the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi: Pentagon Press (in association with Indian Council of Social 
Science Research); V. Sakhuja & V. Bhatia (2018), Indo-Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Perspectives, 
New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs; J. M. Smith (2017), Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and 
Balancing in the Indo-Pacific, Rowman and Littlefield; A. Rossiter & B. J. Cannon (2020), Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: New Geopolitical Realities, London, New York: Routledge. 
251 The term is borrowed from the title of a book authored by D. Kux entitled India and the United States: 
Estranged Democracies 1941-1991, Washington: National Defense University Press. The term invites 
attention to the uneven and unpredictable relationship between the US and India over nearly half a century, 
which, by and large, remained ‘estranged’, turning ‘hostile’ occasionally, primarily due to sharply diverging 
perceptions over major national security concerns, Kux (1993) p. 447.
252 S. W. Khan (2018), Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
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5.2. WHAT IS THE ‘INDO-PACIFIC’ AND WHAT DOES IT 
STAND FOR?
Haruko Wada253 has insightfully shown how “the geographical contours of 
the term Indo-Pacific have evolved in the conception of the key countries 
involved”. As far as the origins of the term are concerned, in the annals 
of Western geopolitical tradition, the term Indo-Pacific was first used by 
German geopolitician Karl Haushofer254 and American IR scholar with a 
realist world view255 Nicholas J. Spykman. As the following discussion 
reveals, these geopolitical texts were intricately embedded in overwhelm-
ingly colonial and imperial contexts.256 
Karl Haushofer equated the ‘Indo-Pacific region’ with ‘Asiatic Mon-
soon countries’ and predicted the rise of China and India. In an article 
written in 1939, he pronounced: “If an empire could arise with Japan’s 
soul in China’s body, that would be a power which would put even the 
empires of Russia and the United States in the shade”.257 He wanted Ger-
many to work towards “promoting the geopolitical unity of this region in 
order to offset British and American Sea Power”.258 Haushofer’s military 
map of the ‘Great Indo-Pacific Ocean’, drawn in 1930, included both 
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.259 He argued, as early as 1924, 
that these two oceans with their ‘rimland bases’ remain the “hinges of 
geopolitical destiny”.260 
Haushofer, fascinated by British geographer Halford J. Mackinder’s 
Heartland thesis261 – to be discussed at some length later in this paper 
– divided the world into “Pan Regions”,262 each of which was dominated 
by a great power: Pan-America by the United States, EurAfrica by 
253 H. Wada (2020), “The Indo-Pacific Concept: Geographical Adjustments and Their Implications”, RSIS 
Working Paper, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, p. 22. 
254 Described by some as the “leading intellectual theorist of German Geopolitics in the 1920s and 30s”. See F. 
C. Sempa (2015a), “Karl Haushofer and the Rise of Monsoon Countries”, The Diplomat, March 10, https://
thediplomat.com/2015/03/karl-haushofer-and-the-rise-of-the-monsoon-countries/.
255 Nicholas J. Spykman wrote that “the search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral 
values are used to facilitate the attainment of power” (cited in J. Gottman (1945): Reviewed Work: Compass 
of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, by H. W. Weigert & V. Stefansson (1945), Pacific Affairs 
vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 398-399.
256 J. M. Hobson (2012), Eurocentric Conceptions of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
257 F. C. Sempa (2015a).
258 ibid. 
259 Doyle & Rumley (2019), p. 7. 
260 H. H. Herwig (2016), The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer ‘Educated’ Hitler and Hess, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 154. 
261 F. P. Sempa (2002), Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers. 
262 H. H. Herwig (1999), Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and lebensraum, Journal of Strategic Studies, 22: 2-3, 
p. 227.
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Germany, and Pan Asia with Japan. At the core of his Indo-Pacific strategy 
was the “ideal global alignment”, where “the overbearing dominance of 
the “pirates from the sea”, that is, the “outer crescent” of the Anglo-Sax-
on powers of Britain, its empire/dominions, and the United States, was 
first checked and then checkmated by the “robbers of the steppe”, that is, 
the world’s “geographical pivot” of Germany, Russia, China, and Japan.263
As Herwig264 so succinctly puts it, “Haushofer’s depiction of history 
as a constant great-power game between the “pirates from the sea” and 
the “robbers of the steppe” has been played out since 1945 between the 
Soviet Union and the United States and more recently between the United 
States and China.” What has changed, argues Herwig, is just the termi-
nology: “pirates” and “robbers” have been defanged in favor of “whales” 
and “bears”. Haushofer visited India in November 1908, had a lunch meet-
ing with Horatio Herbert, Viscount Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief 
in India, at Fort William in Calcutta, and was informed by his host that 
an Anglo-German war, lasting at least three years, was ‘inevitable’.265 
In a poem written soon thereafter, titled ‘England in India’, Haushofer 
wrote: “Britain, this “miserable people of robbers,” had both “beguiled” 
and “plundered” India”.266 To quote Herwig:
Africa (with the exception of Italy’s attempt to conquer 
Abyssinia) and South America almost totally escaped 
Haushofer’s attention. Rather, his gaze was riveted on 
what he liked to call the “monsoon lands.” India was the 
apple of his eye. It was not only a “wronged victim” of 
British imperialism, but it was steadfastly on the path to 
independence under Mahatma Gandhi. Geopolitically, 
Haushofer dreamed of a future in which India, together 
with China and an independent Indonesia, would take 
their place as an effective counterweight at the crossroads 
of the German-Russian-Japanese “geographical pivot of 
history” and the Anglo-Saxon “outer crescent.” Perhaps, in 
time, other oppressed colonial lands such as the Philippines, 
Indochina, Singapore, Malaya, and even Hawaii would join 
this Pan-Asian conglomeration… As to China, Haushofer 
was an ardent Sinophile. He was well aware that the Middle 
Kingdom for most of its history had been the dominant Asian 
263 Herwig (2016), p. 154. 
264 ibid., p. 214.
265 Herwig (2016).
266 ibid., p. 18.
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power, and he fervently desired to see it brought into the 
“geographical pivot.”267 (emphasis added)
Nicholas J. Spykman, Sterling Professor of International Relations at 
Yale University, subscribing to a realist worldview of international rela-
tions and ‘balance of power’, could foresee in 1942 that China would be 
a major continental power in control of the “Asiatic Mediterranean”.268 
This large section of the littoral group of marginal seas such as the Sea of 
Japan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, controlling China’s 
access to the Pacific Ocean – and the SLOCs connecting the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans – acts as an “insular world par excellence”.269 
The ‘Rimland’ concept mooted by Spykman, an important conceptual 
building block in the architecture of the Indo-Pacific regional construct, 
has been interpreted differently and, according to some, at times even in-
correctly.270 For Spykman, it is not the Heartland but the Rimland that the 
‘balance of power’ problem stems from, especially due to the rise of inde-
pendent centers of power. He maintained a distinction between ‘balanced 
power as divided power’ and ‘unbalanced power as integrated power’.
The Cold War geopolitical template, and the narratives of ‘balance of 
power’, containment, and encirclement rested upon and largely revolved 
around the Heartland-Rimland, land power-sea power binaries, with the 
figures of Mahan, Mackinder and Spykman looming large. Fast forward 
to the post-Cold War era and John Agnew271 would argue that, “since 
the Cold War there has been no single geopolitical template that assigns 
meaning to world politics. This has led to the search for new geopolitical 
structures, often based on questionable empirical evidence and interpre-
tations.” Is the Indo-Pacific one such template or a set of templates, with 
each gathering its own relevant facts in pursuit of individual national 
interests but in an apparently regional framework? A “new strategic 
construct”?272 An ‘Asian Maritime Super Region’ or “a super-region in 
which the sub-regions still matter”?273 Or a set of “strategic narratives 
267 ibid., p. 157. 
268 F. P. Sempa (2015b), “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean”, The Diplomat, 
January 9, https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-struggle-for-the-asiatic-
mediterranean/.
269 N. J. Spykman (1942), America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, 
New York: Harcourt Brace and Company Inc, p. 132. 
270 M. P. Gerace (1991), “Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment and After”, Comparative 
Strategy, 10(4): 347-364. 
271 J. Agnew (2012), “Is US security policy ‘pivoting’ from the Atlantic to Asia-Pacific? A Critical Geopolitical 
Perspective”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 7.
272 N. Bisley & A. Phillips (2013), “Rebalance to Where?: US Strategic Geography in Asia,” Survival, 55 (5): p. 96.
273 R. Medcalf (2013), “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?”, The American Interest 9(2): p. 59.
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of regional order”, with each narrative, notwithstanding the collective 
rhetorical commitment to a ‘stable’, ‘prosperous’, ‘open’, ‘free’ and ‘in-
clusive’ Indo-Pacific, pursuing and promoting “a distinct conception of 
regional order, reflecting different sets of political, geopolitical, economic 
and institutional concerns and agendas”?274
Pardesi,275 questioning the ‘newness’ of the term, has forcefully ar-
gued that three sub-regions, namely South, Southeast, and Northeast 
Asia, and Indian and Western Pacific “have constituted a single strategic 
system for the past two centuries”, with the last three decades of the Cold 
War proving to be exceptional. It is important to note, he further argues, 
that the future regional order in this ‘larger Asia’ will emerge not from 
the conflict between the land power and the sea power but “from the 
interdependence of continental and maritime power”. Pardesi276 argues 
forcefully that, 
This larger strategic Asia that first emerged around the time 
of the ‘great divergence’ between the West and the rest was 
created by a rising Britain through its Indian base. While 
Cold War geopolitics ‘split’ Asia into smaller sub-regions, 
the rise of China and India is reversing this split. The 
contemporary re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific allows the 
United States to create a regional distribution of power and 
a regional distribution of status (through discourse) that 
favours the United States in an increasingly multipolar region. 
(emphasis added)
Whereas the future of land/continental-sea/maritime binary geopol-
itics is difficult to pinpoint or predict in an increasingly interdependent 
and interconnected world, a number of trends strongly suggest that global 
geopolitics, after passing through the bipolarity of the Cold War era and 
the unipolarity of the post-Cold War, has now entered into the post-post-
Cold War phase of multipolarity, with a rather complex and convoluted 
spatiality in terms of nature, location, distribution and balance of power. 
274 M. Barthwal-Datta, & P. Chacko (2020), “The politics of strategic narratives of regional order in the Indo-
Pacific: Free, open, prosperous, inclusive?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 74: 3, p. 244. 
275 M. S. Pardesi (2020), “The Indo-Pacific: A ‘New’ Region or the Return of History?”, The Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 74(2), p. 124. 
276 ibid. 
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It is to a brief discussion of the post-post-Columbian epoch277 – which 
continues to unfold with hitherto unanticipated twists and turns – that 
I turn next.
5.3. OLD TEXTS AND NEW CON(TEXTS): THE ‘INDO-PACIFIC’ IN 
THE COBWEB OF THE POST-POST-COLUMBIAN EPOCH
The British geographer Halford J. Mackinder, writing in 1904, had pro-
posed a geopolitical thesis centered on the so-called ‘natural seats of pow-
er’ in Euro-Asia, based on what he described as the geographical causation 
behind history: the Heartland thesis. Ably assisted by the display of a few 
unconventional maps, he persuasively argued before the British audience 
that their much-cherished Columbian epoch – the so-called era of ex-
ploration and discovery – dictated and driven by Sea Power, had sadly 
just ended. And the dawning of the post-Columbian epoch meant that 
the world had become a ‘closed political system’ of worldwide scale and 
scope in such a manner that: “Every explosion of social forces, instead 
of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of closed space and barbaric 
chaos, will be sharply echoed from the far side of the globe and weak 
elements in the political and economic organisms of the world will be 
shattered in consequences”.278
A key message emanating from Mackinder’s writings and lectures, 
as noted in a seminal work by Gerry Kearns,279 was that “the world was 
now a single organism and that the global order rested upon force and 
contention” and the challenge to “Britain’s unique historical mission” 
of “challenging the rise of despotism overseas” as well as the “rise of a 
Power in Europe so great in resource that it could out build our fleet” now 
came “not from one quarter only, and not merely from Europe”. Among 
the most probable challengers, namely Germany, China and Russia, it 
was the last one that Mackinder found most threatening. It is important 
to note, as pointed out by Weigert,280 that:
277 Mackinder, underlining the geographical causation behind history, identified three epochs. The Pre-
Columbian epoch witnessed the domination of the land power of the Asian steppes, with horse- and camel-
riding (symbolizing the technology of the day) nomads, especially the Mongols, striking the great Asiatic 
hammer on the heads of the Europeans. In the Columbian epoch (1500-1900), the power shifted to the 
sea power of European colonial empires, ably assisted by sailing vessels and sea transportation technology, 
and the outcome was the European overseas expansion. And the Post-Columbian epoch (1900- ), with 
railways serving as the dominant technology, characterized by the land power of those who controlled the 
Heartland, and resulting in a closed space and struggle for relative efficiency. See also H. J. Mackinder (1904), 
“Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, vol. 170, no. 4, December 2004, pp. 298-321. 
278 H. J. Mackinder (1904), p. 298.
279 G. Kearns (2009), Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 183. 
280 H.W. Weigert (1942), ‘Haushofer and the Pacific’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 20 (4), pp. 732-42.
SEPTEMBER 2020    123
Mackinder’s consciousness of the passing of the Victorian sea 
power age made him see Europe and its political geography as 
subordinate to Asia. It is in Asia that the land power and the 
land-based air power have had their greatest opportunities 
to challenge established power positions in the world at 
large. The mobility of land power (not land power as such), 
in competition with the mobility of sea power, evolved as 
a decisive geopolitical feature of the twentieth century. By 
evaluating the competition and possible clash between sea and 
land power, Mackinder discovered the “pivot region of the 
world politics”: the Heartland of Eurasia. (emphasis added)
Fast forward from the interregnum of the 20th century, when Mack-
inder anxiously pronounced the arrival of the post-Columbian epoch, 
to the recent dawning of the post-post-Columbian epoch and what we 
are facing at present is the geopolitical conundrum of the 21st-centu-
ry interregnum, marked by both continuity and change. The appeal of 
classical geopolitical theories centered on Euro-Asia has not diminished, 
however, despite the Fourth Industrial Revolution281 building on the Third 
Industrial Revolution.282 Moreover, many of the issues/concerns that 
were central to Mackinder’s thesis remain important today, “including 
natural resources, mass migration, communication, and transport across 
vast geographical spaces”.283 
What is changing, however, is the pecking order in the hierarchical 
international system. Equally visible is the “shift from a Western-domi-
nated hegemonic or quasi-hegemonic order to a more complex, diverse, 
and decentered (post-hegemonic) world politics”.284 The spectacular 
economic growth of some of the “non-Western states into Great Pow-
ers in their own right”,285 and their geopolitical rise on the Euro-Asian 
rimland, or what Mackinder described as the inner crescent, has desta-
bilized the conventional sea power-land power geopolitical binary and 
the geostrategic doctrines based on them. The most outstanding among 
these powers is China, “which has become a major player just east of 
281 K. Schwab (2016), The Fourth Industrial Revolution, New York: Crown Business. 
282 J. Rifkin (2011), The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming Energy, the Economy 
and the World, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; T. L. Knutsen (2014), “Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and 
the Heartland Thesis”, The International History Review, 2014, vol. 36, no. 5: 854. 
283 T. L. Knutsen (2014), “Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis”, The International 
History Review, 2014, vol. 36, no. 5: 854.
284 A. Acharya (2018), Constructing World Order: Agency and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 3.
285 Knutsen (2014), p. 852.
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Mackinder’s Heartland”.286 As Xiang287 would argue, “China needs Mack-
inder’s heartland to reduce the enormous strategic pressure from the 
eastern Pacific”. Whereas Knutsen288 would ask, “Can a continued Si-
no-Russian rapprochement give China access to the Heartland from the 
east?”, Mackinder considered the possibility briefly. Curiosities abound!
Indeed, Mackinder had hinted at the dawning of this epoch (i.e. 
post-post-Columbian) in his 1904 article titled ‘The Geographical Pivot 
of History’: “Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, 
to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might 
constitute the yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would 
add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advan-
tage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region”.289 
One of the most outstanding geopolitical features of the post-post-Co-
lumbian epoch, and the one that proves Mackinder wrong, is not simply 
the rise and return of Asia –especially China and India – but the calls by 
both for the respectful restoration of agency.290 For Mackinder, 
The Indians were a classic agricultural people although, unlike 
Germany, they were unable to resist domination from locust 
swarms of nomadic peoples that swept down upon them 
from time to time, or who settled among them as imperial 
overlords. Perhaps for this reason, the lectures on the United 
Kingdom for Indian school children began with a chapter on 
the benefits to India brought by British rule.”291 
With the strategic geographies of international relations becoming 
multi-spatial, posing new challenges before foreign policy establish-
ments and national security experts the world over, the long-upheld Sea 
Power-Land Power geopolitical binary seems to have lost its strategic 
relevance, if not its appeal. The cobweb-like geometry of power in this 
era is characterized by intersections, flows, networks, crossroads and 
mobility. The figure of the ‘nomad’ is far more complex than imagined by 
Mackinder in his tripartite scheme of epochs. Needless to say, the concept 
286 ibid. 
287 L. Xiang (2004), “China’s Eurasian Experiment”, Survival, 46(2), p. 118.
288 Knutsen (2014).
289 Mackinder (1904), p. 437. 
290 As pointed out by Hobson (2012), “Neither Mackinder nor Mahan granted Eastern Agency a progressive role 
in the making either of the West or of world politics. Eastern People were cast with the negative stereotype 
or trope of barbaric activism – i.e., predatory Eastern agency – contributing nothing positive either to 
progressive civilization or to world order and constituting merely the harbingers of an anarchic new world 
disorder.”
291 Kearns (2009), pp. 178-179. 
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of region and the process of regionalization can no longer be approached 
and analyzed in a geo-spatial framework of fixed-static geographies. The 
new big picture is graphically captured by Holslag:292 
The Eurasian continent has become a true world island. 
Trains plough from Shanghai to Rotterdam, pipelines branch 
out from the energy-rich heart-land in all directions, and 
imposing mountain passes are pierced by wide, blacktopped 
highways. In parallel, the seas bordering the world island 
have merged into a single, crowded maritime ring-way, a 
vital conduit for trade in raw materials and manufactured 
goods, and for the projection of influence.
The apparent mismatch between the discursive/imagined and the 
real/material – a source of widely shared policy discomfort as well as 
cartographic anxieties – appears to be one of the defining features of what 
George Sørensen has described as an interregnum.293 A frantic search is 
underway for new theoretical constructs, strategic geographs and ge-
opolitical templates with which to approach, analyze and manage the 
tangled geopolitical-geoeconomic realities of post-post-Cold War world 
transitions and their military-strategic fallouts. 
As pointed out by Doyle and Rumley,294 these transitions are under-
pinned by at least five global geopolitical/geo-economic simultaneous 
shifts to: 1) a post-Cold War world witnessing a “New multiplex Cold 
War” but without much evidence of the Cold War mental maps and 
mentality having completely withered away; 2) “a post-unipolar world” 
and, relatively speaking, the decline of the United States of America;295 
3) a post-colonial world and “emergence of post-colonial nationalism”. 
Fourth, a “shift in the global distribution of economic power” away from 
Europe and the US to Asia. And finally, a “shift in the nature of ‘threat’ to 
‘non-traditional’ concerns”. 
The post-post-Columbian epoch is also characterized by acute car-
tographic anxieties around the future/fate of America’s Asian Allianc-
es296 and questions of ‘alliance sustainability’, ‘alliance adaptability’, 
292 J. Holslag (2013), “The Eurasian Sea”, Survival, 55: 4, pp. 155. 
293 J. Chaturvedi and J. Painter (2007), “Whose World, Whose Order? Spatiality, Geopolitics and the Limits of the 
World Order Concept”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 
vol. 42(4): 375–395. 
294 Doyle & Rumley (2009), p. 10. 
295 According to some, the ‘decline of the US-led world order’, which is not the same as the ‘relative decline 
of America’, deserves equal attention. See Acharya, A. (2014), The End of the American World Order, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
296 R. D. Blackwill & P. Dibb (2000), America’s Asian Alliances, Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
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‘alliance management’, and ‘alliance longevity’.297 The boundaries drawn 
through the geopolitical partitioning/compartmentalization of the globe, 
for example between ‘South Asia and South East Asia’ by the Cold War 
ideological geopolitics298 are becoming increasingly fuzzy. Some scholars 
have expressed doubts over the viability of the hub and spokes framework 
that evolved under the San Francisco model.299 Teo and Emmers300 argue 
quite persuasively that, “While the impact of these pressures on individual 
alliances may vary, this system as a whole is expected to modify in three 
primary ways. Specifically, the San Francisco System is likely to become 
more diffused, selectively interconnected, as well as characterized by 
more insecurity toward the alliances on the part of both the United States 
and its allies.” 
Apparently, with some of the old alliances displaced and/or drifting 
away – although not yet fully apart – the search for new allies by the 
‘major’ powers appears to be floundering, with the ‘middle’ and ‘small’ 
powers finding it difficult to take clear-cut sides in a complex and volatile 
tug-of-war and thus facing dilemmas hitherto unimagined. This also 
demands critical rethinking of the assertion that multiple alignments 
are the best form of non-alignment for middle and small powers. India’s 
simultaneous serious engagement with Indian Ocean maritime regional-
isms, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and sub-region-
alisms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), shows the elastic nature of India’s 
strategic geographies. 
There is no denying the fact that what makes the Indo-Pacific a con-
tested construct is the role of ‘middle’ and ‘small’ powers and the di-
lemmas faced by several of them. Beyond the geopolitical imaginations 
and visions of a unipolar, bipolar and multipolar international system, 
anchored in structural realism, lies a complex reality that Amitav Achar-
ya301 would describe as a multiplex international system characterized by 
cultural and political diversity. Conspicuous by its absence in a multiplex 
world is a hegemon, while “Leadership is plural and is conducted in differ-
ent styles and modes, just as a multiplex runs movies of different varieties. 
Yet being under one complex means sharing a common architecture and 
297 W. T. Tow (2019), “Minilateral security’s relevance to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific: challenges and 
prospects”, The Pacific Review, 32(2): pp. 232-244.
298 J. Agnew (1998), Geopolitics: Visioning World Politics, London and New York; Routledge. 
299 Formed in 1950, the San Francisco system or model of US bilateral alliances – a major building block of the 
Asia-Pacific Security architecture – was initially aimed at containing the spread of communism during the 
Cold War. 
300 S. Teo & R. Emmers (2020), “The Future of the San Francisco System: Pressures and Prospects”, Asian 
Politics & Policy, p. 1. DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12513
301 Acharya (2018), p. 8. 
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being in an interdependent relationship. And the security screening at 
the entrance to the entire complex implies that collective and common 
security mechanisms are at play.”
Applying the imagery of a multiplex to the Indo-Pacific opens up an 
interesting vista of various competing, converging and diverging narra-
tives catering to the desires, anxieties and fears of various stakeholders 
at multiple scales and in diverse locations. 
As noted earlier, from a constructivist perspective, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is 
a ‘Super Region of Sub-Regions’, discursively carved out of a mind-bog-
gling diversity, with an intriguing assemblage of strategic geographies of 
major, middle and small powers. No wonder its fuzzy boundaries remain 
in a state of flux. The extent to which these geographs converge and/or 
diverge around certain core issue areas needs to be explored. The core 
concerns that could possibly be discerned from repeated official policy 
pronouncements by the major proponents of the Indo-Pacific – primar-
ily the USA, India, Japan, Australia and Indonesia – include ‘freedom 
of passage’, a ‘rule-based maritime order’, and ‘security of sea lanes of 
communication’. 
This nascent, supposedly collective ‘security’ architecture, anchored 
in shifting geometries of power, can also be seen as responses to perceived 
challenges and dilemmas posed by a cobweb of entangled geopolitical, 
geoeconomic, strategic and ecological logics. As succinctly noted by Su-
jan R. Chiony,302 the manner in which China and the US are entangled 
through trade and investment, despite a huge trust deficit, and the rest 
of the countries are “intertwined in a web of relation with both China 
and the US” pose difficult policy dilemmas. With a rather fractured power 
profile – economic, political or military – the idea of one single coun-
try dominating all issues is simply unthinkable. Issues related to trade 
and technology are highly contested. At the same time, “Nationalism 
and regionalism are on the rise. There is less multilateralism but greater 
multi-polarity. Hedging and multi-alignment are part of every coun-
try’s strategic toolkit. The old consensus is fraying and a balance is yet to 
emerge. This calls for readjustments”.303
The ongoing global Covid-19 pandemic, unfolding with hitherto unim-
agined consequences, has added a new dimension to the post-post-Co-
lumbian epoch. This dimension relates to the geo-emotional-psycholog-
ical dimensions of the conundrum of connectivity. Mackinder’s greatest 
fear at the dawning of the Columbia epoch seemed to revolve around the 
perception of a world fast closing in – reinforced by the introduction of 
302 S. R. Chinoy (2019), “India must negotiate growing Chinese presence in Indo-Pacific region”, Indian Express, 
17 December, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/navigating-the-indo-pacific-6170525/.
303 ibid. 
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the trans-Siberian railways across the geographical pivot or the Heartland 
– and its implications for a freedom-loving sea power. The post-post-Co-
lumbian epoch, however, appears to be overwhelmingly characterized 
by an intricate emotional patchwork of hope and fear surrounding the 
perceived inevitability of ‘connectivity’.
5.3.1. The ‘China factor’: Connection defines danger? 
The usage of the term Indo-Pacific ostensibly includes containing/coun-
ter-balancing narratives, but is not exhausted by them. Locations con-
tinue to matter both within and beyond the Indo-Pacific on the face of 
the globe. In the making of the 21st-century construct of the Indo-Pacific, 
the ‘China factor’ looms large. Various facets of this highly nuanced China 
factor await critical examination. In geopolitical-spatial terms, strategic 
thinkers are increasingly re-locating China at the intersection of the sea 
power-land power binary. 
Geopolitically approached and analyzed, China, hitherto overwhelm-
ingly seen as a land power, is now being increasingly perceived by some 
analysts/policymakers as proactively mobilizing vast continental re-
sources in pursuit of unrestrained amphibious capability, ably supported 
by steadily growing ambition and the ability to mark its geopolitical and 
geoeconomic presence in diverse regions – from the Arctic to Antarctica 
with the Indian Ocean in-between – and related governance regimes. 
According to Shyam Saran,304 former foreign secretary of India, what 
current geopolitical trends suggest is that China, through its BRI strat-
egy/initiative, is meticulously “carving out” a “continental-maritime 
geostrategic realm”. For Saran, “it is not a question of whether but when 
China – recalling some of its past maritime traditions – would start be-
having like a sea power beyond the South China Sea.”
‘Is China Bidding for a Heartland?’ Francis A. Sempa305 in a concise but 
thought- provoking article carrying this title succinctly provides a key to 
the answer in the sub-title itself: ‘Beijing doesn’t have to choose between 
land and sea predominance. It could have both’. According to Sempa:
China today sits at the gates of the Heartland and has 
access to the sea. Its foreign policy has both maritime and 
continental components and it is projecting power and 
influence at sea and on land. It would be wise, therefore, for 
304 S. Saran (2015), “What China’s One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for India, Asia and the World”, The 
Wire, October 9, https://thewire.in/external-affairs/what-chinas-one-belt-and-one-road-strategy-
means-for-india-asia-and-the-world.
305 F. P. Sempa (2015c), “Is China Bidding for the Heartland? Beijing does not have to choose between land and 
sea power predominance. It could have both”, The Diplomat, January 21, https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/
is-china-bidding-for-the-heartland/.
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the world’s statesmen to reflect upon Mackinder’s warning 
in 1919 in his book Democratic Ideals and Reality (Mackinder 
1919: 70). Mackinder had said: “What if the Great Continent, 
the whole World Island or a large part of it, were at some 
future time to become a single and united base of sea power? 
Would not the other insular bases be outbuilt as regards ships 
and outmanned as regards seamen? Their fleets would no 
doubt fight with all the heroism begotten of their histories, 
but the end would be fated.”
Fast forward once again to when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(Quad) emerged in 2007. Soon thereafter, Quad was eclipsed by Shinzo 
Abe tendering his resignation as Japan’s Prime Minister and Australia 
choosing to withdraw during the prime ministership of Kevin Rudd. A 
decade later, the Quad (colloquially termed “Quad 2.0”), was revived by 
the US, Japan, Australia and India on the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Sum-
mit. This happened against the backdrop of the widely perceived assertive, 
bordering on aggressive, behavior of China in and around the South China 
Sea. Whereas the Chinese media was quick to label the grouping as a 
potential “Asian NATO”, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi de-
scribed the initiative as “foam in the ocean, destined to dissipate soon”.306
A critical examination of the what, why and where of the Indo-Pacific 
in the geopolitical visions of ‘Quad’ states can be illuminating. What is 
the extent to which their definitions and perceptions of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
converge and/or diverge and why? There is no such thing as a ‘view from 
nowhere’. Rai307 would argue that “while the Quad may not currently be 
functioning as envisaged and desired, there is no gainsaying the fact that 
the future is unpredictable beyond certain fairly narrow bounds. Thus, 
the future may well witness the birth of new ways and means by which 
the Quad 2.0 could be a functional and useful platform to ensure a more 
stable balance of power and the maintenance of stability and peace.”
Victor D. Cha308 reminds us of the ‘powerplay’ strategy of the USA and 
its profound and lasting impact on the Asian security spectrum. “It was 
through the hub and spoke bilateral security alliance system”, points 
out Cha, that the United States created and cultivated “tightly held and 
exclusive, one-to-one bilateral partnerships with countries in the region. 
Like a bicycle wheel, each of these allies and partners constituted “spokes” 
306 A. Rai (2018), “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0) – a credible strategic construct or mere ‘foam in 
the ocean’?”, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 14: 2, 139. 
307 ibid., p. 146. 
308 V.D. Cha (2016), Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, p. 3. 
130    SEPTEMBER 2020
connected with a central hub (the United States), but with few connec-
tions between the spokes.” 
It is useful to acknowledge that a major challenge before the Quad 
is that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is yet to be operationalized. The Indo-Pacific 
is what states, including/especially major powers ‘residing’ in this su-
per-regional space, including China, make of it through the lenses of 
their respective strategic geographies and perceived national, regional 
and global interests in an increasingly volatile international geopolitical 
economy marked by ‘trade wars’. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris 
have argued in their book titled War by Other Means: Geoeconomics 
and Statecraft309 that “China is seeking a grand strategy that will end 
U.S. primacy in Asia and alter the balance of power in that vast and cru-
cial region. And although People’s Republic of China is undertaking an 
ambitious program of military modernization, its tools in pursuing that 
grand strategy for the foreseeable future are primarily geoeconomic and 
not military…the strength of the economies of America’s allies and of India 
will be critical factors in their ability to resist Chinese economic coercion 
and to stand strong in maintaining the current balance of power in Asia 
at large.” The statement demands and deserves critical engagement with 
the implications of geoeconomics for the India-US strategic partnership 
in the Indo-Pacific. 
5.4. ‘INDIA’ IN THE US NARRATIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC: 
‘ESTRANGED DEMOCRACIES’ NO LONGER!
Why does India figure the way it does today in various doctrines and 
national security documents of the US? The manner in which India’s 
‘strategic’ location is being discursively carved out on the strategic geo-
graphs and supporting cartographies of the US and its ‘allies’ on the new 
Indo-Pacific map deserves closer and critical attention. It is useful to re-
call, as pointed out earlier in this paper, that India’s location was indeed 
a matter of both geopolitical curiosity and strategic concern early on in 
the eurocentric narratives and cartographies of the Indo-Pacific. I will 
return to this point shortly.
309 R. D. Blackwill & J. M. Harris (2016), War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 256. 
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As widely believed, reported and discussed, it all began with the ‘piv-
ot’, ‘rebalancing’ or ‘reorientation’ to Asia in 2011.310 However, Silove311 
has persuasively questioned the “misperception that the pivot to Asia was 
either “all talk and no walk” or that it was a containment strategy”. In 
his assessment, based on a closer look at some of the de-classified docu-
ments, a “sustained and substantial reorientation toward Asia” began in 
the mid-2000s. “From then, the United States implemented major revi-
sions to its force posture in Asia to increase the overall capabilities of the 
United States and its allies and partners in the region. The hub-and-spokes 
model of alliance relationships, which had endured since the end of the 
Korean War, was substantially revised to build stronger defense rela-
tionships among the spokes and add India – an important new partner 
– to the arrangement.” One of the key objectives behind these initiatives, 
to which an economic dimension was added through the TPP, was “to 
work in concert toward the goal of reducing the likelihood of a Chinese 
bid for hegemony in Asia. If the strategy were successful, it would pre-
serve the existing power balance in the region, in which the United 
States held the superior position.” (emphasis added)
The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
emphatically points out that “the U.S. interest in a free and open In-
do-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic”.312 It invites 
attention to “geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions 
of world order” in the Indo-Pacific region and points out that the region, 
“which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the 
United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic 
part of the world.” In the sub-section dealing with ‘South and Central 
Asia’, the document underlines the need to broaden and deepen the stra-
tegic partnership between the US and India, also in order to augment In-
dia’s leadership role in ensuring maritime security in the broader region.313 
The US definition of the Indo-Pacific excludes the Western Indian Ocean.314 
In mid-2018, a major policy decision by the United States of America 
to rename its Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command raised many 
310 “The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at 
the center of the action,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in October 2011, while presenting the 
Barack Obama administration’s strategy toward the Asia Pacific. See H. Clinton (2011), “America’s Pacific 
Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_
century. See also J. A. Bader (2012), Obama and China’s Rise: An Insiders’ Account of America’s Asia 
Strategy, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
311 N. Silove (2016), “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia”, 
International Security, 40(4), p. 88. 
312 White House (2017), National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.), December, p. 46.
313 White House (2017), p. 50. 
314 The boundary between India and Pakistan coincides with the boundary between the US Central Command 
and the US Indo-Pacific Command.
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eyebrows and invited wide- ranging speculation in the media. According 
to Pardesi,315 this renaming could also be interpreted as a “subtle message” 
to India that “while the United States welcomes India’s rise, India is rising 
in only one world region that is covered by one single American military 
command”. In his view, “as with power distribution, the discourse of the 
Indo-Pacific also ensures a distribution of status that is favourable to the 
United States by decentring China and by reminding India of its place in 
the American world order.” In this geopolitical-strategic framing, the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea get eclipsed in comparison to 
the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. 
In February 2020, during the state visit of President Donald Trump to 
India, a joint statement outlining the ‘Vision and Principles for the United 
States-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’ was issued.316 
Under the sub-heading ‘Strategic Convergence in the Indo-Pacific’, the 
critical importance of a close partnership between India and the Unit-
ed States to ensure a “free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous 
Indo-Pacific region” and good governance, ably assisted by maritime 
domain awareness, was underlined. What also came to be acknowledged 
was ASEAN’s centrality, along with the emphasis placed on the safety 
and freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful settlement 
of maritime disputes through adherence to the ‘Code of Conduct’ and 
without prejudice to the legitimate rights and interests of all nations under 
international law. Referring to the geoeconomic content of their strategic 
partnership in the Indo-Pacific, both underlined the need to forge a “new 
partnership between USAID and India’s Development Partnership Ad-
ministration for cooperation in third countries”.
After a formal US-India dialogue held in New Delhi, US Deputy Sec-
retary of State John Sullivan is reported to have said:317 “What we seek 
is a China that competes fairly in the rules-based order that has brought 
increased prosperity to so many over so many decades. But we recognize 
we can’t do this alone. That’s why the vitality of the U.S.-India partner-
ship is such an important factor in determining whether China ultimately 
succeeds in reshaping Asia to its purposes. Leaders of both the United 
States and India recognize this.”
315 Pardesi (2019), pp. 139-40.
316 MEA (2020).
317 J. Sullivan (2019), Remarks at the India-US Forum, https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-india-u-s-forum/.
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5.5. VIEWS FROM INDIA ON THE INDO-PACIFIC
The term Indo-Pacific has slowly but surely registered itself in the formal 
official parleys and pronouncements of India.318 Early on, Scott319 had 
perceptively captured the contours of the emerging maritime framework 
for a possible US-India convergence at three levels: conceptual, policy 
and causal.320 He concluded his analysis of the causation behind India’s 
engagement with the Indo-Pacific with the argument that, “cooperation 
(as indeed competition and confrontation) does not stem from the term 
Indo-Pacific, but rather from the actual policies and interactions of the 
actors in that Indo-Pacific region. What is clear is that, either way, the 
role of the Indo-Pacific as a meaningful security concept has become 
important for India. It is an area of growing strategic importance and 
maritime involvement for India, both in terms of traditional geopolitics 
and critical geopolitics and geo-economics”.321 
However, from a historical perspective, some of the early reflections 
from India on the question of the Indo-Pacific can be found in the strategic 
thinking of Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s foreign secretary at the time of the Sec-
ond World War, and K. M. Panikkar,322 a distinguished diplomat, profound 
philosopher/thinker of sea power and India’s first diplomat to China.323 It 
is pointed out that “their geopolitical reasonings and arguments remain 
integral to contemporary Indian framings of the Indo-Pacific”.324 Caroe 
and his so-called ‘viceroy’s study group’ anticipated a ‘New Great Game’ 
in the Indian Ocean spilling over to the Indo-Pacific, and saw a great deal 
of merit in Panikkar’s emphasis on “historical and strategic connections 
between India and Southeast Asia”, and “India’s past and future interest 
in places ranging from the Gulf of Aden in the west to the South China 
Sea in the east”.325 Caroe, writing in 1955, argued that: “forms change but 
there is a reality which remains. In terms of international politics today 
318 It is widely acknowledged that Gurpreet Khurana was the first to use the term Indo-Pacific, outside of 
formal-official circles, Khurana, G. (2007), “Security of sea lines: Prospects for India-Japan Co-operation”, 
Strategic Analysis, 31(1), pp. 139–153.
319 D. Scott (2012a), “India and the Allure of the Indo-Pacific”, International Studies, 49 (3&4), pp. 165-188. 
320 ibid. and D. Scott (2012b), “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ – New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks 
for US-India Strategic Convergence”, Asia-Pacific Review, 19 (2), pp. 85–109.
321 Scott (2012a), p. 180.
322 Published in 1945, K. M. Panikkar’s book India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea 
Power on Indian History (New York: MacMillan Company) remains important reading for Indian naval 
officers. See D. Brewster (2015), “Indian Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean: Striving towards 
Strategic Leadership”, India Review, 14 (2), pp. 221-37. 
323 A. Raju (2020), “K. M. Panikkar, a Historian for Our Times”, The Wire, 9 June. https://thewire.in/history/k-
m-panikkar-a-historian-for-our-times.
324 Doyle & Rumley (2019), p. 3. 
325 P. J. Brobst (2005), The Future of The Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence, and the Defense of 
Asia, Akron: The University of Akron Press, pp. 26-27. 
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the reality is that, as once in the nineteenth century in Asia, there are now 
in the whole world two major concentrations of power, one continental, 
and the other a string of like-minded nations linked by the sea.”326 
Fast forward to post-colonial India, against the backdrop of President 
Obama’s Pivot to [maritime] Asia policy,327 and in the wake of the first 
official use of the term Indo-Pacific in 2012 by the then US Secretary of 
State, in overwhelmingly maritime terms,328 the former Chief of Naval 
Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash, was one of the first in India to argue in 
support of a “new and comprehensive regional maritime initiative” in 
the Indo-Pacific: 
Borrowing from an old US concept of a “1000 ship navy”, 
we need to consider the creation of an “Indo-Pacific 
Maritime Partnership”. Navies which have the capacity could 
contribute ships, aircraft or personnel. Such a multinational 
partnership would not only spread the burden of anti-
piracy operations, but also make the protective umbrella 
for shipping more comprehensive. Since the scene of 
action is the Arabian Sea, India could provide support and 
coordination for this complex and protracted undertaking.329 
It is useful to note that the above-mentioned proposed maritime part-
nership in and for the Indo-Pacific region – including the Western Indian 
Ocean – was aimed at mobilizing regional naval cooperation in order to 
promote security and safety in the vast maritime domain by addressing 
non-traditional threats to security, including climate change, natural 
disasters, and piracy. No less worthy of attention is the emphasis that 
Arun Prakash330 placed on the need to “form multilateral institutions 
for cooperative security endeavours”, while acknowledging that “while 
no one believes that Utopia is around the corner, cooperation is worth 
striving for, and the maritime domain is perhaps the easiest place to start 
since, as they say, oceans make neighbours of people around the world”.
The partnership between the Indian and the US navies in the domain 
of maritime security, insightfully analyzed in a number of studies, has 
326 Ibid, p. 145. 
327 K. Campbell & B. Andrews (2013), “Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia”, Chatham House:  
https://kritisches-netzwerk.de/sites/default/files/explaining_the_us_pivot_to_asia_-_kurt_campbell_
and_brian_andrews_-_the_asia_group_-_august_2013_-_9_pages_1.pdf.
328 D. Scott (2018), ‘The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts’, Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(2), 
pp. 19-43. 
329 A. Prakash (2011), “Rise of the East: The Maritime dimension”, Maritime Affairs, 7(2), p. 12.
330 ibid., p. 13.
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apparently gone from strength to strength in the past decade. For some, 
“no area of United States-India defense cooperation holds more promise 
than maritime cooperation”.331 For others, “The Indian navy’s apparent 
reluctance to seek a bigger role and increase its interoperability with the 
US appears to derive from a ‘hedging strategy’”.332 And according to Pant 
and Joshi, “India does not want to be seen as allied with the United States. 
Instead, it wants to sit on the side-lines while the United States and Chi-
na slug it out for dominance in the Indo-Pacific”.333
Against the backdrop of both continuity and change in India’s geo-
political vision, the most enduring feature is the unrelenting centrality 
of India’s location in the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, “India’s 
narrative promotes ‘issue-based’ alliances with a variety of countries, 
including China, Russia and the United States, to promote a multipolar 
regional order, and reflects a long-standing desire to culturally identify 
and economically integrate with East Asian states”.334 India’s cautious 
and well-calculated approach to issues of allies, alignments and alliances 
makes it difficult to generalize with the help of a single theoretical frame-
work, be it realist, liberal or constructivist.335
India, as one of the fastest growing economies in the world with grow-
ing reliance on seaborne trade, is likely to play a major role in the Bay 
of Bengal, a critically important maritime link, or rather a bridge, be-
tween the Indian and Pacific Oceans.336 The geopolitical, geoeconomic 
and strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal, especially in the context 
of India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean, is steadily growing.337 Equally 
compelling are the multifaceted fallouts of climate change and natural 
disaster.338 A nuanced sub-regional approach to the Indo-Pacific, firmly 
anchored in the notion of a Greater Indian Ocean, is likely to better serve 
India’s enlightened interests in this vast socio-spatial confluence.
331 A. Thakker & A. Sahgal (2019), “US-India Maritime Cooperation”, Washington: CSIS, p. 1. 
332 Doyle & Rumley (2019), The Rise & Return of the Indo-Pacific, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 58.
333 H. V. Pant and Y. Joshi (2015), “The American ‘pivot’ and the Indian navy”, Naval War College Review, 68 (1), 
p. 64.
334 Barthwal-Datta & Chacko (2020), p. 244. 
335 S. Chaturvedi (2017), “Mapping Maritime Order in the Greater India Ocean from IR Perspectives”, in Y. 
Kumar (ed.) Whither Indian Ocean Maritime Order, New Delhi, Knowledge World.
336 S. Amrith (2015), Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
337 D. Brewster (2018), India & China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
338 S. Chaturvedi & V. Sakhuja (2015), Climate Change and the Bay of Bengal: Emerging Geographies of Fear and 
Hope, Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute & New Delhi: Pentagon Press. 
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Ever since the then foreign minister Marty Natalegawa proposed an 
‘Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ in 2013, Indonesia has 
steadily promoted the idea of an ‘ASEAN-led Indo-Pacific’.339
Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley, in their recent seminal work titled 
The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific, have argued that, “In brief, an 
Indian strategy of multialignment is aimed primarily at developing and 
using strategic partnerships, being involved in a policy of ‘normative 
hedging’, boosting India’s economic development and national security, 
and at projecting influence and promoting Indian values”.340
India’s External Affairs Minister, in his valedictory address at the XI 
Delhi Dialogue, held on 13 and 14 December 2019, outlined the geograph-
ical-spatial scope of India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific, which is far more 
expansive than that of the USA. 
One step in building this concept outward is enhancing the 
Indian Ocean region’s community’s involvement with, and 
in, the notion of an Indo-Pacific. While the nations of the 
eastern Indian Ocean and States on the connecting seas 
leading to the Pacific are defining their vision of the Indo-
Pacific, there is room for a western Indian Ocean version of 
this concept too. In line with our own view that the Indo-
Pacific naturally includes our western ocean neighbors in the 
Gulf, the Island nations of the Arabian Sea, and our partners 
in Africa, India’s approach to this concept led us to recognize 
that both geographical extremities of the Indo-Pacific 
and everything in between should ideally have their own 
indigenously evolved approach to the Indo-Pacific.
Here is an important acknowledgement, even privileging, of the diver-
sity principle underpinning India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. A truly out-
standing feature of the above intervention by the External Affairs Minister 
of India in the conceptual evolution of the Indo-Pacific is the reference to 
a ‘Western India Ocean version’ of the Indo-Pacific, in which the Western 
Coast of India bordering the Arabian Sea and facing the Gulf region would 
also figure prominently. This amounts to a discursive boundary-crossing 
not only between India-Pakistan but also between the Central Command 
and the Indo-Pacific Command.
Another landmark in the conceptual evolution of the Indo-Pacific con-
cept is the keynote address delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
339 W. Choong (2019), “The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: an assessment”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 73 (5), pp. 420–425. 
340 Doyle & Rumley (2019), p. 65. 
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Modi, on 1 June 2018, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. It further 
attests to India’s nuanced understanding of, and approach towards, the 
Indo-Pacific. As a regional construct, the Indo-Pacific is described as 
‘natural’ and characterized by “inclusiveness and openness and ASEAN 
centrality and unity”. The stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region extend-
ing “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas” are seen as coming 
from both within and beyond the region. PM Modi’s speech also stands 
out for pointing out that India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a 
strategy marked by club mentality, or for that matter directed against 
any country. Given its strategic location at the ‘crossroads’, India gives 
due importance to greater connectivity within the region but not at the 
cost of “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, consultation, 
good governance, transparency, viability and sustainability”. Moreover, 
connectivity projects must not lead to a debt trap for some countries, a 
concern that has been felt and expressed by several commentators re-
garding China’s B &R initiative. The fact that the Indo-Pacific is seen by 
India also from a highly normative perspective is graphically revealed in 
another quote from the same speech: 
We believe that our common prosperity and security require 
us to evolve, through dialogue, a common rules-based order 
for the region … based on the consent of all, not on the power 
of the few … When we all agree to live by that code, our sea 
lanes will be pathways to prosperity and corridors of peace. 
We will also be able to come together to prevent maritime 
crimes, preserve marine ecology, protect against disasters 
and prosper from blue economy. 
India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific under the banner of QUAD 
also appears to be driven by a geopolitical vision that resists being impris-
oned by a geostrategic monologue centered on the threat dimension of an 
increasingly assertive China. This is despite the ongoing border skirmishes 
that run the risk of escalation. Panda341 has argued that the caution with 
which India has approached this ‘consultative forum’ is “a statement of 
New Delhi’s plural foreign policy arch in an evolving Indo-Pacific con-
struct. Balancing China’s growing outreach with the Indo-Pacific region 
while concurrently affirming bilateralism with Beijing explains India’s 
strategic autonomy and pluralism in its foreign policy”. In Panda’s view, 
there is insufficient evidence to prove that India’s approach to Quad 
is anti-China or, for that matter, motivated by the fear-driven logic of 
341 J. Panda (2018), “India’s Call on China in the Quad: A Strategic Arch between Liberal and Alternative 
Structures”, Rising Powers Quarterly, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2018, p. 83. 
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anti-China ‘containment’. With the geographies of India’s maritime inter-
ests steadily expanding along and across scales (sub-regional to trans-re-
gional) and sectors (energy, trade, defense), India’s quest to secure the 
sea lanes of communication finds the Indo-Pacific construct appealing.
The notion that India’s geopolitical vision of the Indo-Pacific has a stra-
tegic space for Russia is well noted by scholars,342 leading think-tank re-
ports,343 diplomats and the media alike.344 As noted by Hosoya,345 “Japan’s 
approach to the free and open Indo- Pacific is more comprehensive, more 
inclusive, and more cooperative than what is written in NSS of the US”.
Reflecting on the persistent challenge of operationalizing the concept 
of the Indo-Pacific, Pant and Rej346 have argued that, rhetoric notwith-
standing, the harsh ground realities in India’s north, east and west get in 
the way of achieving a convergence of visions between India and the USA 
and playing a role commensurate with its ambition and ability. Looking at 
China to its North, India realizes both the power disparity vis-à-vis China 
and the uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of bilateral relations 
with its giant Asian neighbor. Finally, to India’s west, “divergent Indian 
and American positions in the western Indian Ocean, in particular on 
Pakistan and Iran, prevent the creation of a unified cohesive view of the 
Indo-Pacific that both countries share. These divergences have concrete 
consequences for the future of U.S.-India regional cooperation”.347 
5.6. CONCLUDING THE INCONCLUSIVE: SOME REFLECTIONS 
Call it a construct, a set of strategic narratives, a seamless continuum, a 
‘Super Region of sub-regions’ – or a combination of some or all of these – 
the Indo-Pacific is likely to remain a hyphenated notion in the foreseeable 
future: a contested ‘work in progress’. For those who look at the Indo-Pa-
cific as a vast region of sub-regions, it is useful to acknowledge that “the 
constructed region is a product of the purpose, the spatial vision, and 
342 S. Lunev & E. Shavlay (2018), “Russia and India in the Indo-Pacific”, Asian Politics & Policy, 10 (4): pp. 713-
731. 
343 A. Zakharov (2020), “While criticizing the Indo-Pacific, Russia steps up its presence”, ORF Raisina Debates, 
6 February 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/while-criticizing-the-indo-pacific-russia-
steps-up-its-presence-61102/.
344 N. Basu (2020), “India wants Russia to Join Indo-Pacific Initiative to Signal It’s Not Just a US Centric Plan”, 
The Print, 28 July 2020, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-wants-russia-to-join-indo-pacific-initiative-
to-signal-its-not-just-a-us-centric-plan/468853/.
345 Hosoya (2019), p. 25
346 H. V. Pant & A. Rej (2018), “Is India Ready for the Indo-Pacific?, The Washington Quarterly, 41: 2, 47-61. 
347 Pant & Rej (2018), p. 57. 
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the strategic goals of that which/who delimits it.348 Moreover, as Philip 
Steinberg349 so aptly puts it, depending on who is approaching the ocean 
space (e.g. the Indo-Pacific), it will be perceived and used differently by 
different actors with diverse interests, policy preferences, choices and 
strategies. Little wonder therefore that the outcome is likely to be “a set 
of social institutions, attitudes, and norms that would reproduce the 
construction of the ocean as an un-claimable transport surface, claimable 
resource space, a set of discrete places and events, and a field for military 
adventure”.
At present, there is no clear answer to the following questions: For 
whom does the Indo-Pacific Region speak and who speaks for the In-
do-Pacific Region? For those who see the Indo-Pacific as a set of strategic 
narratives, it is the imperative of ‘national’ that appears to be overwhelm-
ingly decisive in driving the regional imaginations, ambitions and desires, 
and not the other way around. Having noted that, I have argued in this 
chapter that the discursive as well as the material linkages between the 
‘rise and return of the Indo-Pacific’ and the ‘rise and return’ of [Monsoon] 
Asia in global geopolitics350 need to be acknowledged, along with the fact 
that these connections, intersections and networks operate within the 
larger context of the post-post-Columbian epoch. 
Looking ahead, a key challenge that the major proponents of the ide-
a(s) of the Indo-Pacific face, including the USA and India, relates to the 
operationalization and institutionalization of the idea.351 Given the plu-
rality of spaces, scales and geometries of power that seem to lie at the core 
of the historically contingent notion of the Indo-Pacific, it seems highly 
unlikely that there would ever be a single institution that embodies the 
remarkable diversity of interests, agendas, perceptions, visions and values 
that prevail, and that offers a consensus-based road map with undisputed 
‘rules of the road’.
In other words, as pointed out earlier, the Indo-Pacific is what the 
state and non-state actors concerned make of it in the light of their per-
ceived interests, agendas, world views and contexts. Which mainstream 
IR perspective dominates the mental maps of policymakers at a particular 
time and in a given location would be equally consequential. For example, 
348 Doyle & Rumley (2019), p. 9.
349 P. Steinberg (2001), The Social Construction of the Ocean, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
350 “The simultaneous rise of China and India is one of the most important developments in international 
relations in the early 21st century.” See M. S. Pardesi (2019), “The Initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry”, 
Asian Security, 15: 3, pp. 253-284. 
351 M. Beeson (2018), “Institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific: the Challenges of Regional Cooperation,” East Asia 35, 
pp. 85-98.
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as Kai He352 rightly points out, a ‘realist face’ of the Indo-Pacific, advo-
cating a “balancing strategy against China”, would prefer an institutional 
mechanism that excludes China, whereas a ‘liberal face’ of the Indo-Pa-
cific would demand a novel, more inclusive “institutional setting that 
facilitates cooperation among states across the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans”. And if left to the constructivists, the Indo-Pacific is likely to be 
approached as an “ideational construct” where a “value-oriented and 
norm-based diplomacy in the region” could be pursued and promoted. 
Given the important interplay between the theories, policy worldviews 
and practices, much will depend on the choices China makes in, and with 
regard to, the Indo-Pacific region.
What will the post-Covid-19 world, including the Indo-Pacific, look 
like geopolitically? This is difficult to predict but the trends are revealing. 
So far, as Covid-19 causalities continue to mount in different parts of the 
globe, including India, it appears that classical geopolitical concepts and 
theories, despite being seriously questioned, will continue to assert them-
selves, albeit in their new avatars, with ‘health security’ looming large. 
Will the novel coronavirus be able to corrode the resilient geographies of 
mutual distrust among major powers? Will the sub-regional geopolitical 
assertions of China in the South China Sea subside, thereby creating scope 
for mitigating the security dilemma between China and its neighbors,353 
and the much-desired space for confidence-building and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes in accordance with international law?
Zimmerman,354 while mapping the influence of non-traditional se-
curity (NTS) in the domain of security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 
shows how the trans-national NTS have served as important catalysts 
for the “expansion of existing institutions and the development of new 
institutions aimed at providing security governance”. Many of these in-
stitutions have been ASEAN-centric. One possibility of moving forward 
towards institutionalizing cooperation in and about the Indo-Pacific 
appears to lie in the domain of so-called non-traditional security, such 
as drug trafficking, human trafficking, humanitarian assistance/disaster 
management, IUU fishing, pandemics, climate change, and so on.
One of the key findings of this paper is that the narrative of a new mar-
itime order in the Indo-Pacific – one that is ‘inclusive’, ‘transparent’ and 
‘rule bound’ – needs to be located in the larger context of the demands 
352 K. He (2018), “Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the ‘Indo-Pacific’ from an IR Theory 
Perspective, East Asia 35, p. 149. 
353 K. H. Raditio (2019), Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist 
Perspective, Singapore: Springer. 
354 E. Zimmerman (2014), “Security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: non-traditional security as a catalyst”, 
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 10: 2, p. 162.
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and dilemmas of an emerging international geopolitical economy that has 
been steadily pivoting towards Asia – especially maritime Asia – in recent 
times. As the 21st century unfolds with a long list of global risks, including 
incrementally unfolding climate change, and more recently the outbreak 
of the Covid-19 pandemic, the meta-geographies and geographs of in-
ternational relations will remain in a state of unprecedented flux for the 
foreseeable future. As far as the ‘China factor’ is concerned, this chapter 
has shown that China, at least for the foreseeable future, will continue 
to resist the Indo-Pacific construct, with some Chinese scholars calling 
it ‘old wine in new bottles’.355 
India’s approach to the geopolitics of this vast maritime region and 
its power- and capability-generating aspects is quite nuanced. India’s 
Indo-Pacific dilemma emanates from the complex interplay between 
the push of a ‘strategic imperative’, which makes India ‘tilt’ towards 
the United States, and the pull of a ‘strategic autonomy’, which calls 
for caution in the wake of (mis)perception in some quarters, especial-
ly Beijing, that India is on its way to becoming a close ally of the US in 
‘containing’ or ‘counter- balancing’ China. It is important to note what 
India’s External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaishankar356 said recently: “The 
consequence of repositioning of the United States, that the big umbrella 
is now smaller than it used to be, has allowed many other countries to 
play more autonomous roles. It doesn’t affect us as much because we 
were never part of an alliance system and we will never be. But coun-
tries who depended more on the U.S. are finding they have to take a call 
themselves on many issues.” 
As the Indo-Pacific awaits institutionalization, it will be critically 
important for various stakeholders, including India and the US, to pay 
attention to the challenge of ‘maritime domain awareness’ (MDA). As 
shown by Upadhyaya,357 in response to the priorities and needs of var-
ious stakeholders in the diverse sub-regions a number of information 
centers have been established in the IOR, but without much evidence of 
their having effectively addressed the challenge of maritime safety and 
security. According to Upadhyaya, what needs to be established is “a 
pan-Indian Ocean information grid that could integrate the various infor-
mation sources to provide comprehensive MDA for the region”.358 In the 
355 C. Zhu (2018), “The Strategic Game in Indo-Pacific Region and Its Impact on China’s Security”, in C. Zhu (ed.) 
Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2018), Indo-Pacific: Concept Definition and 
Strategic Implementation, Springer, pp. 3–34. 
356 The Hindu, 20 July, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-never-been-part-of-an-
alliance-and-will-never-be-jaishankar/article32142128.ece.
357 S. Upadhyaya (2017), “A case for a pan-Indian Ocean information grid for improved maritime domain 
awareness”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 13: 3, p. 335. 
358 ibid.
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Anthropocene epoch – characterized by global emergencies like climate 
change and pandemics – it is neither feasible nor desirable to exclusively, 
or even excessively, focus on the Indo-Pacific as an idea, construct or 
region, disconnected from the rest of planet Earth.
As for the ‘Quad’, its authority, legitimacy and effectiveness will 
largely depend on turning the vision of an ‘inclusive’, ‘transparent’ and 
‘rule-bound’ maritime world order into an agenda and action in/for the 
Indo-Pacific. The time is ripe for ‘Quad’ to take a lead in this regard in 
partnership with Europe, and rejuvenate and revive itself in the process. 
It is time to identify issue-areas where timely, proactive interventions 
can be made to develop, for example, an Indo-Pacific Coast Guard. It 
is useful to recall in this respect that the Indian and the Japanese coast 
guards were cooperating as early as 2007.359 More recently, France has 
shown willingness to engage more proactively with maritime security 
issues in the Indo-Pacific.360 
As noted above, with the Indo-Pacific space witnessing proliferating 
traditional and non-traditional threats361 (e.g. climate change, natural 
disasters, ocean acidification, pandemic diseases), the need for what Oran 
R. Young has described as a ‘regime complex’ is becoming increasingly 
compelling in this super-region of sub-regions. For example, as in the 
case of the Bay of Bengal and ASEAN, we find sub-regionalisms assert-
ing their geo-historical identities, flagging contemporary concerns and 
articulating future visions. According to Young, the gap between rhet-
oric and reality with regard to governance issues is widening the world 
over. Young362 defines a regime complex as a “collection of governance 
arrangements that are linked together in the sense that they address 
matters relating to a common issue or spatially defined region but that 
are not hierarchically related in the sense that they all fit within some 
well-defined institutional architecture”.
‘Estranged democracies’ no longer, the United States of America and 
India no doubt find themselves in the tight embrace of a ‘strategic part-
nership’. But there is no evidence as yet to suggest that ‘views from India’ 
and ‘views on India’ – especially those of the US – converge fully on the 
what, where and why of the Indo-Pacific. In India’s approach to the 
Indo-Pacific one finds a subtle but significant policy move towards the 
359 G. S. Khurana (2007), Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation, Strategic Analysis, 31: 1, 
pp. 139-153. 
360 N. Regaud (2020), “France’s Innovative Maritime Security Engagement in the Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 
3 April, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/frances-innovative-maritime-security-engagement-in-the-
indo-pacific/.
361 Zimmerman (2016).
362 O. R. Young (2016), “The Shifting Landscape of Arctic Politics: Implications for International Cooperation”, 
The Polar Journal, 6(2), p. 218.
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sub-regionalization of this Super Maritime Region of sub-regions, such 
as the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the South China Sea. This can 
also be seen as a conceptual contribution by India to the new meta-geog-
raphies of a new planetary multiplex geopolitics where the Indo-Pacific 
becomes a space, a site or a laboratory where unconventional meanings of 
security and sustainability can be tested, operationalized and even insti-
tutionalized at multiple scales. The process of broadening and deepening 
India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is an evolving one, often articulated in 
terms of India’s Look/Act East policy.
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6. US-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC: DOES EUROPE HAVE A 
ROLE TO PLAY?
Liselotte Odgaard
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The Indo-Pacific in general and the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean 
in particular have become central arenas for US-China rivalry since 2016 
when Washington and Beijing’s relations began to be dominated by stra-
tegic competition. In response, while facing numerous internal crises, 
Europe has taken steps to play a meaningful role in these areas of stra-
tegic competition. Looking at the increasing rivalry between the US and 
China in the Indo-Pacific region in general, and in the South China Sea 
and the Indian Ocean in particular, this chapter assesses the European 
policy and examines how it has translated into concrete actions on the 
ground in these fields. 
6.2. US-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE OVERALL INDO-PACIFIC REGION
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, US Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter announced the development of a principled security network of 
interconnectedness, interoperability and shared capabilities, with Japan, 
Australia, the Philippines, India, Vietnam and Singapore as key partners. 
Carter welcomed China’s participation in this network. However, the 
main thrust of the speech was a warning that China’s expansive actions 
in the South China Sea are isolating it and if these actions continue, China 
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could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.363 The response by 
Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo was that some countries, with scant refer-
ence to the US, adopt joint rules of the use of international law, and do not 
conform to the agreeable approach of not taking unfair advantage, openly 
flaunting their military force in the South China Sea and pulling in help 
from cliques to support their allies in antagonizing China.364 
At this same Dialogue, uncompromising exchanges broke out over the 
US decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems 
in South Korea, protecting South Korean and US forces on the peninsula 
against a North Korean nuclear attack. Even if those words were not used, 
the exchanges clarified that US-Chinese relations in the Indo-Pacific 
would be dominated by strategic competition and conflict over alternative 
visions of the world order. This development was set in stone with the 
Trump administration’s pronouncement in 2017 of China as a revisionist 
power that seeks to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region, expand 
the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region 
in its favor.365 Finally, in the 2018 US national defense strategy, China was 
explicitly termed a strategic competitor.366
6.3. EUROPE’S ROLE IN US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN 
THE INDO-PACIFIC
Does Europe have a role to play in this strategic competition? The internal 
challenges facing the European Union have been pronounced by many 
as being symptomatic of the fact that the grand project of a united Eu-
rope is failing. For example, Walter Russell Mead comments that “if Paris 
and Berlin could devise a program to reignite European growth, secure 
its frontiers, and satisfy the nationalist emotions now roiling the bloc, 
Europe could arrest its decline. So far at least, such an outcome seems 
unlikely”.367 Despite doomsday prophecies and the UK’s departure from 
the EU with Brexit, support for the European Union appears to be stronger 
than ever. Not even the illiberal Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban 
363 Ashton Carter, speech on “Meeting Asia’s Complex Security Challenges”, 15th Asia Security Summit, the IISS 
Shangri-La Dialogue, June 4, 2016, 22_SLD16%201st%20Plenary%20-%20Carter%20As%20Delivered.pdf.
364 Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, Central Military Commission, China, speech on 
“The Challenges of Conflict Resolution”, 15th Asia Security Summit, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, June 5, 2016, 
22_SLD16%201st%20Plenary%20-%20Sun%20Jianguo%20As%20Delivered.pdf.
365 D. Trump (2017), “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, p. 25, NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905%20(1).pdf.
366 United States of America Department of Defense (2018), “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of 
the United States of America”, 2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
367 W. R. Mead (2019), “Incredible Shrinking Europe”, Wall Street Journal, February 12. 
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and his Fidesz Party have leaving the EU on the agenda although the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s Center-Right grouping decided in March 2019 to 
suspend Fidesz from the group on the grounds of violations of EU prin-
ciples on the rule of law. If anything, the consecutive internal crises have 
encouraged the EU to take initiatives to strengthen Europe’s footprint in 
the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that not just focusing on the United States 
and China, but creating solid links with like-minded countries in the 
Indo-Pacific is necessary for Europe’s continued economic, social and 
political well-being.368 
The EU has strengthened its partnerships with countries and multi-
lateral institutions such as Japan, ASEAN, Singapore, India, Australia and 
Indonesia. These are some of the same partner countries prioritized by 
the US, complementing Washington’s efforts to expand its relations with 
Indo-Pacific states that embrace at least the market economic aspects of 
a liberal rules-based order. However, Europe’s strengthening of its Asian 
links proceeds from an independent position prioritizing multilateral 
institutional cooperation and comprehensive free trade agreements. This 
deviates from recent US priorities of bilateral negotiations and ad hoc 
institutional frameworks. This is not necessarily a drawback, but could be 
utilized as a division of labor, focusing on the complementarity of efforts 
that are carried out with the same common fundamental objective of pre-
serving a liberal market economic and democratic world order governed 
by the rule of law. European policies in between US-Chinese strategic 
competition highlight the possibilities and limitations of transatlantic 
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific at a time of rising Chinese influence. 
6.4. US-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
China has expanded its strategic presence in the South China Sea. The 
country’s shift to a more assertive regional diplomacy involves manifest-
ing its territorial claims in the South China Sea and building up contested 
islands and reefs to consolidate its claims. China has never clarified the 
precise extent of its claim. However, maps of the so-called nine-dash 
line covering approximately 85 percent of the area are frequently put 
on display by official agencies of China. This implies that China claims 
sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Consecutive Chinese lead-
ers have made repeated references to China’s long-term aspiration to 
restore an area that it considers historic Chinese space. Xi Jinping has 
368 A detailed account of Europe’s Indo-Pacific policy can be found in L. Odgaard (2019), “European Engagement 
in the Indo-Pacific: The Interplay between Institutional and State-Level Naval Diplomacy”, Asia Policy, 14: 4, 
pp. 129–159. 
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honored this tradition repeatedly. In 2018, he said that China could not 
lose even an inch of the territory left behind by its ancestors.369 By 2018, 
China had established a robust presence of combatant, law enforcement 
and support ships as well as airstrips in the features it occupies in the 
Paracels and the Spratlys.370 Complementing these efforts, China has 
rolled out its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing has made significant 
inroads into the US alliance system with economic investments, assisting 
Southeast Asian countries in advancing trade and development through 
infrastructure projects such as railway construction in Myanmar, Laos 
and Thailand. Most conspicuously, the rapprochement between China and 
the Philippines since 2015 has called into question Manila’s commitment 
to its US ally.
The US has responded by stepping up its presence in the South China 
Sea, as indicated by its enhanced military assistance and two carrier visits 
to Vietnam since 2018, and the transfer of aircraft mission systems from 
the US to Malaysia. In addition, the US has encouraged allies and stra-
tegic partners such as Japan and India to enhance their presence. Japan 
is regularly conducting exercises with US allies such as the Philippines, 
and it equips Manila with surveillance capabilities such as patrol vessels. 
Together with Japan and Australia, the US has launched its alternative to 
the BRI, the Blue Dot Network (BDN), in November 2019. BDN is intended 
to facilitate private investments in the global need for infrastructure pro-
jects that meet standards of transparency, sustainability and development. 
Under the Trump administration, the US has also gradually strengthened 
its freedom of navigation operations, routinely conducting non-inno-
cent passages within twelve nautical miles and overflying the airspace 
of features occupied by China to indicate that the South China Sea is in-
ternational waters and the airspace above it international. The strategic 
rivalry has produced a confrontational and uncompromising atmosphere 
with regular interception incidents at sea and in the air involving the US 
and Chinese navies, coast guards and paramilitary forces that engender 
risks of escalation. 
369 T. Gibbons-Neff & S. L. Myers (2018), “China Won’t Yield ‘Even One Inch’ of South China Sea, Xi Tells Mattis”, 
New York Times, June 27, https://www.nytimes.com.2018/06/27/world/asia/mattis-xi-china-sea.html.
370 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (2018), “Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly 
Islands”, AMTI Brief, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 9 and 18, 
https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/ and https://amti.csis.org/china-
lands-first-bomber-south-china-sea-island/.
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6.5. EUROPE’S NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
In the EU’s maritime strategy published in 2014, the rule of law and free-
dom of navigation are listed as being in the EU’s strategic maritime in-
terests.371 The EU’s action plan for the maritime strategy encompasses 
promoting the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Law of the Sea, 
implementing binding decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea, and establishing mechanisms for maritime confidence-building 
measures.372 The EU’s global strategy for foreign and security policy from 
June 2016 remains at the level of generalities. It reiterates that the EU will 
uphold freedom of navigation, stand firm on the respect for international 
law, including the law of the sea and its arbitration procedures, and en-
courage the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. The EU states that 
it will help build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional 
security architecture.373
The EU’s South China Sea policy reflects deep internal divisions in 
Europe. The UK, Germany and France want to make it clear that Bei-
jing must uphold international law as China seeks a bigger global role. 
However, countries such as Hungary and Greece, which want to attract 
Chinese investments, are unwilling to criticize China in such direct terms. 
Moreover, countries such as Croatia and Slovenia have their own mar-
itime disputes and are worried about setting precedents by coming out 
too strongly against China. Due to internal divisions in the EU on how 
far to go in criticizing China’s behavior, the Union does not devise ac-
tivities in support of the EU’s general policy. Instead, the general policy 
commitment has been followed up by a growing number of EU member 
states that have coordinated and cooperated on manifesting a European 
presence in the South China Sea. 
Since 2014, French naval vessels have regularly patrolled the South 
China Sea and made port calls in regional states, and the UK has been 
France’s main European partner in these efforts.374 In 2016, France de-
ployed a frigate to sail through the South China Sea with personnel from 
the US and from other European countries on board, such as Denmark, 
371 European Commission (2014), “European Union Maritime Security Strategy: Responding Together to Global 
Challenges: A guide for stakeholders”, Brussels: European Council, https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/
sites/maritimeaffairs/files/leaflet-european-union-maritime-security-strategy_en.pdf.
372 Council of the European Union (2014), “European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) – Action Plan”, 
December 16, 17002/14, para. 1.6, https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security_en.
373 European Union (2016), “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, p. 38, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/
pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.
374 E. Brattberg, P. Le Corre and E. Soula (2018), “Can France and the UK Pivot to the Pacific?”, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, July 5, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/05/can-france-and-
uk-pivot-to-pacific-pub-76732.
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Italy, and Germany. In 2017 and 2018, the UK also sent helicopters and 
navy vessels to conduct operations in support of freedom of navigation. 
The naval diplomacy with several European countries contributing, in-
cluding the four major powers – France, the UK, Italy and Germany – 
allows Europe to get around internal disagreement on how far to go in 
practice in challenging China far from Europe’s shores. Groupings of EU 
member states that take action allow Europe to demonstrate support for 
core values shared with the US and its allies, but from an independent 
position based on European interests and worldviews. 
The Europeans have refrained from sailing within twelve nautical miles 
of disputed features in the area. In this way, Europe has avoided chal-
lenging the Chinese presence in an area full of international legal grey 
zones to make sure that Europe stays in line with universally recognized 
international law. This contrasts with the US navy, which routinely sails 
and conducts exercises within twelve nautical miles of Chinese-occupied 
features. In 2017, the French-led operation in support of freedom of navi-
gation was combined with a port call in Shanghai in China to demonstrate 
that the actions were not directed against China. Subsequent operations 
have omitted port calls in China. This reflects growing European dissat-
isfaction with continued Chinese militarization in the South China Sea 
and with China’s plans to negotiate a code of conduct for the area without 
including third countries such as European states. This exclusivity con-
stitutes a potential challenge to the European and US view that the South 
China Sea is international waters. The China-ASEAN process contributes 
to fears that a prospective code of conduct will include restrictions on 
the free movement of military vessels and aircraft. 
6.6. US-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
China has equally expanded its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. 
In 2017, China opened its first permanent naval base at the site of the US-
built naval pier in the port of Obock in Djibouti. As in the South China 
Sea, Beijing mixes economic and military interests, establishing railway 
connections to neighboring Ethiopia and water pipelines.375 China has 
approached the Seychelles as another likely partner. Chinese navy ships 
already stop for supply and rest facilities in the ports of the Seychelles. 
The BRI has accompanied China’s entrance into the Western Indian Ocean, 
opening up trade connectivity, and deepening investment and industrial 
cooperation with two Memoranda of Understanding signed in September 
375 J. D. Durson (2016), “China’s rising near this key US war base: Here’s how we push back”, Defense One, 
July 26, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/07/US-china-djibouti/130221/.
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2018.376 Together with Kazakhstan, Pakistan is a test case for the BRI. The 
flagship project is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the 
main projects are expansion of the port in Gwadar and of Pakistan’s en-
ergy, road and railway infrastructure.377 Bangladesh has been an official 
partner of China’s BRI since 2016 and has received the second highest 
amount of BRI funding after Pakistan. The Chattogram sea port and its 
adjacent maritime area has been an integral part of the maritime BRI.378 
Despite massive domestic internal resistance against China’s Myitsone 
Dam project, in 2019 Myanmar confirmed that it embraces the BRI. In 
2018, China agreed to build a deep sea port in Kyaukpyu along the Bay of 
Bengal.379 In Sri Lanka, China has built the Hambantota port through BRI 
funds. Faced with a cash shortage, the Sri Lankan government handed 
over the port and adjacent land to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 
years.380 The Maldives signaled a more critical stance towards China and 
a recommitment to India as a main economic and strategic partner with 
the election in April 2019 of President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. However, 
this development does not alter the general pattern of Chinese strate-
gic and economic dominance of the developing rim states of the Indian 
Ocean.381 All of these countries also have extensive military-strategic 
relations with China. Beijing is a major weapons provider, and it conducts 
training and education of national forces. Together with access to critical 
infrastructure, China’s economic and strategic partnerships allow it to 
realize its Indian Ocean strategy of open seas protection of its interests. 
China’s military presence is minor for now. The Chinese escort task force, 
the 35th of which was dispatched 28 April 2020 to the Gulf of Aden on 
anti-piracy duties, is the only permanent Chinese presence. Submarine 
376 B. Bonnelame (2018), “Seychelles and China sign agreements as president of island nation 
continues visit”, September 3, http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/9678/
Seychelles+and+China+sign+agreement+as+president+of+island+nation+continues+visit.
377 D. S. Markey and J. West (2016), “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan”, Expert Brief, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, May 12, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-
securities-studies/resources/docs/The%20Stakes%20in%20the%20China-Pakistan%20Economic%20
Corridor%20-%20Council%20on%20Foreign%20Relations.pdf.
378 N. M. Sarker (2019), “New Government in Bangladesh: Implications for China-Bangladesh Relations”, 
modern diplomacy, January 19, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/01/19/new-government-in-
bangladesh-implications-for-china-bangladesh-relations/.
379 P. Venkataraman (ed.) (2018), “China to build port in Myanmar, third in India’s neighbourhood”, News 18, 
India, November 9, https://www.news18.com/news/india/china-to-build-port-in-myanmar-third-in-
indias-neighbourhood-1934401.html.
380 L. Zhou (2019), “Sri Lanka rejects fears of China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ in belt and road projects”, South 
China Morning Post, April 22, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007175/sri-lanka-
rejects-fears-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy-belt-and.
381 V. Mishra (2018), “China is Moving into the Indian Ocean”, The National Interest, April 14, https://
nationalinterest.org/feature/china-moving-the-indian-ocean-25380.
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deployments have so far been scant and unsuccessful.382 However, Beijing 
has set up the infrastructure for a future large-scale presence. 
The US response has been to push into China’s traditional waters in 
return. Washington’s military stronghold is its naval base on the British 
island of Diego Garcia, which hosts an anchorage and a port housing a 
US navy support force, a flotilla of navy prepositioning ships with army 
and marine corps equipment, barracks, an airfield, separate US air force 
detachments supporting Pacific air forces and air mobility command 
flights, an air force satellite relay and a powerful telescope to keep track 
of spacecraft. The naval facilities are important for US plans to counter a 
growing Chinese fleet in the Indian Ocean. As part of a wider expansion, 
the US Navy is building up its own carrier fleet to twelve ships, antici-
pating future Chinese deployments of carrier groups in areas such as the 
Indian Ocean.383 The US has also strengthened its relations with India, 
routinely conducting port visits and exercises, focusing on anti-subma-
rine warfare training, information sharing and coordination between 
maritime patrol aircraft and ships. India and the US have also signed a 
strategic pact which allows the Indian navy access to US naval bases across 
the Indian Ocean.384
6.7. EUROPE’S NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The EU does not have a common policy position in the Indian Ocean. How-
ever, it has initiatives that provide platforms for the initiatives of member 
states. The Indian Ocean is included in the EU’s Naval Force programme, 
which was established in 2008 and is called the European Union Naval 
Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR). The programme has a mandate until 2020. 
It is tasked with protecting vessels of vulnerable shipping such as the 
World Food Programme, deterring, preventing and repressing piracy 
and armed robbery at sea, monitoring fishing activities off the coast of 
Somalia, and supporting other EU missions and international organiza-
tions working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region. 
EU NAVFOR’s areas of operation cover the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf 
382 M. Pubby (2019), “Chinese submarine movements in the Indian Ocean down, Pakistan Navy remains choked 
in”, The Economic Times, April 25, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-battle-
ship-take-part-in-chinese-navys-biggest-fleet-review-pakistan-gives-it-a-miss/articleshow/69019513.
cms.
383 D. Axe (2019), “Diego Garcia: Why This Base Is About To Get Much More Important to the U.S. Military”, The 
National Interest, February 26, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/diego-garcia-why-base-about-get-
much-more-important-us-military-45682.
384 R. Edens (2018), “India crafts its own ‘string of pearls’ to rival China’s naval jewels in the Indian Ocean”, 
South China Morning Post, March 23, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2138327/
india-crafts-its-own-string-pearls-rival-chinas-naval-jewels.
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of Aden and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles, 
Mauritius and the Comoros.385 The programme provides the EU with a 
defence aspect to its policies in the Indian Ocean that makes it easier to 
establish links with strategic partners such as India that go beyond the EU 
level, involving EU member states. Unlike the US, the EU shares India’s 
and China’s perspective that the Indo-Pacific is linked to Africa and the 
Middle East. 
In 2019, Europe’s naval diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific centered on the 
Indian Ocean, complementing the broad partnership agreements entered 
into by the EU as well as its perspective on the Indian Ocean, the Middle 
East and Africa as closely integrated regions. The capabilities that formed 
part of the operations were much larger than before. France again took 
the lead by deploying the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as well as four 
support ships. With Britain embroiled in Brexit in 2019 and 2020, France 
has been flying the flag for Europe, engaging a rotating cast from the UK, 
Portugal, Denmark and Italy as well as from Australia and the US. Of the 
European vessels, a Danish frigate stayed with the carrier group the long-
est, until the North Indian Ocean. The carrier group sailed from Toulon 
in France through the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. It 
passed through the Strait of Malacca and ended the tour in Singapore, 
in time for then US Secretary of Defense Shanahan’s presentation of the 
US’s Indo-Pacific strategy and the Chinese defense minister’s response 
to the US. The carrier group’s tour involved participation in Operation 
Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the Ramses exercises with Egypt and a port call 
at the French base in Djibouti. The French part of the carrier group also 
participated in the bilateral Varuna exercises with India and La Perouse, a 
series of military exercises with vessels from the US, Australia and Japan in 
the Bay of Bengal. It was the first time that the four navies had conducted 
exercises exclusively together.
A carrier group is the most muscular expression of power projection 
capabilities far from national shores. While Paris does not want the de-
ployment of the carrier strike group to be seen as France ganging up with 
the US against China, it can be interpreted as a means by which France 
seeks to counterbalance growing Chinese influence. France’s reluctance 
to present itself as part of a united front against China can be explained 
by France’s European agenda. The EU sees China as both a partner and 
a competitor, and France is playing a leading role in building an inde-
pendent European military force due to dwindling faith in US security 
guarantees towards Europe and a more conciliatory policy towards China. 
385 European Union External Action (2008), “EU NAVFOR Somalia”, https://eunavfor.eu/mission/.
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At the same time, France is a close military partner of the US and while 
France is still working on expanding the contributions of other Europe-
an countries to Indo-Pacific military deployments, it has no interest in 
alienating Washington. France walks a tightrope between working with 
the US and its partners to give Europe a defense footprint that is taken 
seriously while sticking to the European policy of maintaining cordial 
relations with China.
France is not just flying the flag for Europe, but is also nurturing na-
tional interests. It is a major arms producer, and exercises with countries 
such as Egypt and Australia during deployment are useful opportunities 
for France to showcase arms such as fighter aircraft and submarines. In 
addition, France is a resident power in the Indo-Pacific, which gives 
Paris a vested interest in pushing back against growing Chinese influence. 
French Indian Ocean bases in La Réunion and Mayotte add to the network 
of military assets that France has an interest in defending.
As China’s navy is developing at a rapid clip, the French-led naval 
diplomacy is well-received in Washington, which is looking for partners 
willing to adopt hard power responses to China’s growing presence. It 
may not be able to match China in firepower, but Europe’s emerging 
independent defense profile in the Indo-Pacific is also not easily written 
off as signaling without consequence. By joining forces with like-mind-
ed Indo-Pacific partners at the political, economic and defense levels, 
together they form a formidable force that influences Sino-US rivalry. 
6.8. CONCLUSION
The South China Sea and the Indian Ocean have become principal arenas 
for US-Chinese strategic competition as China seeks to replace the US as 
the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific. Europe influences US-China stra-
tegic competition, demonstrating support for core liberal values shared 
with the US, but from an independent position that allows Europe to 
take into account specific regional and national interests and worldviews. 
This active role is found even on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and 
defense policy, where Europe was largely absent until the mid-2010s 
because of internal disagreements. In these areas, Europe has worked out 
a division of labor whereby the EU designs general policies and establishes 
political and institutional links that are translated into initiatives on the 
ground by groupings of member states. 
Paradoxically, the EU has become more active in the Indo-Pacific than 
ever at a time when it is facing serious internal and external challenges. 
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Brexit, growing authoritarianism and migration are all issues that have 
caused great turmoil between the EU member states on how to secure the 
future of the Union as a coherent international actor based on a commit-
ment to liberal democracy, market economy and the rule of law. From 
across the Atlantic, Washington has opened trade disputes with the EU, 
ignored European interests in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, and complains about free-riding European military forces. Beijing 
is proceeding with the implementation of its BRI across Europe despite 
the EU’s reservations concerning China’s global development strategy. 
However, these challenges have made the European member states aware 
that they can only exercise sovereignty by cooperating and by clarifying 
European interests in between US-Chinese strategic rivalry. Although 
the EU supports the continued pre-eminence of the US alliance system 
in the Indo-Pacific, it also signals that undue provocation of China by 
operating in the grey zones of international law is not in Europe’s interest 
when trying to preserve the legal and institutional institutions of a liberal 
world order. The transatlantic bond remains strong on the objective of 
opposing China when it behaves in ways that indicate that Beijing appears 
to be undermining the existing order, such as its actions regarding a code 
of conduct in the South China Sea. However, Europe is also beginning 
to part company with the US on issues where Washington is seen as un-
necessarily confrontational, for example by conducting exercises within 
twelve nautical miles of Chinese-occupied features in the South China 
Sea. As Europe begins to focus more on designing policies that promote 
its own interests and worldviews, we will see an increasing willingness 
to deviate from key US policies. 
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7. CHINA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL PRIMACY: 
PROLIFERATION, DETERRENCE AND 
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Morgane Farghen386
7.1. INTRODUCTION
The fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 unleashed an extravagant wave 
of optimism leading many to the idea that – following the collapse of 
the USSR and the subsequent end of the Cold War – the world order had 
entered a post-modern era. Many Western analysts believed that the 
Clausewitzian understanding of international relations, based on the cen-
trality of strong nation-states and the use of force, had become obsolete. A 
Western world vision celebrating the triumph of liberalism, the end of the 
nation-state, the acceleration of globalization, and the rise of multilater-
alism became the leading paradigm of the post-1989 world. Thirty years 
later, it seems that such an interpretation has proved rather idealistic. It 
has been increasingly juxtaposed with the way that key state actors have 
resorted to force, while the practice of power and coercion on the world 
stage has evolved dramatically since the end of the Cold War. A series of 
nuclear crises, foregrounded at times by territorial disputes in a context 
of renewed strategic competition for global primacy, demonstrates that 
the post-modern paradigm has become increasingly irrelevant, even if its 
386 With contributions by Bertrand Viala, Strategic Consultant.
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main proponents in the Western liberal democracies try with persistence 
to keep it at the core of foreign-policy doctrines.387
This chapter analyzes in depth how the strategic competition in a 
renewed geopolitical environment has unfolded from the regional arena 
to a global scale. In particular, the chapter explores three key arenas: 
1) Nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s nuclear 
program; 2) Concerns about proliferation in the Middle East and Iran’s 
strategy of nuclear armament; and 3) China’s own attempts at redefining 
strategic order through its assertive foreign policy as well as national 
economic statecraft.
7.2. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
After fifteen years of proliferation, the North Korea nuclear program is 
more than just a means of keeping the regime alive. It has become a vehicle 
for challenging the established nuclear distribution and for disputing the 
international rules-based order, and, in that regard, the non-prolifer-
ation regime as one of its main pillars. In fact, hardly a month goes by 
without a fresh round of provocations and tensions. July and August 2019, 
for instance, saw, successively, the resumption of North Korea’s missile 
tests and the implementation of new US-ROK military exercises. As re-
cently as June 2020, North Korea blew up an inter-Korean liaison office, 
and threatened to employ nuclear weapons against the US. By rejecting 
the “status quo”, North Korea intends to make it clear to the world that 
it is challenging the legitimacy of the current order.388 The future of the 
NPT (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), and the 
strategic order the treaty has contributed to preserving, are at stake.
After years of strategic patience in the context of seemingly ever-pro-
gressing nuclear proliferation marked by a rapid change in the nature of 
the nuclear threat and Pyongyang’s increasingly bellicose military stance, 
Washington has decided to revise its approach.389 The US has now shifted 
to a more demanding and offensive nuclear policy, mixing both incentives 
and coercion. Donald Trump, an anti-conformist US president, has also 
brought new options to the table. Engagement with North Korea through 
unconventional and experimental top-down diplomacy, conducted in a 
series of summits in Singapore and Hanoi and a working-level meeting 
387 M. Farghen & B. Viala (2019), From 1989 to 2019: The End of the Liberal Illusions of Postmodernism. About 
The Resilient Pertinence Of Geopolitics, Asia Nuclear Initiative. 
388 M. Farghen (2019), Be Old And Bold: The North Korea Nuclear Crisis Will Not Get Fixed With A Conformist 
Approach, Asian Nuclear Initiative. 
389 G. Rachman (2019), “The Asian strategic Order Is Dying”, The Financial Times, July 8.
SEPTEMBER 2020    165
in Stockholm, has failed so far, leading to disappointing and non-con-
clusive results. Although the negotiations relieved the tensions that had 
reached a peak during the first year of Trump’s tenure, and the testing 
moratorium contributed to further appeasement of the situation, North 
Korea has been procrastinating and diverting the process. It has official-
ly committed to denuclearizing, but has refrained from setting a clear 
agenda, and remains reluctant to accept the conditions for a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID).
As a signatory to the NPT, and a self-declared defender of multilater-
alism, China could play a more constructive role on the Korean Peninsula, 
but Beijing’s convenient non-committal stance scarcely hides the reality 
of its strategic interests. China officially backs the US-led diplomatic 
efforts to pursue denuclearization but, in reality, having North Korea 
maintain its nuclear capabilities would be a better outcome for Beijing.390 
To that end, China initially proposed to “freeze” North Korea’s capabilities, 
before Washington and other traditional nuclear states imposed “denu-
clearization” as a key objective. Eager for relief from US sanctions, North 
Korea has failed to meet American expectations, resulting in recurring 
cycles of failing diplomacy. Behind the scenes, China has supported North 
Korea’s intentional lack of engagement, without being held accountable. 
China prefers the longstanding alternative of a reunification of the pen-
insula on its own conditions to the short-term prospect of a potential 
collapse of the hermit regime.
North Korea’s nuclear proliferation confirms that the established stra-
tegic order is being challenged. Disputes relevant to the NPT and its main 
components show that the treaty regime is on the verge of collapsing and 
it is difficult to foresee what could replace it. Hiding behind North Korea is 
a sleeping giant that has now awakened. China is standing on its feet and 
is ready to shake the region and the entire world order. In the guise of a 
cooperative stance on denuclearization, China’s real strategic objective 
is to oust the US from its immediate neighborhood. China’s ultimate aim 
is to define a new strategic order in which it plays a dominant role. The 
negotiation process on the peninsula has been its best leverage thus far, 
as China can count on its already massive political and economic influ-
ence in the region. On the peninsula, China has even offered defense and 
deterrence to North Korea through the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid 
and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. The result is now a more volatile and 
hence dangerous geopolitical landscape.
The strategic order is therefore crumbling, but the usual challenging 
powers, such as North Korea, are not the only ones responsible for this 
390 M. Farghen (2019), On China’s Rise And The Question Of Power, Asian Nuclear Initiative.
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dramatic change.391 Although in liberal circles much of the blame has 
recently been placed on Trump’s America, other countries within the 
liberal sphere have also contributed to the gradual loss of legitimacy of 
the post-World War II international order. In an ultra-polarized West-
ern sphere, between liberal progressives and national conservatives, the 
question of how far to go in pressuring North Korea in the first place, and 
whether or not to impose sanctions on China, have been particularly 
divisive elements of the strategic debate. 
How to address China is therefore the centerpiece of the peninsula’s 
strategic puzzle, but it has also become a new cornerstone in relations 
between the Western liberal states. The North Korea nuclear issue, as 
it relates to China, has become one variable in conflictual transatlantic 
relations. As proliferation is raging against the backdrop of China’s rising 
power and expansionism, traditional approaches assumed by the West are 
both limited and self-defeating. The Europeans seem to be willing to re-
main stubbornly conformist, while Washington expects them to be bolder. 
At stake are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its continued existence.
Two distinct approaches within the West are thus colliding without 
generating either positive or constructive outcomes. As a result, the per-
spective of successful denuclearization is fading without providing any 
credible options to maintain arms control. By implication, deterrence is 
becoming the key variable in power relations, encompassing diplomatic, 
security and economic dimensions. As North Korea has resumed its missile 
tests and reconciled with its old habit of diplomatic blackmail, China is 
taking advantage of the negotiations to better promote its strategic aims. 
As a result, the perspective of negotiating arms control has become less 
credible. Instead, determining how deterrence works in this new context 
is topping the agenda. 
Indirectly, a redefinition of deterrence may also raise the cost of Chi-
na’s support for Pyongyang. Rebalancing this bilateral relation is key to 
reversing the current dynamics in the region. As an anti-China sentiment 
is growing among Western elites, the mood has shifted from arms control 
to utter deterrence. In this context, the American withdrawal from the 
INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty is offering new leverage 
to pressure China. And the potential new nuclear deployments following 
the demise of the INF in Asia will result, for China, in increasing the costs 
of its unwillingness to cooperate. The potential spread of US nuclear de-
ployments in Asia is making it clear to China that its current policy may 
prove counterproductive.
391 M. Farghen (2018), “A New Definition of the Power Balance in the Peninsula. How the US was Sidelined 
in the Post-Olympic Truce Talks”, Défense nationale. 
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In this strategic turmoil, European liberal democracies and their 
regional institutions have become, once again, the weakest link in the 
arena. Due to the nature of their governance and values, they are easily 
bullied and targeted by less scrupulous regimes. A significant step in 
the depreciation of their strategic autonomy and resilience was brought 
about by the simultaneous cyber-attacks attributed to North Korea or 
its strategic partners that took place in December 2019, targeting the Los 
Angeles Times, the European Commission, and an association in Seoul in 
charge of dealing with refugees.392 
Liberal democracies therefore bear considerable responsibility for 
the perpetuation of the current negative and counter-productive cycles 
in international negotiations. By focusing too heavily on their policy 
differences and by showing that their will to negotiate with Pyongyang 
was higher than Pyongyang’s own, they have reinforced the regime’s 
belief that it could count on the leniency of liberal Western capitals to 
obtain concessions that would not be forthcoming from the reluctant 
US. By praising arms control rather than denuclearization, they have 
encouraged North Korea’s belief that it could expect a compromise on 
denuclearization if it was patient. Western capitals have lost track of what 
this crisis management was about.393 As a result, they ended up paying a 
high price for it. Conflicts within the West have ended in the US’s Western 
allies being targeted by US tariffs the same way as China and North Korea, 
all the while remaining vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks from these 
two countries. By rejecting a more offensive diplomatic approach to crisis 
management, the Western liberal nexus has become a stake for a more 
defiant North Korea. 
When North Korea acts, China is never far away, as the two share a 
security and defense treaty. As tensions and pressures in Asia have tak-
en a dramatic turn, Western capitals face a new dilemma: should they 
keep their distance from the ongoing strategic competition, without any 
guarantee of being immune to becoming the target of future attacks, or 
should they endorse a more offensive stance? If the quest for dialogue 
fails to bring any hope of tangible progress, then coercive diplomacy may 
offer new options and leverages. Whatever their decision, they had better 
consider Washington’s strategic solitude favored by an extremely polar-
ized domestic political landscape – a dynamic which extends to Europe 
and Asia through the liberal nexus. This polarization has contributed to 
promoting the conditions for the reversal of the balance of power on the 
392 M. Farghen (2019), The Huawei Case: Beyond Spying, A Test For Defence And Deterrence And A New 
Imponderable Variable In Upcoming Negotiations On The Peninsula, Asian Nuclear Initiative. 
393 M. Farghen (2019), The North Korea Nuclear Crisis: The Magnifying Glass of All The Pathologies of A 
Declining West, Asian Nuclear Initiative. 
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peninsula. Despite the campaign of maximum pressure, North Korea feels 
comfortable enough to threaten the United States. Pyongyang even seems 
undeterred by potentially increasing US pressure. With North Korea’s 
latest threats to restore nuclear tests and long-range missile launches if 
Washington does not make amends for “betrayal”, some experts are now 
considering a “maximum pressure 2.0” doctrine.394 
The most problematic trend is that the traditional Western powers have 
failed to restore moderation through diplomacy. Meanwhile, contrary 
to what it pretends, China has not been defending the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, supporting North Korea instead in an uninhibited fashion while 
trying to impose its own model of governance at the United Nations level. 
Chinese foreign policy has become more assertive, and aggressive. Resort-
ing to coercion has become commonplace even with economic partners. 
Instead of easing Beijing into the position of a moderate state that was a 
victim of an erratic American strategy, the North Korea nuclear crisis – 
along with other crises in China’s neighborhood, in Hong Kong and in the 
South China Sea – has shed a more realistic light upon the true nature of 
the regime in Beijing. For EU members, the nuclear crisis on the penin-
sula, as well as other crises in China’s periphery, cannot be understood 
as a solely Trumpian dilemma. From a political, economic, technological 
and military perspective, China has again become a defining power. The 
redefinition of China’s foreign policy, its quest for primacy and the means 
it dedicates to reaching those aims, make it a strategic competitor/rival 
in the making for other nations, and the way it deals with current crises 
is therefore alarming.
Against this backdrop, strategic competition is the best analytical 
framework for understanding the way Great Powers interact with one 
another, on the peninsula as well as in other regions. China is on a quest 
for global primacy.395 By unveiling this goal, China has set the conditions 
for strategic competition, which unfolds globally and intensifies conflicts 
in localized areas, including the peninsula. The latter has become a central 
stage for the new power struggle. As the region has become more com-
bustible, nuclear capabilities remain the most disputed stake.
394 D. Maxwell (2019), “Maximum Pressure 2.0: How To Turn The Tables on North Korea”, December 9, Military 
Times. 
395 D. Albright (2019), Understanding And Dealing With North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Capabilities, Asian 
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7.3. PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE OF IRAN
Two theaters, one paradigm: while proliferation is raging on the peninsula, 
the Middle East has become the second theater for renewed concerns 
about proliferation, in a mirror game that also aims at redefining the 
world order with China as the new master chief.
The interconnectedness and the parallels that can be drawn between 
the two regions are of course inherent to the interdependence of world 
affairs and the local involvement of global powers. Despite obvious cul-
tural, economic and geopolitical differences, similarities in the way pro-
liferation scenarios are unfolding are striking. First, in both regions an 
increasingly strong and at times equally confused anti-Western narrative 
has arisen, at times targeted solely at the US and at times encompassing 
both the EU and the US. The nature of the anti-Western narrative is based 
in both regions on the extensive use of neo-colonial and anti-imperialist 
arguments, legitimizing a strong defiance towards any multilateral talks 
and alliances. The West, meanwhile, has been divided over the merits of 
the now nearly defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a 
resilient effective tool capable of preventing nuclear proliferation, ahead 
of addressing Iran’s persistent missile tests and destabilizing actions on its 
periphery. The renewal of tensions has resulted in the consolidation of an 
opposite strategic and tactical nexus that stretches from Russia to Iran and 
also encompasses China and North Korea. In the midst of tensions, China 
has formally called for better coordination between different stakeholders.
In these troubled times, the road to hell is often paved with good in-
tentions, and the EU’s benign attempts to mitigate the risks of escalation 
into conflict seem to have emboldened Iran, and North Korea as well for 
that matter. Instead of preventing the escalation of tensions, the approach 
has positioned the EU and the major European powers at the center of 
Iran’s (and North Korea’s) strategy to counterbalance US pressure. After 
Paris promoted the creation of the INSTEX (the Instrument in Support of 
Trade Exchanges) mechanism to bypass US sanctions,396 Tehran rewarded 
it with diplomatic blackmail consisting of threats to restart its nucle-
ar program if sanctions were not relieved. Instead of being praised for 
playing the role of mediator, the EU, spearheaded by France, has become 
an instrument for a new, very “21st-century” kind of interstate conflict 
under the conditions of US-China strategic competition.
The latest episode in this dramatic deterioration in the international 
security landscape was the killing of General Suleimani, Commander 
of the Iranian Forces, and the series of reprisals that followed. Despite 
396 See also Chapter 9 in this report. 
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the context – in which the EU was also threatened by Iran following the 
process kickstarted by France, Britain and Germany to trigger the dying 
JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism – the EU insisted on remaining 
distanced from the US’s tough posture towards Teheran. Even though 
Teheran’s threats targeted them, the Europeans still pin their hopes on 
finding a middle way by resisting another deal to replace the JCPOA397. 
True enough, the stakes are high since the probable end of the JCPOA, 
rendered likely by the recent eruption of tensions, will motivate Iran to 
pursue its strategy of nuclear armament development.
The fact that the JCPOA had nearly been devoid of any relevance fol-
lowing the US withdrawal should indicate that a multilateral tool can 
achieve some credibility and constraining capacity only if backed by a 
power credible in the eyes of the stakeholders. As a matter of fact, Iran 
had already started scaling back its commitments since May 2019. The 
recent move by Iran threatening to quit the NPT if the JCPOA dispute is 
referred to the UN should come as no surprise. In such a context, Turkey, 
another key country in the region that will be directly impacted by Iran’s 
self-release from the counterproliferation constraints, has already regu-
larly stated its willingness to acquire nuclear military capacities. It is up to 
the Europeans to decide whether, as laudable as it might be, focusing on 
increasingly irrelevant multilateral tools still remains a credible option to 
contain nuclearization and proliferation and, if so, what demonstration of 
strength might be required from them to add credibility to their position. 
For decades, the strategic value of the Republic of Iran for China was 
mostly limited to energy, as the former has the largest energy reserves in 
the region. China has initiated upstream and downstream joint ventures 
with Iran, banking operations and a backed-loans policy, while its na-
tional oil companies are boosting the flow of energy resources from Iran. 
Critically, the political implications of China’s energy gaining strategy, 
the potential for conflict, and the repositioning of major powers vis-à-
vis Iran will give China a unique vantage point in the future. It is also an 
epicenter for US-China rivalry.398 China’s call to deepen coordination with 
North Korea and Iran, two major sensitive states, raises new questions 
about the operational dimension of the security and military relationship 
and how far it goes. Would China provide defense and deterrence for Iran 
as it already does for North Korea? Or how far does the coordination go 
397 P. Wintour (2020), “European States trigger dispute mechanism in Iran nuclear deal”, January 14, The 
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/14/european-states-trigger-dispute-
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between the three of them, particularly when it comes to cyber defense 
and cyber-attacks?
7.4. REDEFINING STRATEGIC ORDER: CHINA’S ASSERTIVE 
FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
The unresolved nuclear disputes on the Korean Peninsula and the Mid-
dle East have profound consequences that go far beyond the question 
of nuclear distribution. Against the backdrop of strategic competition 
between an ascendant challenging power and a declining established 
power, they reflect a fight for a new hierarchy on the international stage 
and set the conditions for a complete rebalancing of power. In parallel 
with the dispute over denuclearization on the peninsula, in the context 
of nuclear and missile proliferation, the strategic competition/rivalry 
between China and the US has taken a global turn.
Self-affirmation and a quest for primacy are manifesting as expansion-
ism and strongly worded assertiveness. In the face of a more demanding 
and offensive US, China has turned to resistance. Strategic competition 
has expanded to all realms – diplomatic, economic and military. Instead of 
persuading China to assume a more cooperative stance, economic tensions 
between Washington and Beijing have escalated into a trade war. Mean-
while, China is expanding its territory in the South China Sea through 
a successful tactic known as “creeping expansionism”, which relies on 
strategic moves that are not confrontational individually, but which, 
taken together, reshape the geography to its own advantage. China is also 
working to maintain and capitalize upon its already attained positions. 
Militarization and sanctioning are now the new norms of China’s active 
defense policy. Lately, the building of a military harbor in Cambodia has 
brought to light the military dimension of China’s regional expansionism.
In Washington, the Kissinger consensus that had prevailed over the 
past decades, where the US facilitated China’s rise in return for Beijing’s 
acknowledgement of the US as the hegemon, is dead and buried.399 The 
US has duly added tariffs and economic pressure to its strategic toolbox 
vis-à-vis China. In the South China Sea, the new strategy has taken the 
form of a declared will to “push back” China’s expansionism and milita-
rism. The exercise of pressure has restored deterrence alongside a renewed 
economic envelope as an incentive, as the main components of a novel 
strategic equation. This repositioning of deterrence in foreign policy has 
399 Rachman (2019).
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opened a new chapter in both the history of the US-China relationship 
and the balance of power.
Even if China cannot be held responsible for instrumentalizing each 
and every anti-US or anti-Western dispute, it is important to note that 
its soft power has been effective in spreading its world vision on a global 
scale. After a three-decade-old foreign policy defined under the auspices 
of a “low profile”, and a new leadership with the nomination of Xi Jinping 
as president, China has redefined its national ambitions and readjusted 
its strategic goals to pursue global primacy. The allocation of numerous 
impressive loans and foreign direct investments was set to be key in es-
tablishing the New Silk Road, and its pending effect, the rejuvenation of 
the “China Dream” (a formula borrowed from the imperial past to justify 
President Xi Jinping’s new mandate). The great rejuvenation of China en-
capsulated in the formula envisions a world in which China would restore 
its central position, without offering reassurances on how far the Chinese 
influence would accept compromises with other states and organizations 
if a conflict of interests arose.
China may have its own strategic goals and interests both on the Ko-
rean peninsula and in Iran, but at a time of expansionism and neo-im-
perialism, China’s nuclear trajectory cannot be separated from its na-
tional economic statecraft. China has again become a defining power for 
Western deterrence, and loans and FDI have become a key variable in 
protecting sovereignty. The speech by French President Emmanuel Ma-
cron on Defense and Strategy on 7 February 2020 was a major landmark 
in articulating this new strategic reality. None of the liberal states could 
ignore the influence of loans and FDI in reshaping the strategic order and 
redefining the balance of power. Recent years have seen the rise of Chi-
na’s global ambition and Beijing’s partly successful attempt at expanding 
its sovereignty over new territories via the development of large-scale 
infrastructure in airspace, subterranean space, oceanic space as well as 
cyberspace. This extension of sovereignty has been supported by a strong 
political doctrine aimed at positioning China at the top of the interna-
tional hierarchy of global powers. It has been served by a development of 
commercial and technical capabilities initiated in the 1970s and updated 
recently in the “Made in China 2025” plan released in 2015. The ten-year 
plan aims at updating China’s manufacturing sector and enabling it to 
take a leadership position in 10 identified priority industries with electric 
vehicles, ICT, AI, biotech and advanced robotics among the top sectors 
of IR4 (Industrial Revolution 4.0).400 The plan is to consolidate China’s 
400 This includes the Internet of Things (IoT), Big Data, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, 
3D etc.
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already top-level position in the global supply chain and further expand 
it to a position of domination.
The rise from the status of an emerging nation to that of a superpower 
able to dominate and shape parts of the global supply chain has been 
supported, first and foremost, by competence and leverage acquisition, 
using FDI and lending strategies extensively. As of 2018, China had con-
cluded 130 BITS (Bilateral Investment Treaties) and 21 agreements with 
investment provisions, and had become fully integrated into the global 
financial system, including on stock exchanges and in multilateral insti-
tutions such as the World Bank, from which Beijing obtained (in December 
2019) a highly contested aid plan amounting to over USD 1 billion annually 
through June 2025.401 Beijing’s complex international financial govern-
ance has enabled China to gain influence in multilateral institutions, foster 
regional cooperation with, for instance, ASEAN countries and acquire 
technologies and key assets. The debates concerning the creation of Chi-
na’s sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC),402 are 
illustrative of the central role played by financial mechanisms in China’s 
strategy of expanding its influence. Serious concerns already emerged in 
the US in 2009 when the CIC expanded its sovereignty holdings with the 
acquisition of stakes in energy and natural resources companies. As early 
as December 31, 2009, the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
reported that the CIC had holdings in 82 US entities, raising the issue of 
inward FDI for the US Congress.
The other pillar of China’s strategy aimed at consolidating its increas-
ingly dominating economic position and extending its influence, and 
tangentially its economic sovereignty over non-Chinese assets and terri-
tories, has been its lending and loan policy. The BRI investment schemes 
launched in 2013 are unique tools in that they mix elements of territorial 
sovereignty expansion with financial and commercial leverage. The BRI 
was presented as a tool to foster local development and regional integra-
tion. China has been able to sell its BRI scheme in spite of high interest 
rates, up to 6.5% for Sri Lanka for example, partly due to its attractive 
rhetoric of mutual interest and cooperation, the non-politicization of its 
lending policies, and great attention to local considerations for interna-
tional and regional cooperation. With ASEAN countries, this has been in 
the shape of the 2018 China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, which came 
into effect in October the same year. Interestingly enough, it was not 
impacted by the earlier example of Sri Lanka in 2017, when it was forced 
401 B. Viala (2019), Strategic Intelligence Consultant. Mirror Games: Iran, North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation. 
What It Teaches Us About the New World Order, September, ASNI.
402 The CIC was established in 2007 by the State Council, China’s ruling executive body.
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to hand over its Hambantota port to a Chinese state company on a 99-
year lease, due to the government’s inability to repay a ballooning debt.
Despite and probably because of its global success and policy conse-
quences, China’s lending and FDI have been raising increasing concern 
given the implications for the sovereignty of other governments. The 
recent policy debate with India over China’s BRI plan in Pakistan shows 
that these plans have strong territorial and sovereignty-related implica-
tions. Similarly, other analysts mention that the implementation of the 
Maritime Silk Road (MSR), a branch of the BRI, is of great concern for 
ASEAN member states as it supports China’s influence in South East Asia.403 
Similarly, Italy’s entry into China’s BRI generated a reaction from the 
then EU Budget Commissioner Gunther Oettinger, who warned that the 
“autonomy and sovereignty of Europe” must not be endangered.404 The 
acquisition of Germany’s top robotics firm KUKA in 2018 by China’s MIDEA 
raised considerable concern about the sovereignty of the country’s future 
plans for Industry 4.0. Proponents of the move justified it by pointing to 
the fact that KUKA had already opened its first Chinese plant in 2013.
In such a context of increasing defiance and criticism, China’s priority 
is now to protect and/or redivert its outbound investment. A 2018 Backer 
McKenzie report405 states that increasingly protectionist attitudes via 
tougher regulations and scrutiny in Europe and the US, initiated as of 2017, 
contributed to a decrease in Chinese outbound investment into these two 
markets: “New investment activity has fallen dramatically in sectors that 
are being scrutinized by regulators on both sides”. This demonstrates an 
increasing level of mistrust about the added value and implications of 
these funds. By attempting and partly succeeding in maximizing its use 
of global financial networks, predominantly to its own national advan-
tage, Beijing has also sown the seeds of stronger demands for economic 
sovereignty. If this issue has been taken seriously in the US for over a 
decade, the EU and its governments seem to have become aware of such 
concerns only recently. The challenge remains for the Europeans, in this 
new decade, to be able to establish the right industrial, financial and 
technological capacity and to align their aims accordingly.
403 As mentioned by Yang Yue and Li Fujian in their book The Belt and Road Initiative: ASEAN Countries’ 
Perspectives, World Scientific, 2019. 
404 B. Viala, Multilateralism’s Swan Song: A Challenge For The XXIst Century, Asian Nuclear Initiative (ASNI), 
November 2019. 
405 See M. Farghen (2019), “Hong Kong 2019: the tale of an unfolding crackdown. How China holds everyone 
hostage”, September. Paris: ASNI.  
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7.5. CONCLUSION
To conclude, geopolitics has not vanished. It has merely expanded into a 
globalized and complex space. Nuclear and ballistic proliferation modified 
the strategic landscape in Asia. In spite of their calls for a multilateral 
approach to deal with the issue, China (and Russia) do not act against 
proliferation and try instead to impose their views and interests. In the 
meantime, the resurgence of imperial ambitions has merged with a re-
newal of territorial expansionism and the building up of military capacity. 
These trends are redefining geography and presenting new threats for 
liberal democracies. In a global and increasingly unstable space experi-
encing a major redistribution of power, two conflicting interpretations 
of order exist, one defended by Western countries, the other propounded 
by China. These visions reflect major differences in terms of values, and 
thus look to generate long-term confrontations. In such a context, di-
plomacy and legal standards no longer possess the capacity to adjust to 
new powerful historical changes. They lose their relevance as they fail to 
contain new forms of violence. The current context of competition/rivalry, 
one that will undoubtedly prove resilient, will see the emergence of two 
types of powers, weak and strong. Weak powers will favor diplomacy, 
open door policies and norms to the detriment of strategy, alliances and 
deterrence policies. Strong powers will have developed assertive policies. 
They will have anticipated the quest for offshore deployment options and 
have instrumentalized their interdependence to better assert themselves. 
Contrary to weak powers, they will have integrated armament dynamics 
and will have planned the acquisition and development of weapons in a 
pre-emptive manner. 
In such an emerging environment, developing relations with China 
implies a redefinition of foreign policies to have these relations enter a 
more mature era. The sole force of the market should not be the only cri-
terion to design strategies to the detriment of any other requirement and 
at the cost of immense vulnerabilities. For Western capitals, the problem is 
two-sided: in the short term, if they do not focus on asserting themselves 
and adopt a fighting posture, others will and will do so on their own terms. 
As the strategic competition unfolds in the diplomatic realm, they will 
sooner or later be forced to adjust to the policies of others accordingly. 
Up to now, China has rarely been held liable for anything, but this may 
change. From spying and stealing data to supporting proliferation, abro-
gating the status quo in Hong Kong, and disturbing stability in the South 
China Sea, the point is not to mimic or adjust to the US’s strategic choices 
but to make sure that the Europeans have a voice in the new emerging 
176    SEPTEMBER 2020
global context. In the mid-term, the emerging decade is set to witness the 
reshaping of the concept of sovereignty along the lines of the China-US 
feud. Understanding sovereignty in the 21st century requires monitoring 
how either party will shape, reorganize or simply cancel current forums of 
international cooperation and how they will build new sets of alliances. In 
parallel with the expected development of military programs, priorities 
are not only to be set on the visible and usual aspects of coercion and 
power on which the effective exercise of sovereignty depends, but also 
on the ability to hold a dominating position in the global supply chains 
in the key areas of AI and Big Data, which are set to be the main drivers 
of defense and security.


8

SEPTEMBER 2020    181
8. US-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
FROM ENGAGEMENT TO COMPETITION
Deborah McCarthy
8.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter critically assesses how relations between the US and China 
in the economic sphere have evolved from strategic engagement to com-
petition. It first analyzes the underlying assumptions, beliefs, and drivers 
for the US’s diplomatic engagement with China during the past decades, 
and then examines the strategic shift from engagement to competition 
under the current Trump administration. The chapter thereafter proposes 
vistas for a way forward, arguing for the need to re-engage with China 
in concert with key allies. 
8.2. THE ERA OF ENGAGEMENT
Since the Nixon years, the United States has pursued a policy of diplo-
matic engagement with China, building a complex web of bilateral and 
multilateral discussion frameworks, agreements and understandings on 
issues of critical interest to the United States.406
On the economic side, deeper US engagement with China was pred-
icated on the assumptions that: 1) it would open the Chinese market to 
US companies and 2) bring benefits and choices to Chinese citizens lead-
ing them, in turn, to pressure the government to maintain a more open 
406 There is no consensus on the definition of diplomatic engagement. For an excellent review, see E. Resnick 
(2001), “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2, pp. 551-66. For this chapter, 
we will define engagement as “the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the 
comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue areas.”
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economy. The US granted China Most Favored Nation (MFN) Status be-
ginning in 1980, extended Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 
2000 and supported China’s membership in the WTO in 2001. US-China 
trade jumped from US$125 billion in 2001 to over $700 billion in 2017.407 
China duly became the largest US merchandise trading partner, the biggest 
source of US imports, and the third-largest US export market.
The strategy of economic engagement was also based on the funda-
mental belief that the United States could shape China’s future, help it 
“reform” its state-managed economic system and adopt Western norms 
for economic interchange. As the size of the US economy continued to far 
exceed that of China, the approach also reflected the firm conviction that 
the norms of the post-World War II liberal economic order were the cor-
rect and only standard.
President Obama came into office aiming to establish a pragmatic and 
effective relationship with China.408 The Administration believed that a 
prosperous China actively engaged as a stakeholder in the global econo-
my was in the interest of the United States. Together with President Hu 
Jintao, President Obama launched the US-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) in April 2009 with the aim of establishing regular sen-
ior-level talks across the whole range of interests of the two countries. 
A third component, the Strategic Security Dialogue, was added in 2011.
US priorities in the Economic Dialogue included: 1) pressing China to 
move to more market-oriented exchange rate practices and away from 
competitive devaluations of the Chinese renminbi, which favored Chinese 
export; 2) boosting US exports and opening new sectors of the Chinese 
economy to US investment; and 3) pushing China to modify its legal and 
regulatory framework to reduce discrimination against US firms, increase 
IP protection and obtain commitments to abide by a broad series of in-
ternational standards. 
The currency discussions were particularly acrimonious between 2009 
and 2011, as the global economy emerged from the financial crisis. The US 
current account deficit was ballooning, there were extensive debates in 
the G20 and other fora on competitive devaluations, and the US Congress 
was pressuring the Administration to take action in response to Chinese 
currency manipulation. As the US pushed for China to appreciate its 
currency, China accused the US of pursuing loose monetary policy which, 
among other things, decreased the value of China’s large holdings of US 
407 J. P. Meltzer and N. Shenai (2019), “The US-China economic relationship: A comprehensive approach”, 
Brookings Institution and American Enterprise Institute Policy Brief, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
the-us-china-economic-relationship-a-comprehensive-approach/.
408 B. Obama (2009), National Security Strategy, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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dollars and government securities. The administration spent considerable 
time responding to China’s concerns but studiously avoided naming China 
a currency manipulator.
The second priority of the S&ED was to boost US exports and open 
up China to US investment. The export push was driven by the Obama 
National Export Initiative, which aimed to double global US exports in 
five years. On investment, much time was spent chipping away at mul-
tiple obstacles, particularly in the services sector. Discussions were also 
launched to negotiate the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) using a 
new US model that provided protection against technology transfers and 
competition from State-Owned Enterprises, among others. The BIT was 
also perceived as a means of drawing Chinese investment into the United 
States since, as part of the Administration’s 2011 Commitment to an Open 
Investment Policy, the US expanded efforts to bring in foreign investment 
by paying special attention to China. This included launching a special 
subnational dialogue between governors of US states and governors of key 
Chinese provinces on two-way investment opportunities. Chinese FDI 
flows into the US rose from $4.9 billion in 2011 to $46.5 billion in 2016.409
A third priority was to push China to modify its legal and regulatory 
framework to reduce discrimination against US firms, increase IP pro-
tection and obtain Chinese commitments to abide by established inter-
national standards. Some agreements were reached410 through dogged 
persistence although, as noted by Campbell and Ratner, the US “fought 
tooth and nail for small, incremental concessions.”411
Outside of the S&ED, the Administration supported greater Chinese 
participation and cooperation in multiple economic forums including 
the G-20, APEC and the OECD. Examples include the establishment of 
the special OECD China-Development Assistance Committee to discuss 
development policies and practices and the addition of the renminbi to 
the IMF SDR basket 2016.
The engagement strategy did not preclude enforcement efforts. The 
United States set up a new interagency trade enforcement unit to ad-
dress unfair trade practices and pursued, with success, multiple trade 
enforcement efforts against China in the WTO.412 In many instances, other 
409 The US-China Investment Hub, https://www.us-china-fdi.com/us-china-foreign-direct-investments/fdi-
data.
410 For a sample list, see the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet – 
Economic Track, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0484.aspx.
411 K. M. Campbell & E. Ratner (2018), “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, Issue 2, pp. 60-70.
412 Office of the United States Trade Representative archive (2015), “FACT SHEET: The Obama Administration’s 
Record on Trade Enforcement”, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/
january/fact-sheet-obama-administration%E2%80%99s.
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countries jointed the disputes. The US also took steps to stymie Chinese 
cyber hacks, issuing an executive order which allowed the Department of 
the Treasury to apply sanctions for “cyber-enabled activities that create 
a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic 
health or financial stability of the United States.”413 
Nor did the engagement strategy preclude encirclement of China. 
The Obama Administration strengthened alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
and negotiated the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to link the 
nations of Asia into a new 21st-century trading network. It also launched 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU to 
establish, among other things, new higher standards for the protection 
of IP, labor and the environment.
Across these efforts, the Obama administration sought to establish 
mechanisms to address the unfair competitive advantages of Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that receive preferential treatment by 
the Chinese government. Both within the trade discussions, through the 
BIT talks as well as at the OECD,414 the US sought to develop international 
standards for SOEs.
There has been criticism of the lack of concrete results of the Obama 
economic engagement policy with China, despite the signing of multiple 
agreements and understandings on a wide range of issues from standards 
to climate change and the very profitable presence of US business in the 
country.
There is less recognition of the fact that the S&ED and earlier dialogues 
not only integrated China into the global economic system but were also a 
means of: 1) exchanging detailed information on macroeconomic develop-
ments, industry trends as well as upcoming changes in laws and regula-
tions; 2) allowing US companies, through US government representatives, 
to formally and directly present their views to the Chinese authorities; 
and 3) working in coordinated action with China in multilateral fora such 
as the G20 and APEC.
413 B. Obama (2015), “Executive Order -- ‘Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant 
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities’”, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 1, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-
persons-engaging-significant-m.
414 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/
guidelines-corporate-governance-soes.htm.
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8.3. THE SHIFT TO COMPETITION
Under the Trump administration, there has been a strategic shift from en-
gagement to competition with China.415 As stated in the 2018 National Se-
curity Strategy, “China (and Russia) challenge American power, influence, 
and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”416
The Administration affirms that the engagement strategy failed as 
China did not commit to the liberal Western order or reform its political 
system. In addition, as articulated by Vice President Pence in a speech at 
the Wilson Center in October 2019, the shift has been driven by the un-
derlying assumption that China’s rise was funded and enabled by the 
United States, to its detriment. China’s rise, he noted, was the result of 
“the greatest transfer of wealth in the history of the world … much of this 
success driven by American investment in China.” Quoting President 
Trump, he added, “We rebuilt China over the past 25 years.”417
As a result, the Administration has adopted tactics to reduce Chinese 
exports to the United States through tariffs and bans, increase screen-
ing of Chinese investment in the United States, label China a currency 
manipulator, and push back regionally on Chinese economic influence.
To address unfair Chinese trade practices, the Administration has 
chosen to pursue unilateral measures under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 and bilateral negotiations, largely ignoring the WTO settlement 
process, which it perceives as ineffective and too lengthy.
In March 2018, the Administration began a Section 301 investigation 
in response to Chinese forced technology transfers, unfair practices on IP, 
and cyber intrusions into US networks to gain business information. Sub-
sequently, the Administration increased tariffs by 25% on $250 billion of 
imports from China and threatened to boost tariffs on nearly all remaining 
products from China (valued at $300 billion) if no trade agreement was 
reached by December 2019.418 
The Administration also placed an increasing number of Chinese firms, 
including Huawei, on the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of In-
dustry and Security’s Entity List, making them subject to specific license 
415 Initially, the Administration restructured the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) into four different 
talks: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, the Law Enforcement 
and Cybersecurity Dialogue, and the Social and Cultural Dialogue. But the process rapidly broke down. 
The first was held once in November, 2018. The Economic Dialogue was superseded by the ongoing trade 
discussions and the last two have not met since 2017.
416 Seal of the President of the United States (2017), “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
417 Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture, October 24, 2019, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-
lecture/.
418 In return, China increased tariffs (at rates ranging from 5% to 25%) on $110 billion worth of imports from the 
United States.
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requirements for the export, re-export, and/or in-country transfer of 
controlled items. In October 2019, the US Department of Commerce added 
28 Chinese companies and agencies to a list of firms banned from doing 
business in the United States, with a focus on entities specializing in ar-
tificial intelligence, machine learning and digital surveillance. Separately, 
the Administration banned federal agencies from buying equipment and 
services from certain Chinese companies, including Huawei.419
To address growing national concerns about Chinese and other foreign 
exploitation of investments in the United States, new legislation (The 
“Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA)) 
was passed, significantly expanding the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), including on foreign 
investments in critical infrastructure and businesses maintaining sensi-
tive personal data. The Administration is also examining a plan to limit 
Chinese company listings on US stock exchanges and US pension plan 
investments in Chinese securities.
In August 2019, the Administration branded China a currency manip-
ulator for the first time in 25 years, after China allowed its currency to 
drop two percent following US threats to levy additional tariffs.420 As the 
declaration carries no penalties, the Administration is also considering a 
rule whereby the US could impose countervailing duties on imports from 
countries deemed to be artificially undervaluing their currencies. 
The Administration has also sought to push back on Chinese regional 
economic influence by launching the International Development Finance 
Corporation to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and warning 
countries of the pitfalls of Chinese investment and development finance.
The shift from engagement to competition has had broad bipartisan 
support. For years, there has been general concern over predatory Chinese 
economic practices including IP theft, hacking, forced technology transfer 
and China’s efforts to privilege its national champions. According to the 
August 2019 Pew survey on US perceptions of China, 60% of Americans 
have an unfavorable opinion of the country, the highest level in 14 years.
In foreign policy security circles as well, there is growing agreement 
that a number of the assumptions on which engagement was pursued 
were incorrect. While some questioned the approach all along and warned 
419 B. S. Glaser & K. Flaherty (2019), “The Trade Deal Falls Through”, Comparative Connections, Volume 21, 
Issue 2, http://cc.pacforum.org/2019/09/the-trade-deal-falls-through/.
420 The move came despite a finding in the Treasury’s May semiannual report to Congress on the foreign 
exchange policies of major trading partners that China was not manipulating its currency, a position 
reinforced by the IMF confirmation in July that the renminbi was not undervalued.
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of increased competition, others have recently concluded that a change 
of approach is required.421
While there is debate about whether the past US engagement strategy 
really aimed at the liberalization or democratization of China,422 there is 
little debate that China today, under President Xi Jinping, has become a 
more nationalistic, state-controlled and closed system that seeks dom-
inance in key industries, to shape new rules of interchange and offer an 
alternative model for developing countries.
Despite the general support for a more robust response to China’s 
predatory economic practices, it can be argued that the US Administra-
tion’s approach is NOT making the US more competitive but is merely 
confrontational.423 In an era of global power competition, the Adminis-
tration is not enhancing the competitiveness of the United States but is, 
in fact, weakening its international position.
For one, the large US current account deficit is NOT due to the mer-
chandise trade imbalance with China. Rather, it is primarily the result 
of US domestic policies, including large government deficits, high levels 
of consumption and a low national savings rate. Moreover, for 2019, the 
federal budget deficit was projected to increase by a whopping 26 percent 
to $1 billion due to tax cuts and increased government spending. 
Second, the US tariffs on Chinese goods have cost the US export 
markets. The US merchandise trade deficit with China continues to rise 
(8 percent in 2017 and another 11 percent in 2018).424 The overall Current 
Account grew from $449 billion in 2017 to $489 billion in 2018.425 As a 
result of the US China tariff disputes, the IMF estimates that global trade 
growth has decreased to its lowest level since 2012.426 
Third, the tariffs have increased costs for US consumers and, with 
the consequent uncertainty for investment, US GDP for 2020 is expected 
421 Campbell & Ratner (2018), pp. 60-70. See also A. Friedberg (2018), “The Signs Were There”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 97, Issue 4, pp. 186-187 and K. M. Campbell & J. Sullivan (2019), “Competition Without Catastrophe”, 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, Issue 5, pp. 96-110. 
422 A. I. Johnston (2019), “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”, Washington Quarterly, 
Volume 42 Issue 2, p. 4. See also T. Christensen, & P. Kim (2018), “Don’t Abandon Ship”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 97, Issue 4, pp. 188-189. 
423 Campbell & Ratner (2018), p 7. 
424 Trade statistics are reported on a gross basis. Much of China’s exports consist of foreign-produced 
components (i.e. Apple iPhone parts), delivered for final assembly in China. On a value added basis, the US 
bilateral trade deficit with China would be smaller. See https://www.usitc.gov/special_topic_value_added_
measurement_trade.htm.
425 US Trade Representative. US-China Trade Facts. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-
taiwan/peoples-republic-china. Bureau of Economic Statistics (2019), https://www.bea.gov/news/
blog/2019-03-27/us-current-account-deficit-increases-2018. As a percentage of US GDP, the deficit 
increased to 2.4 percent from 2.3 percent.
426 IMF World Economic Outlook (2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/
world-economic-outlook-october-2019#Chapter%201
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to be from 0.3 to 1 percentage point lower than it would otherwise be, 
depending on the estimate.427 
Fourth, to finance its continued current account deficit, the US needs, 
among other things, to attract investment and borrow more. Yet FDI to the 
United States is decreasing. It dropped 40 percent from 2016 to 2017 and a 
further 8 percent in 2018.428 On borrowing, China has for some years been 
the largest foreign owner of US debt. As of December 2018, China held $1.1 
trillion, 17.9% of all foreign investment in US federal debt.429 While it is 
unlikely that China would take steps to use this as leverage in the current 
trade dispute and any large-scale sell-off would lead to losses, it is a card 
they have played before. As the Administration continues to accuse China 
of currency manipulation in an effort to reduce the deficit,430 China is 
likely to raise concerns about the safety and value of its large holdings.
Fifth, attempts to decouple the US from China ignore the realities of 
global supply chains today. US companies recognize that global opera-
tions mean working with China. While the Administration has sought to 
discourage companies from investing in China and even threatened to 
force them to return, US foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into China 
have dropped only slightly from $14 billion in 2017 to $13 billion in 2018.431 
According to the 2019 AmCham Shanghai survey of US companies, China 
continues to be profitable for most companies, although US-China trade 
tensions are creating uncertainties.
Sixth, the Administration is seeking to protect US industries rather 
than develop them. It has used bans and export controls with no con-
current efforts to increase government investment in R&D, or to foster 
public-private initiatives in key technologies to make the US more com-
petitive. 
Lastly, the US has not integrated its current foreign assistance, trade 
and investment programs to engage more effectively with developing 
countries and its influence has declined: in 2006, the US was the principal 
427 K. Russ (2019), “What Trump’s Tariffs Have Cost the US Economy”, EconoFact and PBS, October 11, https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/what-trumps-tariffs-have-cost-the-u-s-economy.
428 Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (2019), https://ofii.
org/report/fdi-in-the-united-states-quarter-two-20191f. Although China is not among the top investors in 
the United States, it too has reduced its holdings in the country. Chinese FDI flows in 2018 were only 5 billion 
dollars, 8 percent below the previous year and 45 percent below the 2016 level. While the drop is due in part 
to Chinese capital controls, it is also the result of the new US FIRMMA Act, https://www.us-china-fdi.com/
us-china-foreign-direct-investments/data.
429 Congressional Research Service, Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt (2019), July 26, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RS22331.pdf.
430 D. Ikenson (2019), “Trump and Bipartisan Majority in Congress Complicit in Chinese Currency Canard”, 
Forbes, August 6, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2019/08/06/trump-and-bipartisan-
majority-in-congress-complicit-in-chinese-currency-manipulation-canard/#1c9eb71145e1.
431 Cumulative US FDI in China (at historical cost) still exceeds cumulative Chinese FDI in the US by a factor 
of two ($276 billion vs $148 billion). See https://www.us-china-fdi.com/us-china-foreign-direct-
investments/data.
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trade partner for over 130 nations. By 2016, that number had dropped to 
76.432 Foreign assistance has stagnated with yearly battles between major 
cuts proposed by the Administration and Congressional replenishments. 
While the new US Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) is a step in 
the right direction and will enable higher US investment in developing 
countries, its capitalization is small ($30 billion) in comparison with the 
estimate of annual $110 billion outlays by China on investment and con-
struction projects in the Belt and Road Initiative.433 
8.4. THE WAY FORWARD
The US is more likely to shape China’s actions if it works in concert with 
allies and partners both within current organizations and in initiatives to 
shape new norms and standards. In particular, joint or concurrent action 
in the WTO, international investment issues and development finance 
could help modernize trade rules, better support US business and leverage 
the combined weight of major like-minded donors.
While cumbersome, the WTO nevertheless continues to provide the 
principal global set of rules for trade that can be used to push back on 
Chinese economic practices. By pursuing a primarily bilateral trade agen-
da with China, the US is foregoing the power of leverage. The US, the EU, 
Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico and South Korea combined account for 
40 percent of Chinese exports and have much greater bargaining power.434 
Building broader support for key US WTO proposals including the 
reform of the system whereby countries, such as China, self-declare 
themselves developing countries (thereby enabling them to adhere to 
weaker standards) would be important. Likewise, providing strong vocal 
US support for actions, such as the 2018 EU complaint against China for 
forcing European countries to transfer technology, would also increase 
pressure on China.
Like the US, France, Germany, the UK and others have moved to tight-
en inbound investment screening with an eye on China. As transatlantic 
investment flows will also be affected, consultations on new legal norms 
and on trends in Chinese investment would help decision-makers as they 
432 D. Runde, R. Bandura & O. Murphy, (2018), “Renewing US Economic Engagement with the Developing 
World”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewing-us-
economic-engagement-developing-world.
433 C. Joy-Perez & D. Scissors (2018), “The Chinese State Funds Belt and Road but Does Not Have Trillions to 
Spare”, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/the-chinese-state-
funds-belt-and-road-but-does-not-have-trillions-to-spare/.
434 W. Cutler (2019), “Strength in Numbers”, Asia Policy Society Institute Issue Paper, April 2019, https://
asiasociety.org/policy-institute/strength-numbers.
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refine legislation. Similarly, the US would be more effective in shaping the 
implementing regulations of the new Chinese investment law to the ben-
efit of US companies if it worked with other key investing countries such 
as Germany and the Netherlands. Likewise, in addressing the challenge 
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, joint efforts would be more effective. 
As stated by Campbell and Sullivan “rather than fight China at every turn 
– on every port, bridge, and rail line – the United States and its partners 
should make their own affirmative pitch to countries about the kinds of 
high-quality, high-standard investments that will best serve progress.”435
Much attention has been paid to the creation of the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank and the New Development Bank by China. This has 
fogged the reality that official development assistance flows continue to 
be dominated by the US and other member countries of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD, and that the new banks are small and 
therefore have not drastically altered control in the Multilateral Devel-
opment Banks (MDBs).436
Yet many low-income countries are turning to China for infrastructure 
financing in the absence of MDB concessional financing. A significant 
contribution for infrastructure by the US and other like-minded donors 
to the current replenishment drive for the World Bank IDA (International 
Development Association) would give low-income countries more sus-
tainable choices and cover major financing needs.437
8.5. CONCLUSION
There is general agreement that a number of the assumptions underlying 
the long-standing US strategy of engagement with China were flawed and 
that the era of great power competition with China has arrived. However, 
the current US Administration’s approach of seeking, via coercive bilat-
eral means, to force China to adhere to current norms and to rebalance 
economic power is not making the US more competitive. 
Ironically, by ignoring allies and some of the key institutions that 
form the basis of the current system, in order to push China to adhere to 
the rules, the US both risks undermining the very order it is defending 
and reducing US influence in shaping new 21st century rules. By pulling 
435 Campbell and Sullivan (2019).
436 BRIC countries’ representation has risen only by an estimated 0.8 percentage points since the two banks were 
established. See R. Ray (2019), “Who Controls Multilateral Development Finance?”, Boston University Global 
Development Center, Working Paper 026, http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2019/04/GEGI-WP-R-Ray-2019-
Power-Weights.pdf.
437 N. Lee (2019), “Infrastructure and IDA 19. A priority or Not”, Center for Global Development, September 3, 
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/infrastructure-and-ida19-priority-or-not.
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out of the Trans- Pacific Partnership, for example, the US lost a valuable 
seat at the negotiating table on new norms, including on the operations 
of State-Owned Enterprises, a key element of China’s economic model.
Given the relative decline in US economic power,438 joint efforts with 
key allies, such as the EU, to apply current norms and develop new ones 
reflective of power shifts and modern economic interchange are even 
more important.
Cutting back on regular senior face-to-face meetings across the broad 
spectrum of US-Chinese economic interests both ignores the reality that 
China now plays a very important role in global power and that the US 
and Chinese economies are closely linked. The lack of engagement also 
limits the US ability to obtain information, more effectively argue for the 
interests of US companies and leverage the relationships built over years, 
including the tens of thousands of the brightest Chinese students who 
have studied in the US. 
Seeking to isolate and weaken China is not an effective strategy. Rather, 
the US should leverage the joint strength of allies and partners to shape 
modern rules for open economic interchange and to seek to deepen Chi-
na’s linkages to them. Competition is now a given. Engagement should 
be a strategic choice.
438 As measured on a Purchasing Power basis, China’s share of global GDP stood at 18.3 percent in 2017, while 
that of the US dropped to 15.3 percent, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.
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9. WASHINGTON’S NEW ECONOMIC 
COERCION AND GEOPOLITICAL 
COMPETITION: THE EUROPEAN 
VIEWPOINT
Clara Portela439
9.1. INTRODUCTION
International affairs analysts have long predicted that, in a world where 
large-scale inter-state war has ceased to be viable, great power con-
frontation will be fought in the economic domain. Rather than seeking a 
major war, states will just seek the fruits of that war by other means.440 
Accordingly, increased attention is being devoted to geo-economics, un-
derstood as the exercise of power via economic instruments to advance 
geopolitical objectives. Pointing to the primacy of the US in this domain, 
observers warn of Washington’s superior ability to make use of economic 
and financial tools. In particular, the status of the US dollar as the world’s 
reserve currency and primary medium of exchange enables Washington 
to isolate the target from the global financial system.441 Scholars note that 
global networks of information and finance, asymmetrical in that some 
of their nodes are far more connected than others, are being increasingly 
leveraged for strategic advantage.442 Sanctions have long been identified 
as a means of global geopolitical positioning.443
439 The author is grateful to Dr Patricia Garcia-Duran for useful comments on a previous version of this chapter. 
All remaining errors are author’s own.
440 P. Porter (2019), “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 
42, no. 1, pp. 7-25.
441 N. Gould-Davies (2020), “Russia, the West and Sanctions”, Survival, vol. 62, no. 1, pp.7-28.
442 H. Farrell, & A. Newman (2019), “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State 
Coercion”, International Security, vol. 44, no.1, pp. 42-79. 
443 B. Taylor (2010), Sanctions as Grand Strategy, IISS, London. 
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In recent months, Washington’s economic coercion has indeed taken 
center stage. Following its 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal – 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Washington re-imposed 
sanctions on Iran. The following year, the US enacted sanctions on Russia 
and Cuba with extraterritorial consequences.444 The growing volume of 
sanctions imposed under the administration of President Donald Trump 
has led some observers to speak of “overuse”.445 According to a major law 
firm, in 2018 the US blacklisted nearly 1,500 people, companies and enti-
ties, nearly 50 percent more than in 2017, which was the second-highest 
year on record.446 The number of new designations dropped by half in 
2019, but the almost 800 listings still represented the third highest figure 
since 2001.447 
What is most intriguing about these sanctions is that they diverge 
from the classical definition of economic sanctions as foreign policy in-
struments. Economic sanctions are understood as the interruption by one 
state of trade and finance with another country in pursuance of security 
policy goals. In the post-Cold War era, this practice has evolved into the 
targeting of individuals and entities, blocking their assets and banning 
transactions with them. Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
are allowed to deviate from treaty obligations under a security exemption 
enshrined in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Among the various exemption clauses contemplated in the GATT, 
Art. XXI appears to be the most relevant to the present cases as it stipulates 
that the Treaty’s contents do not prevent any of its parties from taking 
any action ‘in time of war or other emergency in international relations’ 
or ‘in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for 
the maintenance of international peace and security’. The security ex-
emption is characterized by the ample margin of manoeuvre it reserves 
for member states in adopting security policies that hinder trade flows, to 
the point that is has been called ‘self-judging’.448 The WTO issued its first 
panel ruling ever delineating the scope of the security exception of Art. 
XXI in 2019, on a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over sanctions.449
How does Washington’s geo-economic dominance and its increasing-
ly diverse sanctions palette play out in the current global environment, 
444 S. Lohmann (2019), “Extraterritorial U.S. Sanctions”, SWP Comment no. 5, SWP. 
445 Politi, J. (2020), “Trump administration leans on sanctions to shape foreign policy”, Financial Times, 30 
January. 
446 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (2019), “2018 Year-end sanctions update”, 11 February. 
447 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (2020), “2019 Year-end sanctions update”, 23 January.
448 R. Alford (2011), “The Self-judging WTO Security Exemption”, Utah L. Rev, no. 3, pp. 697-759. 
449 See World Trade Organisation (2019), DS512: Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds512_e.htm.
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characterized by intensifying competition between the US and great pow-
ers like China? And most specifically, how does this affect Europe and its 
relations to Washington? This chapter presents an overview, and outlines 
the place and prospects for Europe in the midst of an environment of 
geopolitical competition. 
9.2. THE PRESENT: SECONDARY SANCTIONS
The EU is directly impacted by the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions 
against third countries like Iran, Russia or Cuba.450 Secondary sanctions 
are used to exert influence on EU firms: they punish European entities 
which engage in dealings with third states under Washington’s sanctions. 
Even though secondary sanctions are not embraced or enforced by EU 
member states, European firms are compelled to comply with them. 
The employment of secondary sanctions is not new. The extraterritorial 
application of US sanctions elicited a significant transatlantic crisis in the 
late 1990s when the US Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act (short for 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act). This bill allows US citizens 
with claims to property expropriated by Cuban authorities to sue foreign 
companies and individuals exploiting such property. Their executives 
and shareholders, as well as their immediate families, are denied entry 
to US territory. By means of the enactment of a ‘Blocking Statute’, the 
EU prohibited European firms from complying with US measures. While 
tensions were eventually resolved thanks to then President Clinton’s 
exemption of European companies, the crisis re-emerged following Wash-
ington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and its re-imposition of unilateral 
sanctions with extraterritorial effects. The tightening of the US sanctions 
regime on Iran was followed by the expiry of the waiver exempting EU 
firms from the effects of the Helms-Burton Act. Most recently, the US 
Senate approved new legislation targeting Nord Stream 2, an oil pipeline 
connecting Russia and Germany, which brought construction works to 
a standstill in the last days of 2019.451 The Obama administration made 
extensive use of secondary sanctions, particularly in the Iran context.452 
However, the magnitude of the extraterritorial effects of sanctions was 
not visible at the time because US and EU policies were aligned,453 while 
currently they are increasingly out of step. 
450 V. Sinkkonen (2019), “Sanctions and US Foreign Policy in the Trump era: A Perfect Storm”, FIIA Briefing 
Paper 269, FIIA, Helsinki. 
451 A. Rettman (2019), “US halts building of Germany-Russia pipeline”, EUObserver 21 December. 
452 P. Harrell, (2019), “Trump’s use of sanctions is nothing like Obama’s”, Foreign Policy, 5 October. 
453 C. Portela (2017), “The Triumph of Teamwork”, Peace Policy Newsletter, no. 23, Kroc Institute, Notre Dame.
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9.3. FRAMING A RESPONSE
In response, Brussels reactivated its Blocking Statute. Outside the purview 
of the EU, France, Germany and the UK created a channel for transactions 
with Iranian entities, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (IN-
STEX). Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have 
already initiated their accession process. Membership is also open to 
non-EU countries such as Norway.454
However, neither of these instruments has proved satisfactory so far. 
INSTEX did not process its first transactions until early 2020. For its part, 
the Blocking Statute places companies in a difficult situation as they are 
forced to choose between complying with US or EU legislation. The mod-
est effectiveness of EU-framed responses is largely due to private sector 
willingness to comply with US sanctions in order to maintain access to 
the US market and avoid fines by the US Treasury agency, the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). This is particularly true for banks, which 
need access to the US financial market in order to conduct US dollar-de-
nominated operations. The detachment of the financial environment 
from the control of governmental or supranational agencies makes them 
unwieldy. In situations in which EU sanctions are defined in more narrow 
terms than US sanctions, European firms tend to ‘overcomply’.455 Even 
if the EU has no restrictions in place, European companies are still likely 
to adhere to Washington’s measures.456
Far from being a merely economic issue, the extraterritorial effects of 
US sanctions constitute a major geopolitical challenge for Brussels. This 
has also had considerable repercussions for other US allies, such as Canada. 
How the EU positions itself in this regard may have ramifications for its 
commitment to the multilateral approach and for the already strained 
transatlantic partnership. Reflecting the preoccupation with the extra-
territorial effects of US sanctions, Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen exhorted Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for an Economy that 
Works for People, to improve EU resilience to the extraterritorial effects of 
foreign sanctions, asking him “to develop proposals to ensure Europe is 
more resilient to extraterritorial sanctions by third countries” in order “to 
support our economic sovereignty”.
454 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2019), “Joint statement on joining INSTEX by Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden”, November 29. 
455 C. Portela (2016), “How the EU Learned to Love Sanctions”, in M. Leonard (ed.), Connectivity Wars, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, London, pp. 36-42.
456 I. Aula (2020), “Secondary Sanctions”, in N. Helwig, J. Jokela & C. Portela (eds.), Sharpening EU Sanctions 
Policy for a Geopolitical Era, Office of the Prime Minister, Helsinki, pp. 99-104. 
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Three broad scenarios on how the EU may position itself vis-à-vis at-
tempts at economic coercion can be outlined. These responses are loosely 
based on the categorization undertaken by Steven Lobell, Neil Jesse and 
Kristen Williams, who classified attitudes towards the global hegemon and 
its challengers into strategies of accommodation and resistance.457 Each 
of them carries different implications for the EU’s geopolitical positioning.
A purely passive attitude would see the EU accepting the costs implied. 
However, degrees are possible. A strategy of accommodation does not 
necessarily equate to inaction. It could see the EU opposing US policies 
discreetly and seeking to persuade the US administration to dispense 
waivers to specific firms of its allies, following the model applied until 
the recent reversal of this policy. 
Alternatively, the EU could protest the illegality and unacceptability 
of Washington’s economic coercion at international fora. Attacking the 
legitimacy of the hegemon is considered a strategy of resistance.458 In 
our case, it would however not go beyond the declaration of opposition. 
Contesting the illegality of US action in international fora is a practice that 
has already been witnessed in the context of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). In the explanation of the vote on the UNGA resolution 
condemning the US embargo on Cuba, which is adopted annually by 
an overwhelming majority, EU members express their rejection of the 
extraterritorial effects of the measures, which they consider illegal.459 
This explanation contrasts with that of most countries from the Global 
South, which denounce the use of economic coercion in toto and call for 
the lifting of the embargo in solidarity with Havana. Stepping up efforts 
to contest the extraterritorial effects of sanctions would dovetail with 
the EU’s commitment to upholding the multilateral system, and display 
some continuity with the establishment of INSTEX. 
The open expression of disagreement could be complemented with 
additional measures. One such measure entails the activation of means of 
contestation, such as arbitration or judicial channels. An obvious avenue 
is the establishment of a panel at the WTO, an option resorted to when 
the US Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act. In the event, the dispute 
was resolved thanks to US President Clinton’s issuance of waivers for 
457 S. Lobell, N. Jesse & K. Williams (2015), “Why do Secondary States Choose to Support, Follow or Challenge?”, 
International Politics 52(2), pp. 146-162. 
458 ibid., p. 152.
459 EEAS, “EU Explanation of Vote: Resolution on the embargo imposed by the USA against Cuba”, New York, 
7 November 2019. For the resolution, see “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial 
embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, A/RES/61, https://undocs.org/en/A/
RES/61/11.
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European firms.460 However, the option of calling a WTO panel hardly 
appears practicable today: Firstly, the breadth of the security exception 
under GATT Art. XXI augurs dim prospects of success. When the WTO 
agreed to establish a dispute settlement panel to review the EU’s com-
plaint about the Helms-Burton law in 1996, the Clinton administration 
indicated that the US would refrain from taking part in the proceeding, 
arguing that Helms-Burton is based on foreign policy rather than com-
mercial concerns and therefore should not be judged in the WTO. The US 
position on the matter is unlikely to be different today, despite the fact 
that the recent panel ruling on Ukraine confirmed the broad scope of 
the XXI exception. Secondly, the possibility of redress in the event of a 
negative outcome is unavailable due to the US blockade on Appellate Body 
nominations.461 Thirdly, in view of the strained situation to which the WTO 
is currently subject, the issuing of a panel ruling likely to be disregarded 
by the US would constitute ‘the last nail in the organization’s coffin’.462
An alternative consists of responding to US action by replicating Wash-
ington’s approach activating similar means.463 France’s Economy and 
Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire recently proposed the establishment of a 
European agency comparable to the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (OFAC), an entity endowed with far-reaching competences and 
staffed with a two hundred-strong workforce.464 This could be matched 
with a reorganization of decision-making structures at the national level 
to bring together elements of tariff alteration and decision-making in 
security policy, facilitating the connection between both areas.465 
9.4. A POSSIBLE FUTURE: TARIFFS AS SANCTIONS
Equally worrying is the increasing employment of tariffs to obtain foreign 
policy objectives, although this practice has not affected Europe so far. 
The recurrent use by the Trump administration of tariffs for goals other 
460 K. Gerke (1997), “Unilateral Strains in Transatlantic Relations”, PRIF Report 47, Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main. 
461 T. Miles (2018), “U.S. blocks WTO judge reappointment as dispute settlement crisis looms”, Reuters, 27 
August.
462 P. Joannin (2019), “Quelles réponses européennes à l’extraterritorialité américaine?”, Question d’Europe 501, 
Institut Robert Schuman, Paris, 4 February. 
463 E. Geranmayeh & M. Lafont Rapnouil (2019), “Meeting the Challenge of Secondary Sanctions”, in M. Leonard 
& J. Shapiro (eds.), Strategic Sovereignty: How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, Berlin.
464 France24 (2018), “France urges Europe to push back against ‘unacceptable’ US sanctions on Iran”, 11 
May, https://www.france24.com/en/20180511-iran-france-usa-europe-business-push-back-against-
unacceptable-sanctions-nuclear-trump.
465 J. Hackenbroich & M. Leonard (2019), “Verteidigen wir Europa!”, 7 August, Die Zeit Nr.33/2019; M. Leonard 
& J. Shapiro (2019), Strategic Sovereignty: How Europe can regain the capacity to act, London: ECFR.
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than commercial defence departs from – if not contravenes – the use 
foreseen under the WTO framework as it conflates trade with security 
policy. President Trump threatened to impose a five percent tariff on all 
imported goods from Mexico unless it stopped the flow of undocument-
ed immigrants across their common border.466 Shortly after, he threat-
ened to raise tariffs on Guatemalan products in order to encourage its 
leadership to halt the transit of US-bound migrants.467 These threats were 
successful in eliciting the concessions they aimed for. In June 2019, bare-
ly a few weeks after the threat was issued, the US and Mexico agreed to 
stave off tariffs on Mexican goods in return for concessions on immigra-
tion.468 Similarly, Guatemala concluded an agreement with the US where-
by asylum seekers having transited through Guatemala on their way to 
the US would be returned to the country. Guatemalan President Morales 
admitted having caved in to Washington’s pressure. On the eve of the 
signature of the agreement in July 2019, President Morales justified his 
decision stating: “Thanks to the negotiations, it was possible to fend off 
dramatic sanctions for Guatemala, many of which are geared to hit the 
economy hard, like taxing remittances sent daily by our siblings, as well 
as the imposition of tariffs on our exports and of migration restrictions.” 469
In contrast to classical economic sanctions, the re-imposition of tariffs 
is not contemplated as a foreign policy sanction. This is not to say that 
tariffs had not been subject to any political uses before – they certainly 
had.470 Under the current WTO framework, which sets ceilings on tariffs 
applicable to non-military products, they have traditionally been used 
in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, tariffs are used as measures of commercial defence, which can 
be raised under the current WTO framework in order to respond to unfair 
practices such as dumping or subsidies, or to cope with an unexpected 
surge of foreign goods. Under these scenarios, the increase of tariffs be-
yond the stipulated ceilings obeys purely commercial considerations and 
can be effected only on a temporary basis, although the state wishing to 
adopt the measure must adhere to a number of rules.
466 A. Karnie, A. Swanson & M. Shear, (2019), “Trump Says U.S. Will Hit Mexico With 5% Tariffs on All Goods”, 
New York Times, 30 May. 
467 A. Laborde & J. Elías (2019), “Trump amenaza a Guatemala con aranceles para que acepte más solicitantes de 
asilo”, El País, 23 Julio.
468 M. Pengelly (2019), “Trump calls off tariffs after US-Mexico deal but Mnuchin says threat remains”, 
The Guardian, 8 June.
469 Original: “Por medio de las negociaciones también se evitan sanciones drásticas para Guatemala, muchas de 
ellas orientadas a golpear fuertemente la economía, como gravámenes a las remesas que diariamente envían 
nuestros hermanos, así como la imposición de aranceles a nuestros productos de exportación y restricciones 
migratorias”. 
470 Leading scholar David Baldwin classified the politically-motivated increase of tariffs as a sanction. See D. 
Baldwin (1985), Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
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Secondly, trade privileges offered to developing countries under the 
generalized scheme of preferences (GSP) could be withdrawn following 
the activation of pre-agreed conditionality clauses. The US and the EU 
operate similar schemes, alongside other advanced economies. Under this 
scheme, most products from developing countries are granted unilateral 
tariff reductions or duty-free access to the markets of the GSP-granting 
economy. Such preferences are subject to conditions that include re-
spect for fundamental rights, and may be withdrawn when severe and 
systematic breaches occur.471 Both the US and the EU have withdrawn 
preferences from Belarus and Myanmar in the past, and the EU recently 
suspended preferences for various Cambodian products on account of 
democratic backsliding in the country.472 As the preferences constitute 
a voluntary reduction of duties which is not contractually based, the 
withdrawal merely re-establishes normal trade flows. Therefore, it is not 
technically regarded as a sanction, although its effects are comparable to 
those of economic sanctions.473 Similarly, the US has previously contem-
plated withdrawing most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment from third 
countries on account of their poor human rights record.474 Washington 
repeatedly contemplated withdrawal of MFN status from China,475 and 
suspended it from Romania shortly before socialist rule ended.476 However, 
the Central American examples do not correspond to any of the standard 
options reviewed. 
9.5. CONCLUSION
This brief survey of the effects of recent US sanctions practice on Europe 
and Central America confirms the different treatment received by each 
of the regions in question. While Central American neighbors are threat-
ened with tariffs to compel their cooperation in halting a transnational 
phenomenon, European allies are penalized with secondary sanctions for 
471 For the text of the EU GSP regulation, see: Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0978&from=EN.
472 European Commission (2020), “Trade/Human Rights: Withdrawal of Cambodia’s preferential access to the 
EU market” – Factsheet, 12 February, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/february/tradoc_158631.
pdf.
473 C. Portela & J. Orbie (2014), “Sanctions under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP): Coherence 
by accident?”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 63-76.
474 The MFN status was renamed “permanent normal trade relations” (NTR) in US practice. 
475 S. Chan (2018), “Principle versus Profit: Debating Human Rights Sanctions”, Human Rights Review, vol. 19, 
no.1, pp. 45-71.
476 J. Hufbauer, G. Schott & K. Elliott (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edn., Institute for 
International Economics, Washington D.C. 
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their lack of endorsement of US sanctions against Washington’s targets. 
In these two regions, the readiness and the capability to respond are 
vastly at variance. US sanctions policy in Latin America tends to diverge 
from that applied elsewhere: Washington is almost the only actor that 
imposes sanctions against Latin American targets, and it does so more 
frequently than in any other region in the world.477 What our brief survey 
shows is that the quality of restrictions applied to them also differs. While 
the Southern neighbors of the US appear to have resigned themselves to 
pressure, acceding to Washington’s demands without resistance, Euro-
peans are slowly waking up to the fact that the privileged treatment they 
received in the past is waning, and that the vitality of the transatlantic 
partnership is increasingly in question. All in all, the interlocutors of the 
US find themselves in an uneasy situation: While none of the remedies 
available appears promising, failing to frame any sort of response incurs 
the risk of encouraging comparable behavior in future. Contestation of 
US policy could see the activation of legal means such as the WTO dispute 
settlement system. However, responses that emphasize opposition to US 
measures risk remaining futile while aggravating transatlantic tensions. 
By contrast, taking the opposite approach of replication, which would 
mark a U-turn in EU foreign policy, might undermine the international 
trade regime and discredit the EU as a supporter of multilateralism. 
This state of affairs carries implications for geo-political competi-
tion. The manipulation of tariffs to obtain foreign policy goals recently 
witnessed in US relations to Central American countries may have been 
the “testing ground” for sanction measures that Washington could apply 
elsewhere. If so, what is the likelihood that the EU might be targeted with 
similar tools? Despite the rather unusual character of US sanctions on Lat-
in America, the recent use of raising tariffs to achieve non-trade political 
objectives may spill over to US policy vis-à-vis other regions like Europe. 
It can also be replicated by other global powers, notably China and Russia. 
While the employment of sanctions by these powers remains sparse and is 
normally limited to their periphery, they may be tempted to extend their 
use beyond their respective neighborhoods. They could be encouraged 
to target Europe because Washington’s policy relaxed global inhibitions 
about the employment of tariffs as a means of obtaining foreign policy 
goals. In addition, European helplessness in the face of such attacks may 
invite such use. China and Russia are already under sanctions imposed 
by the EU, one of the most prolific sanctions senders in the world. Beijing 
has been under a European arms embargo since the Tiananmen Square 
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Snetkov & A. Wenger (eds.), Inter-organisational Relations in International Security: Cooperation and 
Competition, Abingdon: Routledge.
204    SEPTEMBER 2020
events, while Moscow has been at the receiving end of EU sanctions since 
its incursions into Ukraine in 2014, and already has sanctions against the 
EU in place. Beijing and Moscow could feel legitimized to employ the same 
tools piloted by Washington vis-à-vis the EU. The US may, intentionally 
or not, lead by example, and the ‘atypical’ may end up becoming ‘typical’ 
in the not too distant future.
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